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Preface
In 2014 the Nordic Research Council for Criminology commis-
sioned a working group on drug policies in the Nordic countries. 
A year later a report appeared, Drugs: What is the problem and 
how do we perceive it? Policies on drugs in Nordic countries. 
Already four years later, the Council felt the need for a further 
working group on drug policies in the Nordic countries, now 
with a specific question: Should there be a change in Nordic 
drug  policy? The reason behind the need of a new analysis is, of 
course, the fast-changing drug policies in several Western coun-
tries. Will the Nordic countries continue their relatively strict drug 
policies or will they adapt new policies when ‘the war on drugs’ is 
being challenged internationally?
The project has been most stimulating, not least the  comparisons 
between the Nordic countries that have led to reflections on the 
drug policy in each of the countries. The question formulated by 
the Council has, however, also been problematic to answer in a sat-
isfying way. The reason is the fast pace of change that takes place 
in the Nordic countries. Every change has meant updating and re-
writing the manuscript. We are aware that the book might already 
be history when it is published. But history has its own value.
We thank the Nordic Research Council for Criminology for a 
generous grant to the working group that also made open access 
publishing possible. We also want to thank the editorial commit-
tee and two anonymous reviewers for their high ambitions for the 
book, the copy-editor for most meticulous work and Stockholm 






In 1989, the German author Hans Magnus Enzensberger wrote 
an article about the heroes of the retreat. Statues of kings and gen-
erals who have bravely fought battles, sometimes winning, some-
times losing, can be seen in most large European cities. However, 
not much praise has been bestowed on those who organized the 
retreat of a lost campaign. In politics, this means negotiating, 
making compromises and showing compliance. This might even 
include violating your own earlier principles and admitting the 
ambivalence of a new situation. To take such a position is hard-
ly seen as heroic but, nevertheless, often as more important and 
healthier for society than the stand of the celebrated firm warrior 
(Enzensberger 1989).
Nils Christie took this article as a starting point for the applica-
tion for a research project. In the 1980s he had already, together 
with Kettil Bruun, written Den gode fiende (The Good Enemy), 
criticizing the repressive drug policies of the Nordic countries 
(Christie & Bruun 1985). Christie now wanted to study the drug 
policies in Norway and Sweden, but not their construction but 
rather their deconstruction. These two countries, both ‘hawks’ 
in European drug policy, were being criticized by other countries 
and had drug policies that did not deliver.
Christie was convinced that Norway and Sweden had to re-
vise their policies and retreat. If so, what forms would the retreat 
take? How would it be justified? Would the costs of the drug pol-
icy now be put forward as being too high? Would scapegoats be 
pointed out? Would organizations disappear or just reorganize, 
How to cite this book chapter:
Tham, Henrik. Introduction. In: Retreat or Entrenchment? Drug Policies 
in the Nordic Countries at a Crossroads, edited by Henrik Tham, 1–10. 
Stockholm: Stockholm University Press, 2021. DOI: https://doi.org/10.16993 
/bbo.a. License: CC BY 4.0.
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 re-interpreting the old policy? Or would there be no change – 
would the two countries just continue the war, e.g. stick to their 
old drug policies?
The research application did not get any funding, possibly be-
cause Christie was ahead of his time when the question was for-
mulated. Today the situation is different. A drug policy based on 
penal legislation, police and prisons has now even more clearly 
shown its limits. At the same time, the costs of violated legal prin-
ciples, police resources, imprisonment and suffering for the drug 
users have increased. The same development outside the Nordic 
sphere has caused a number of countries to rethink their drug 
policies. The question is then: Have the Nordic countries started a 
retreat, and if not, why?
In an analysis of a possible change in drug policies in the 
Nordic countries the prevelance of drugs and problematic use as 
well as existing penalty levels should be taken into  consideration. 
Depending on the situation, different policy reactions could be 
 expected. Some indicators can be compared to the situation in 
other countries. In the European School Survey project on Alcohol 
and Other Drugs (ESPAD 2015) the life-time prevalence of the use 
of cannabis in the Nordic countries is markedly below that of the 
other European countries. Last year prevalence of  cannabis use 
among adults, 15–34, in the Nordic countries was, on  average, 
about the same as in Europe as a whole. In all five Nordic  countries 
there has been an increase among young adults who use canna-
bis (Nordic Welfare Centre 2019a: 11). Problematic use cannot be 
compared due to lack of data. However, all the Nordic countries 
report high numbers of drug-related deaths (EMCDDA 2019).
The drug policies in the Nordic countries have been described 
as relatively repressive. Per Ole Träskman (2004) has noted how 
drug use has been reidentified from a medical problem to a crim-
inal problem, how consumption has been criminalized in most of 
the Nordic countries, and how police control of drug users has 
developed with the goal of being annoying and stressful. This de-
velopment also leads to an inconsistency in relation to the general 
criminal policy, whereby the Nordic countries have been charac-
terized by relative leniency and small prison populations (op. cit.). 
Sten Heckscher (1985) has pointed out that the punishment scales 
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for drug crimes were raised sharply in all the Nordic countries 
early on. In contrast to other crimes, where the lower part of the 
penalty scale is usually used for punishments, the whole scale was 
applied to drug crimes. The countries have also referred to each 
other when increasing the severity of sanctions and justified it in 
the name of Nordic harmonization (op. cit.).
In relation to the overall penalty scales in the Nordic coun-
tries the maximum penalties for drug crimes are high. The highest 
maximum is found in Norway, at 21 years, which is the maximum 
for any crime in the country. This doesn’t mean that Norwegian 
courts mete out the highest sentences among the Nordic countries. 
Such a comparison must be based on the data on actual punish-
ments for drug crimes of the same seriousness.
Some data for such a comparison can be found in a Nordic 
project on the general sense of justice, where data were collected 
in 2009 and 2013. The project included vignettes where persons in 
nationally representative samples indicated what sanctions they 
found appropriate after reading a description of a specific crime. 
The sanctions were chosen from a pre-formulated list. The same 
forms were sent to a panel of judges who, on the basis of the vi-
gnettes, were asked to indicate what they believed would be the 
sentence given in those cases. One of the vignettes concerned a 
young man who had smuggled 250g of heroin. The results from the 
evaluations of judges in the five countries are shown in Table 1. 
The highest penalties are meted out in Sweden, where the max-
imum sentence for a drug crime is 10 years. Denmark has the 
lowest penalties for the same crime among the Nordic countries.
Table 1. Judges’ assessments of the sanctions that would be awarded 
in connection with smuggling 250g of heroin in Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway and Sweden for an offender with no prior record 
in surveys in 2009 and 2013.
Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
5 years + X
3–5 years X X X
2–3 years X
Source: Balvig et al. 2015: 348; Olaussen 2013: 52 f.
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A study of the praxis of penalties for possession of cannabis 
has been carried out by the Nordic Welfare Centre (2019a). The 
figures are presented in Table 2. The data given are not always 
directly comparable. Sanctions will vary with the type of cannabis 
and if the lawbreaker is a previous offender. Some of the coun-
tries also have the possibility of issuing a caution as an alternative 
sanction. On the whole, the figures seem to reproduce the results 
in Table 1. Sweden has the highest fines for possession of small 
amounts of cannabis while Denmark has the lowest.
The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug 
Addiction (EMCDDA) supplies some comparisons of data on 
drug use and criminal justice reactions to drugs. Table 3 shows 
a somewhat higher consumption of cannabis, which is by far the 
most commonly used drug, in Denmark. Sweden and Iceland have 
the highest number of drug-related deaths. The high Icelandic fig-
ures can be attributed to an ongoing opioid crises and were pre-
viously lower. Finally, in the comparison of the number of drug 
crimes reported to the police, Sweden again is in the lead.
The Nordic countries also show both similarities and differ-
ences when it comes to other legally defined policies and practices 
concerning drugs. Table 4 shows that all the countries have syringe 
exchange programs and substitution programs. Only one coun-
try, Denmark, has a heroin maintenance program. For Iceland, 
such programs are not relevant since heroin consumption has not 
been a problem in the country. Denmark and Norway have super-
vised consumption rooms for self-administrated  injections, and 
Table 2. The size of fines for possession of cannabis in Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.
Denmark Hashish < 10 gram/marihuana < 50 gram €270
Finland Hashish < 10 gram/marihuana < 15 gram €420*
Iceland Cannabis 15 gram €700 
Norway Cannabis 15 gram (average) €600
Sweden Cannabis 15 gram €2000*
* Finland and Sweden use day fines, here converted to an amount based on 
median wage in 2017.
Source: Nordic Welfare Centre 2019a: 139 ff.; Borgeke & Månsson 
2018: 1120.
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 permission for such a practice was granted in Iceland in 2020. 
Denmark and Iceland have not criminalized use as such. Finland 
and Sweden are the only countries in 2021 that in practice sanc-
tion the use of cannabis. The fines are the same as that for the 
smallest possession, which in Finland is €420 and in Sweden is 
€880. Sweden is, however, the only one among the Nordic coun-
tries that uses body liquid tests to establish use.
A similar pattern emerges from the four tables. Denmark 
is  relatively more liberal in terms of harm reduction and penal 
sanctions, while Sweden occupies the opposite position with the 
Table 3. Cannabis use, reported drug crimes, and  drug-related 
deaths in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, 
2016–2018.
Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
Cannabis use, last 
year, 15/17–34, %
15.4 13.5 9.1 10.1 9.6
Drug deaths  
per 100 000
4.15 3.63 8.3 5.36 6.26
Reported drug 
crimes per 100 000
462 502 600 633 1004
Source: EMCDDA 2019; Iceland: cannabis use in 2017, 18–44 old and 
drug-related deaths; National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police 2020.
Table 4. The existence of different drug programs and penal  
practices in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.
Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
Substitution 
treatment
yes yes yes yes yes
Syringe exchange yes yes yes yes yes
Heroin maintenance yes no no no no
Supervised drug- 
consumption rooms
yes no yes yes no
Criminalization of 
consumption
no yes no yes yes
Body liquid tests no no no no yes
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 severest sanctions and most intrusive police practice. Other in-
dicators, particularly ‘the law in action’, might show a partially 
different picture, but here the pattern seems clear. These differ-
ences, both between the Nordic countries and in relation to other 
countries, provide the starting point for an analysis of the possi-
ble  retreat to a drug policy less marked by criminal control and 
more by treatment or non-intervention. If the countries are to re-
treat, they will retreat from different positions. Today’s positions 
have, however, not always been the same. The drug policies have 
changed over time and the development in the direction of an ex-
pansion or contraction of penal and other compulsory measures 
have not been unambiguous.
Chapters 2 to 6 give overviews of the development of drug 
 policies in the respective countries. The presentations cover, to 
different extents, indicators of recreational use and problematic 
use, police interventions, sentences and drug-related deaths. The 
indicators are discussed in relation to whether the drug policies 
can be judged as successful or not. The analyses show a  fluctuation 
of focus on the big shark and organized crime, and the user as 
the only indispensable link in the drug market pyramid. The drug 
user, in turn, has switched between a person who is seen as sick 
and in need of treatment and a criminal who is responsible for 
his drug use. There has, in the Nordic countries, been an increase 
in treatment for use of the most common drug, cannabis. The 
reason for this increase is, however, not obvious (Nordic Welfare 
Centre 2019b).
The different chapters also address the question of the actors in 
drug policy. Ultimately it is the political parties, and particularly 
those in government, that decide the policy. The policies, howev-
er, must be justified. References are made to the public, which is 
claimed to demand a strict control of drugs. Media plays an im-
portant role in describing a problem that most people do not have 
first-hand knowledge of. The police force is also a central actor in 
all the countries. An important role in the policy debates has been 
played by different non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – 
arguably a particularly strong agent in the Nordic context. These 
NGOs have, however, taken quite different positions, as have ex-
perts, civil servants and different professional groups.
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Part II contains five chapters from four of the countries deal-
ing with specific drug policy issues. The first study, Chapter 7, 
concerns Denmark, traditionally the most liberal of the Nordic 
countries when it comes to drug policy. Lately, there is a change 
in the direction of moralization of the drug user, not the one with 
a problematic use but the young, recreational user. This change 
is interpreted as a result of perceiving drug use in a neo-liber-
al framing. The drug user is seen as selfish, not regarding the 
 negative consequences of drug use in a wider sense while at the 
same time being able to make a choice to use or not to use drugs. 
In line with this new way of interpreting drug use, legislation has 
been sharpened.
The relatively strict Finnish drug policy is in the next study, 
Chapter 8, described as a paradox. After the Second World War, 
Finnish criminal policy, in terms of the use of prison, deviated 
from the other Nordic countries that had much lower levels of 
inmates. Finland set a goal to reduce the size of its prison popula-
tion, to mark its belonging to Western rather than Eastern Europe. 
This effort was successful, and Finland today resembles the other 
Nordic countries. However, in relation to the overall goal to liber-
alize Finnish criminal policy and reduce the use of imprisonment, 
drug policy developed in the opposite direction. 
The third special study in Chapter 9 concerns the possible 
change of drug policy in the direction of care and help for the 
drug user, illustrated by an analysis from Norway. The drug policy 
debate in the Nordic countries, as well as elsewhere, has focused 
on the question of punishment or treatment. Particularly for the 
Nordic welfare states, an approach of care would seem natural to 
put forward rather than a criminal, policybased control. An ab-
olitionist or non-interventionist policy, on the other hand, would 
seem unnatural. A treatment or welfare state approach to drugs 
can, however, be as controlling as a policy based on legal pun-
ishments. This is particularly important to observe in a situation 
where earlier drug policies based on criminal law are becoming 
criticized and where changes in the direction of a welfare-based 
policy is instead proposed.
Traditionally, the Nordic countries have had quite strict al-
cohol policies. This concern has now, however, ended up in the 
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 background, being replaced by the issue of drugs. The fourth of 
the special issues that are covered in Part II, Chapter 10, asks 
why the issue of two intoxicants, alcohol and narcotics, have been 
constructed so differently in Sweden. While narcotic drugs have 
led to increasing control, the control of alcohol has decreased. 
Different restrictions on the sale of alcohol are lifted and taxes are 
reduced. A prognosis is made about the future of drug policy in 
Sweden based on the development of alcohol policy – the market 
will ultimately decide.
The fifth and final of the chapters dealing with special issues, 
Chapter 11, is also a study from Sweden. It can be said to be con-
cerned with the question of an evidence-based drug policy. Three 
groups are interviewed: treatment staff, youth cannabis users and 
adult cannabis users. Representatives of the three groups discuss the 
risks of taking drugs. They all mobilize arguments for their stand-
points, including references to scientific studies, and arrive at quite 
different conclusions. Different perspectives clash and the position 
on drug policy becomes ‘a matter of concern rather than a matter 
of facts’. The study clearly shows the problem of arriving at a con-
sensus even when the most needed facts are brought into the issue 
of drug policy. That facts are used differently and selectively will, of 
course, have a bearing on the issue of a changing drug policy.
In the concluding Chapter 12, an attempt is made to draw 
the lines together. A clear prediction of the development of the 
drug polices of the Nordic countries will not be possible to make. 
Different and even contradictory developments are demonstrated, 
as well as differences between the five Nordic countries. What is 
quite clear, though, is that the situation is much more open than 
just a few years ago. The question that inspired this comparative 
project, ‘will there be a change in the Nordic drug policy?’, has 
clearly become relevant.
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2. Danish Drug Policy: Between Repression 
and Harm Reduction
Esben Houborg & Kim Møller
In a Nordic perspective, Danish drug policy has traditionally 
been considered to be fairly liberal (Bruun & Rosenqvist 1980; 
Moeller 2019). This has been due, among other things, to a de-
penalization of the possession of drugs for personal use between 
1969 and 2004, and early and extensive use of opioid substitu-
tion treatment (OST). However, in recent years this picture has 
become more complicated. On the one hand Danish drug pol-
icy has moved in a more repressive direction, but on the other 
hand, Denmark has also introduced two of the most controversial 
harm reduction measures: OST with heroin and drug consump-
tion rooms. It appears that priorities in Danish drug policy have 
become rather contradictory. In this chapter, we will discuss the 
recent developments in Danish drug policy with a perspective on 
the background of the history of modern Danish drug policy.
In this chapter we analyse Danish drug policy from the point of 
view of how it defines the drug user as a social citizen and, in close 
relation to this, how it affects the distribution of  drug-related 
harms and risks, and the responsibility for handling them.
Different drug policies and policy instruments affect 
 drug-related risks and how these risks are distributed in society 
(Mugford 1991; Benoit 2003). Some risks are intrinsic to specific 
drugs. Cannabis, heroin, and cocaine have different risk profiles. 
A drug policy that reduces the number of people who use these 
drugs will therefore minimize the number of people who are ex-
posed to these risks. However, risks are not just intrinsic. There 
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are also  extrinsic risks, which are caused not by the drugs but by 
the circumstances under which the drugs are used. How drug pol-
icy affects the conditions under which drugs are used will there-
fore either increase or decrease such extrinsic risks. Rigorously 
enforced drug prohibition will increase this type of risk, while 
harm reduction measures will reduce them. The risks and harms 
mentioned here are the ones that affect the drug user, but there are 
also risks and harms that affect those other than the drug users. 
Families, local communities, and societal institutions can also be 
harmed by the presence of illicit drugs and an illicit drug market. 
Drug policy can also reduce the risks of such indirect harms in dif-
ferent ways. Making controlled substances legally available can, 
for example, reduce certain types of organized crime, depending 
on the specific way this is done. It should therefore be apparent 
that drug policy involves a number of not just technical decisions, 
but also political priorities about which harms to reduce and 
which trade-offs to accept in terms of increasing the potential for 
other harms and exposing parts of the population to such risks.
Drug Policy and Social Citizenship
Benoit (2003) argues that the way a state’s drug policy addresses 
drug-related risks may be influenced by the way it addresses oth-
er socio-economic risks such as illness and unemployment. With 
reference to welfare-regime theory (Esping-Andersen 1990), she 
argues that some states make it an individual responsibility to 
manage and bear the costs of socio-economic risks, while others, 
to different extents, make it a collective responsibility. A residual 
welfare state like the one in the USA, where the responsibility 
for managing socio-economic risks is, to a large degree, delegated 
to individuals and families, will, according to Benoit, also tend to 
individualize drug-related risks. On the other hand, welfare states 
like the Nordic welfare states, where the responsibility for manag-
ing socio-economic risks is, to a large extent, collective, will also 
tend to collectivize drug-related risks.
The way that drug policy distributes drug-related risks, and the 
costs of reducing such risks, can be seen to be part of the prac-
tices that define and give form and content to social citizenship. 
According to Turner (1993), citizenship can be defined as ‘the set 
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of practices (juridical, political, economic, and cultural) which 
define a person as a competent member of society, and which as 
a consequence shape the flow of resources to persons and social 
group’ (op.cit. p. 2). Citizenship involves two dimensions: the 
constitution of social membership and the allocation of resources 
within a population. These two dimensions are affected by the 
drug control policy (drug legislation and its enforcement) and the 
prevention, treatment, and harm reduction policies of a country. 
Does drug policy criminalize the drug user and constitute him or 
her as a deviant? Does it recognize risks related to drug use and, 
if so, to which extent does it do so? Does it, for example, recog-
nize risks associated with being an active drug user by providing 
different kinds of harm reduction measures? The association be-
tween drug policy and citizenship is not unfamiliar in drug policy 
analysis. Some analyses, for example, associate harm reduction 
with new public health as a way to promote a neo-liberal, health 
conscious, and self-responsible citizen (Fomiatti, Moore, & Fraser 
2019; Tammi and Hurme 2007), while others have seen drug pol-
icies as both promoting and restricting social citizenship (Benoit 
2003; Houborg & Bjerge 2011; Houborg, Søgaard, & Mogensen, 
2020). Therefore, when we analyse Danish drug policy we will 
study how different drug policy initiatives have affected the rights 
and obligations of drug users; the extent to which such initiatives 
have served as mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion of drug us-
ers; and how they have influenced drug users’ access to resources.
1950s: The Birth of Modern Danish Drug Policy  
and Criminalisation of Drug Users
In the following sections we will present a history of Danish drug 
policy based on previous research and historical sources. In the 
appendix we provide a table of the sources.
Modern Danish drug policy can be said to have been born in 
1955 when the Danish parliament passed the law on euphoriant 
substances (lov om euforiserende stoffer). This legislation made 
possession of illicit drugs for personal use a criminal offence in 
Denmark. Previously, criminal and administrative sanctions were 
only aimed at regulating the supply of drugs, mainly through the 
regulation of doctors and chemists. During the Second World 
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War and its immediate aftermath, the first drug scene devel-
oped in Denmark when groups of mainly marginalized people in 
Copenhagen started to buy, sell, and use drugs that were procured 
from criminal activities like prescription fraud and burglaries. The 
white paper that was the basis for the new legislation distinguished 
the members of this drug scene from people who got addicted to 
drugs, mainly morphine, after receiving medical  treatment. This 
old group of drug-dependent people were called ‘morphinists’, 
while the new group of drug users were called ‘euphomaniacs’ be-
cause they were seen to have developed a taste for the intoxicating 
effects of drugs rather than self-medicating. Another  difference 
was that drug users were no longer isolated individuals who main-
ly used drugs as self-medication because of what was seen to be 
physical dependence or mental defects, but a social phenomenon 
that grew out of the seediest parts of the city’s vice and bar dis-
tricts (Indenrigsministeriet 1953). Furthermore, the new phenom-
enon was seen to be contagious because  experienced drug users 
would introduce novices to drugs, in part to create new avenues 
to get access to drugs (Indenrigsministeriet 1953; Jepsen 1966). 
This was part of the reason why drug users for the first time came 
to the attention of the criminal justice system, in the form of the 
vice police. Another reason was that drugs were mainly procured 
through criminal activities. The new phenomenon was considered 
to be a problem, to the extent that in 1949 a drug unit was es-
tablished under the health (and vice) police in Copenhagen. This 
unit started a register for these ‘euphomaniacs’, with around 300 
persons included on the register in 1950.
Drug use was, therefore, associated with crime for the first 
time and became an issue for the criminal justice system in 
Denmark. However, because the drug legislation did not crimi-
nalize  possession of drugs for personal use, the police lacked the 
tools to control the new drug scene, particularly because they 
found it difficult to make cases against distributors. The fear was 
that the lack of proper tools would lead to more organized drug 
 trafficking. For this reason, the police wanted to be able to raise 
drug cases against drug users, not to criminalize drug users but to 
make cases against distributors (Indenrigsministeriet 1953: 124f). 
This may also be the reason why drug use was not criminalized, 
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only possession for personal use was. The intention of the legis-
lators to use criminalization of drug users mainly to criminalize 
distributers was stated in the preliminary legislative work, which 
came to have important consequences for later developments of 
Danish drug policy. The drug legislation from 1955 made it pos-
sible to sentence offenders to up to two years imprisonment, but 
in law enforcement practice imprisonment would not be used in 
cases that only concerned possession for personal use (Jepsen 
1966). But the new legislation did provide police in Copenhagen 
with legal instruments that made it possible to control the new 
drug scene (Jepsen 2008). However, in practice, the drug policy 
was more nuanced, because while the ‘euphomaniancs’ were crim-
inalized and registered by the police, ‘morphinists’ were registered 
by the health authorities and this group was mainly controlled by 
the medical system. In other words, underclass drug users were 
constituted as ‘criminals’ while middle- and upper-class drug users 
were constituted as patients (Jepsen 2008: 156). The policy con-
stituted and handled the drug problem as two limited problems. 
First, the development of ‘euphomania’ in a particular anomic 
social environment in Copenhagen that could be controlled by 
the police. Second, the development of ‘morphinism’ among peo-
ple who were mentally and/or emotionally disposed to becoming 
dependent on drugs, which could be reduced by controlling the 
medical system. In both cases drug users were constituted as devi-
ant. The drug policy was mainly designed to control and contain 
these rather marginal forms of deviancy in Danish society.
1960s and 1970s: A Dual Track Drug Policy – 
Decriminalization of Drug Users
From the early 1960s a new drug phenomenon started to emerge 
in Denmark that differed from the known ‘morphinists’ and ‘eu-
phomaniacs’. This involved young people who used cannabis. It 
was at first mainly associated with the ‘youth rebellion’, but lat-
er also as a more mainstream phenomenon. The new phenome-
non was called ‘youth-euphomania’ or ‘youth-narcomania’, and 
in 1968 an advisory board of experts was established called the 
‘Committee on youth-narcomania’ to advice the government on 
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the issue. This committee initiated the production of knowledge 
about the new phenomenon, mainly through surveys of drug use 
among young people in different parts of the country, often pop-
ulations of young people attending school or other kinds of ed-
ucation. Outside the committee the new drug phenomenon also 
became the topic for more theoretically based sociological and 
criminological research (Manniche, Holstein, & Boolsen 1972a; 
1972b; Ulff-Møller 1971; Ulff-Møller & Jørgensen 1972; Voss 
& Ziirsen 1971; Winsløw & Holstein 1972). The studies showed 
an increase in young peoples’ exposure to drugs, experimentation 
with drugs, and use of drugs. From 1968 to 1970 the proportion 
of young people who participated in school surveys that had tried 
cannabis increased from little over 10% to around one fourth, 
regular use of drugs had risen from 1% to 4%, and while less than 
one in four had been in favour of cannabis legalisation in 1968, 
it was a little under half in 1970 (Jepsen 2008; Storgaard 2000).
‘The young drug user’ also started to appear in the different 
institutions that dealt with young people and drug users: the child 
and youth care services, the psychiatric system, and the prison 
system. Within these institutions, the young drug users constitut-
ed a type of client, patient, or prisoner that they had never seen 
before, and for which they were neither epistemologically nor 
methodologically, and particularly not culturally, prepared to deal 
with. As a consequence, both public and private drug treatment 
institutions for young people started to develop, which soon be-
came a new and specialized drug treatment system in Denmark 
(Houborg 2008). This system, sanctioned by the majority of the 
parties in the Danish parliament, was based on an understanding 
of drug use as a symptom of other social problems and of malad-
aptation to society. Drug treatment would involve resocialization 
and social rehabilitation, but the main instrument to reduce drug 
demand would be a social welfare policy that would, more broad-
ly, prevent drug experimentation and the development from drug 
experimentation to problematic drug use (Houborg 2006, 2008; 
Kontaktudvalget 1969, 1970).
The surveys and the ideas governing the treatment system con-
stituted young people as being exposed to drugs through their 
social networks, and drug experimentation as being determined 
by micro and macro social processes. Drug use was not as much a 
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consumption choice as it was a product of being a young person 
in contemporary Danish society. Drug use was no longer some-
thing that developed in a particular anomic social environment or 
something that mainly involved mentally and emotionally afflict-
ed individuals. Rather, it was a practice that developed in the nor-
mal social environments and through the normal social relations 
among young people in Denmark.
In 1968, the government proposed new drug legislation to pre-
vent organized crime developing on the market for illicit drugs. 
This was partly due to pressure from Norway and Sweden that 
Denmark needed to introduce a stricter drug policy to match the 
development in these countries (Jepsen 2008; Storgaard 2000). 
With this background, a new section was added to the penal code 
(§191) that would mean imprisonment for up to six years for vi-
olations of the drug legislation involving professional distribution 
and trafficking of drugs. However, during the political process 
in the parliament, a policy of depenalization of drug users and 
a differentiation between cannabis and ‘hard’ drugs was intro-
duced to accompany the new legislation (Houborg 2008; Jepsen 
2008). This policy outlined that the attorney general would issue 
a  circular (no. 144 of 15/7 1969) that instructed the police and 
prosecution, as a main rule, not to initiate criminal proceedings 
that involved possession of illicit drugs for personal use. Were 
such proceedings initiated the main rule should be to limit the 
sanction to a caution and confiscation of the drug. The idea that 
drug use was socially determined played an important role in the 
development of this policy, along with reference to the legisla-
tive process when the Law on euphoriant substances was enacted 
where criminalization of drug users was defined not as an end in 
itself, but as a means to stop drug distribution.
The day that the parliament passed the new drug legislation 
it also debated Danish drug policy in general. One of the issues 
raised in this debate was whether or not to legalize cannabis. A 
majority of the members of parliament did not outright dismiss 
the idea. Rather, it was decided that in two years’ time, in 1971, 
parliament should revisit the issue when hopefully more knowl-
edge was available (Storgaard 2000). In 1971, when the issue was 
revisited, parliament decided to maintain the prohibition against 
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cannabis. However, at the same time parliament confirmed the 
policy of depenalization of drug users.
The drug policy that was developed during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s can be said to be a ‘dual track’ drug policy 
(Hakkarainen, Tigerstedt, & Tammi 2007), where the criminal 
justice system should reduce drug supply while the social welfare 
system, including the new drug treatment system, should reduce 
drug demand. This policy was based on the idea that drug use 
and drug problems were not something ‘alien’ to Danish society 
but were a ‘normal social problem’ (Grapendaal, Leuw, Nelen, 
& Nelen 1995; Houborg 2006; Leuw 1991), that is, something 
that had structural causes, particularly associated with social 
and cultural change and the social conditions of certain groups 
of children and young people in Denmark. For the majority of 
parliament, this came with concerns about the potential exclu-
sionary and alienating consequences of a policy of criminalization 
in relation to the many ‘normal’ young people who experimented 
with drugs. The state therefore collectivized much of the responsi-
bility for reducing drug demand and, rather than excluding drug 
users, the drug policy aimed to include drug users in society by 
addressing the social problems that caused drug use. It is, how-
ever, important to note that the policy aimed at use reduction, 
not harm reduction. This means that reducing the risks associated 
with active drug use was not included in the drug policy as public 
responsibility. Harm reduction did not become a part of Danish 
drug policy until the 1980s.
1980s: Introducing Harm Reduction, 1990s: Increase  
in Drug Use
The most significant development in Danish drug policy 
during the 1980s was the introduction of the idea of harm reduc-
tion in 1984 – although this concept was not used, ‘graduated 
goals’ treatment goals were used instead (Houborg 2006). During 
the 1970s and early 1980s a growing number of problematic 
drug users could not, or would not, make use of the social treat-
ment institutions that had been developed during the 1960s 
and 1970s. These institutions conducted abstinence-oriented 
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psycho-social treatment, but an increasing number of ‘older’ drug 
users found the treatment paternalistic or could not meet the re-
quirements (abstinence) for receiving treatment. A consequence of 
this was an increasing number of older, untreated drug users, who 
instead became a growing part of the population of institutions 
for homeless people and other institutions for socially marginal-
ized people.
Since the early 1970s methadone had been a contested is-
sue in Danish drug policy. Some drug users, their relatives, and 
some doctors argued that methadone maintenance treatment 
should become part of the drug treatment system. But the drug 
treatment system and drug experts, including the committee 
on  youth-narcomania, rejected this as medicalization of a so-
cial problem (Houborg 2006, 2013). As a consequence, a kind 
of dual treatment system developed: drug-free public treatment 
and medical private treatment provided by general practitioners. 
In 1984 the Alcohol and Narcotics Council (which has replaced 
the committee on youth-narcomania) issued the report ‘At møde 
mennesket hvor det er …’ [To meet the person where they are at] 
(a quote from Kirkegaard) (Narkotikarådet 1984) as a response 
to the growing number of untreated (older) drug users who were 
increasingly affected by severe medical, mental, and social prob-
lems. The report recommended that the treatment system should 
provide services for these drug users, even if they continued to 
use drugs. Rather than only aiming for abstinence, the treatment 
system should work with ‘graduated goals’, which meant that it 
should work towards improvements in all aspects of the clients’ 
social, medical, and mental situation, or prevent these areas from 
worsening. The Council said:
Drug abusers who do not feel an immediate need to stop the [drug] 
abuse [misbruget] – or who are not capable of doing it at a par-
ticular moment of time – should not fall outside the help of the 
treatment system. The treatment options should therefore not only 
aim at ‘curing’ the [drug] abuse, but also provide rehabilitating 
measures while the [drug] abuse goes on. 
(Narkotikarådet 1984: 133)
One of the instruments for doing this could be methadone mainte-
nance treatment. The policy change that the Alcohol and Narcotics 
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Council proposed required that Danish drug policy, and hence the 
Danish state, would take responsibility for mitigating some of 
the risks and harms associated with the lifestyle of a marginalized 
active drug user. In effect, the policy would mean extending the 
meaning and content of social citizenship for this part of the pop-
ulation by giving them access to new and more societal resources.
The new policy was met with scepticism by the drug treat-
ment system and may not have been implemented if the HIV 
and AIDS crisis a few years later had not changed the parame-
ters for drug policy discourse in Denmark. With the advent of 
HIV/AIDS, drug use through injection was no longer mainly a 
risk for drug users but became a public health risk for the entire 
population. For this reason, the Alcohol and Narcotics Council 
increased its efforts to roll out methadone treatment in Denmark. 
This was done, partly, by issuing new methadone guidelines that 
were much less  restrictive than the previous ones (Narkotikarådet 
1988). However, this being said, it is important to have in mind 
that the introduction of harm reduction thinking in Denmark did 
not originally rest on public health concerns about reducing the 
risks associated with HIV/AIDS, but on a broader social welfare 
goal of  providing care for a marginalized part of the Danish pop-
ulation. With these changes to Danish drug policy the state took 
responsibility for reducing and ameliorating some, but not all, of 
the risks and harms associated with being an active drug user in 
Denmark. One of the conditions for receiving methadone main-
tenance treatment was, for example, that the client did not use 
illegal drugs. If the client used illegal drugs, he or she could be 
expelled from drug treatment.
With regard to the other policy elements, the basic configuration 
of Danish drug policy as a ‘dual track’ policy was  maintained. In 
the 1980s no new initiatives were introduced in relation to  ‘minor’ 
drug offences (possession with intent of distribution and posses-
sion for personal use under the law on euphoriant substances). In 
relation to drug trafficking, the 1980s and 1990s saw the imple-
mentation of a number of initiatives that would give the police 
access to various ‘untraditional’ investigative tools (wiretapping, 
use of agents). During the years before the 1980s the number of 
less serious cases under the Law on euphoriant substances had 
been declining, while the number of more serious cases under the 
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penal code had been increasing. However, from 1980 the number 
of ‘minor’ cases started to increase, continuing to increase during 
most of the 1980s and until the early 1990s, when there was a de-
cline. The reason for the increase during the 1980s may have been 
that the police allocated more resources to drug law enforcement 
(Storgaard 2000; Jepsen 2008).
Drug law offenses are not registered by type of drug (Mounteney 
et al. 2016), but the composition of police seizures provide an in-
dication. From 2000–2016, amphetamine seizures have amount-
ed to around 12% of seizures, cannabis resin (hash) about 60%, 
cocaine around 12%, and heroin around 5% (Moeller 2019).
The increase during the early 1990s, and the decline that fol-
lowed, may be attributed to targeted police efforts against drug 
scenes in Denmark, particularly at Vesterbro in Copenhagen. 
In 1990 the Copenhagen police department introduced a 
 stress-strategy against the open drug scene at Vesterbro. However, 
in 1994 the Minister for Justice intervened and had the attorney 
general issue a statement that affirmed the depenalization poli-
cy from 1969 (Storgaard 2000: 149). This led to a decline in the 
number of cases (see Figure 1). 
We thus see how the police challenged the dual track policy 
by increasing their activities against minor drug law violations, 
but also that this resulted in a political reaffirmation of the basic 
Figure 1. Criminal sanctions for violation of the Law on euphoriant 
substances 1980–2017. 
Source: Statistics Denmark, Statistikbanken Table: STRAF40.
Note: It is not possible to separate cases involving possession and cases 
involving distribution under the Law on euphoriant substances.
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ideology of Danish drug policy as it had been established during 
the 1960s and 1970s.
During the 1990s a number of legislative initiatives were im-
plemented in relation to drug distribution, the most important of 
which was was the ‘pusher act’ (1996), which made it easier to 
sanction street dealers and expel foreign nationals for even minor 
drug law violations (Jepsen 2008).
Like all other western countries, Denmark saw an increase of 
drug consumption during the 1990s, followed by a stabilization of 
the prevalence rates from 2000 to the 2010s (see Tables 5 and 6). 
Compared with European levels, Danes have a high lifetime prev-
alence (‘ever’), but a past year prevalence close to the average 
European level (EMCDDA 2017).
This increase was primarily for cannabis prevalence, but the 
introduction of a series of new amphetamine-like substances 
spurred further worry of a ‘normalization’ of illicit drug use and 
cultural accommodation (Parker et al. 1999).
During the early 1990s Denmark saw a sharp increase in the 
number of drug-related deaths (it has remained at this high lev-
el since then) (see Figure 2). From 115 drug-related deaths in 
1990, the number rose to 188 in 1991, before rising even further 
during the following years to 268 in 1996 (Schmidt 1997: 135).
Explanations that have been put forward for this include high-
er lethality among problematic drug users and purer and cheaper 
drugs (Schmidt 1997). This situation led to discussions and in-
creasing demands to introduce harm reduction measures, such as 
OST with heroin and drug consumption rooms. These discussions 
continued into the 2000s.
2000s: Criminalization and Harm Reduction
The 2000s has seen a rather contradictory development of Danish 
drug policy. On the one hand, harm reduction policy was expand-
ed with the introduction of maintenance treatment for heroin in 
2008 and drug consumption rooms in 2012. This was the con-
tinuation of a development that began in the 1980s, with more 
and more risks associated with being an active drug user having 
been collectivized by offering public services. On the other hand, 
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in 2004, an amendment of the Law on euphoriant substances 
 repealed the policy of depenalization of drug users by making 
all possession of illegal drugs subject to punishment (except in 
special cases, which we return to). This meant that Danish drug 
policy, in part, turned away from the ‘dual track’ policy, whereby 
the social welfare system should reduce drug demand while the 
criminal justice system should reduce drug supply.
Various developments led to this policy change. The most im-
portant reason given was concern about a high level of consump-
tion of both alcohol and illegal drugs among young people in 
Denmark compared with young people in other European coun-
tries. The policy change should, however, also be seen in the con-
text of more general political strategy that aimed to  ‘responsibilize’ 
the citizens and which included a stricter criminal justice policy. 
In the government whitepaper that accompanied the new policy 
it clearly expressed that the government wanted to send a signal 
that the use of illicit drugs was a criminal offence and that there 
were ‘legal consequences’ to violating the law (Houborg, Søgaard, 
& Mogensen 2020).
Figure 2. Drug-related deaths in Denmark, 1981–2017.
Source: Sundhesstyrelsen (2018b).
Note: Based on the definition of a drug-related death from National Police: 
Any death where drugs were involved. This definition includes overdoses 
and other incidents, such as traffic accidents with fatal outcome,  
suicides, and homicides, where drugs were involved.
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Through this policy, and the way it was ideologically framed, 
a new way of defining drug demand was articulated that  differed 
from the definition that had been the basis for the dual track  policy. 
Drug demand was now defined as partly a ‘moral’  problem and 
not, as it had previously been, as a ‘social’ problem. This meant 
that consumption of illicit drugs was now, to a larger  extent, de-
fined as a deliberate choice by the drug user and, to a lesser extent, 
seen as being structurally mediated, as it had been previously. Even 
if the policy change could be seen as an attempt to maintain a co-
herent drug policy in a situation with more drug users (Moeller 
2019), it should not be ignored that it was also an ideological 
change of how the relationship between drug users and the state 
was defined and how drug users were defined as citizens.
The introduction of zero tolerance has meant an increase of 
criminal sanctions for violating the Law on euphoriant substanc-
es (see Figure 1). The decrease in 2007 is most likely caused by a 
large reform of the Danish Police that took place that year. After 
the introduction of zero tolerance, the proportion of cases that 
are settled with a caution has, as would be expected, decreased 
significantly, from 30% of the cases before 2004 to 1–2% after 
2004 (see Tables 7 and 8) (Houborg & Pedersen 2013).
These figures show how Danish drug policy during the 2000s 
has become significantly more punitive than it used to be, and 
suggest the end of a more ‘purely’ defined ‘dual track’ policy.
There is, however, one important exception from the punitive 
approach in the new policy. This involves people who are depen-
dent on drugs and who, at the same time, have very few economic 
means (in effect, live on social assistance, early retirement pen-
sion, and the like). Such persons can still be let off with a caution. 
It is not completely clear from the law preparation work and the 
parliamentary debate why this exception was made. There were 
arguments that such drug users would not be able to pay fines and 
would then have to be imprisoned instead, at huge costs to Danish 
society. There were also arguments that their drug use was not (no 
longer) the result of a choice but was caused by their dependence, 
for which reason they should not be held legally accountable like 
non-dependent drug users.
In practice, the continued depenalization of ‘poor and addicted’ 
drug users has not been fully realized. Research conducted at the 
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Table 7. Number of possession cases and how they have been  
settled, 2002–2008.
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number 
of cases
6440 7263 8087 11,293 12,531 9342 10,103
Sanction 61% 63% 76% 94% 94% 94% 93%




9% 7% 6% 5% 4% 5% 5%
Source: Houborg & Pedersen (2013).
Table 8. Number of possession cases and how they have been  
settled, 2009–2013.
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of cases 10,321 9889 12,037 13,515 13,447
Sanction 93% 92% 93% 94% 95%
Caution 2% 2% 2% 1% 1%
Acquittal/ charges 
dropped
6% 6% 5% 4% 4%
Source: Houborg & Pedersen (2013).
Centre for Alcohol and Drug Research has shown that this cate-
gory of drug users is punished almost to the same extent as other 
drug users. The research compared convicted drug users who re-
ceived social assistance or early retirement pension, and who were 
receiving, or had received, drug treatment, with other convicted 
drug users.1
 1 This was how the target group for receiving cautions for ‘social causes’ 
was constructed in the research project, where drug treatment or drug 
treatment history was used as proxy for being drug dependent. But of 
course, it is not all drug users who are dependent on drugs – and who are 
‘poor’ – who receive drug treatment. This means that the target group for 
cautions is larger than the one in the research project.
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Table 9. How cases involving persons receiving social assistance or 
early retirement benefit and who had been in drug treatment were 
settled, 2002–2008.
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Number of cases of 
persons receiving 
social assistance 
or early retirement 
benefit and who 
had been in drug 
treatment 
854 970 1167 1538 1617 1057 1295
Fine 71% 73% 80% 88% 89% 88% 84%
Suspended sentence 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 2%
Caution 19% 16% 12% 3% 4% 4% 9%
Acquittal/charges 
dropped
7% 8% 6% 6% 5% 5% 5%
Source: Houborg & Pedersen (2013).
Discussion and Conclusion
Drug policy involves political priorities about the distribution 
of risks and costs associated with the presence of psychoactive 
substances in society. Closely related to this it also involves how 
drug users are defined as social citizens. Different drug policies 
involve different trade-offs with regards to risks, costs, and social 
membership. It is important for the development of drug policy 
that these political, and hence also ideological, dimensions of drug 
policy become explicit.
When looking at the development of Danish drug policy since 
the 1960s, it becomes apparent how drug policy reflects historical 
changes of the political rationalities that have dominated welfare 
and penal policy.
When addressing the new drug problem of the 1960s, the drug 
policy was dominated by a political rationality that also informed 
the development of the welfare state at the time. The drug  problem 
was defined as a normal social problem that should be addressed 
like other social problems, through social welfare policy. It was 
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an integrative drug policy that aimed to prevent young people 
becoming part of drug using subcultures and help individuals who 
had become part of such subcultures to leave them and become 
part of normal society. The policy explicitly rejected the criminal-
ization of drug users because this was seen to work against the 
social integration of drug users in society.
The development of harm reduction as part of Danish drug 
policy during the 1980s can be seen as an anticipation of a more 
general development in Danish social welfare policy that started 
during the late 1980s. This development involved coming up with 
alternatives to the idea of social integration through normaliza-
tion in the face of what came to be defined as ‘social exclusion’. 
During the 1980s, it had become apparent that not all citizens 
benefited from normalizing treatment and social rehabilitation, 
and would instead live socially marginalized lives excluded from 
the institutions that were meant to help them. From the late 
1980s, new methods and institutions were developed that aimed 
to provide differentiated services to socially excluded groups, 
with the aim of improving their everyday lives. The introduction 
of ‘graduated goals’ in Danish drug policy in 1984 can be seen as 
part of this development. With it, new resources were allocated to 
the most marginalized drug users in Denmark, including access 
to methadone maintenance treatment, which previously had been 
very restricted because it was not seen to work towards social 
integration through normalization. With the graduated goals the 
Danish state took responsibility for addressing some of the risks 
and harms that were associated with being an active drug user in 
Denmark. From a drug policy point of view, it is significant that 
this introduction of harm reduction in Denmark was not mainly 
based on a public health ambition about reducing the spread of 
contagious diseases (HIV/AIDS), but on an ideology of care for a 
marginalized group in society.
The re-penalization of drug users in 2004 happened in a  context 
where responsibilization of citizens was an important political 
goal and during a period where ‘governing through crime’ (Simon 
2007) became an important governmental rationality. This meant 
that increasing emphasis was put on the moral habitus of citi-
zens as autonomous and responsible individuals, and less on how 
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social and structural conditions can influence how people act. 
During this period, criminal sanctions were increased. For exam-
ple, parallel to the recriminalization of people who used illegal 
drugs, new sanctions were also introduced against violence near 
nightlife venues. The criminalization of drug users can be seen as 
the introduction of an exclusionary element in Danish drug poli-
cy that had previously been refrained from. The political rhetoric 
that accompanied the new legislation clearly signalled that pun-
ishment should delimit acceptable and non-acceptable behaviour 
in Danish society. In this way, the new policy introduced practices 
that did not include drug users, but rather excluded drug users as 
competent members of society.
This development can be seen as an articulation of a neo-liber-
al ideology (O’Malley 1999). But what about the introduction of 
controversial harm reduction measures like OST for heroin and 
drug consumption rooms? The introduction of these measures did 
expand the drug-related risks that the state defined as a collective 
responsibility to handle. These measures, particularly drug con-
sumption rooms, could be seen as measures that included the ac-
tive drug user as an active drug user in society as a social citizen.
In this way, we see both excluding and including tendencies 
in Danish drug policy at the same time. This may, however, not 
be as contradictory as it seems because, as numerous research-
ers have shown, harm reduction can be seen as being informed 
by a neo-liberal ideology (Farrugia 2014; Fraser & Moore 2008; 
Moore 2004; Moore & Fraser 2006). Harm reduction has been 
an important and empowering development for drug users. They 
are no longer defined as passive victims of drug-related harms and 
passive clients of expert interventions – they have become active, 
responsible, and autonomous agents in the management of risk. 
However, researchers have also pointed out that this empower-
ment can come with a price in two ways. First, particular norma-
tive assumptions about what constitutes good health and a re-
sponsible citizen in relation to health. Second, narrow definitions 
of the determinants of health, where focus is on the actions of the 
individual and the immediate environment of such actions, and 
not the more general social and structural conditions that affect 
the health and welfare of citizens.
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A distinction is sometimes made between harm reduction as 
a specific measure aimed at the reduction of particular harms, 
such as overdoses, HIV, Hepatitis, or other health harms, and 
harm reduction as a more general public health rationality that in-
forms policy, for example, drug control policy. A number of coun-
tries have embedded public health into the foundation of their 
drug policies. This is not the case in Denmark. Successive gov-
ernments have maintained the zero-tolerance drug control policy 
along with the harm reduction policy described. The history of 
Danish drug policy shows that public health is not the only path 
to drug policy reform. It is also possible, not as an alternative but 
as a supplement, to revisit the broader welfare policy ambitions 
that were used to inform drug policy in a much more prominent 
way than they do today.
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3. Drug Use, Public Debate and Increasing 
Pressures for a Drug Policy Reform  
in Finland
Pekka Hakkarainen & Heini Kainulainen
Introduction
In Finland, drug control was included in the criminal law for the 
first time at the beginning of the 1970s, when the 1972 Narcotics 
Act was enacted. In the Parliament, the government bill for a new 
legislation created a fierce political debate on drug policy, espe-
cially on the issue of whether or not the use of drugs should be a 
punishable offence (Hakkarainen 1999; Kainulainen 2009). In the 
government bill, the use of drugs was not proposed to constitute 
a criminal offence, but the Parliament Legal Affairs Committee 
recommended criminalization. The Commerce Committee sup-
ported the government’s stand, whereas the Grand Committee – 
after drawing lots – decided to support the recommendation of 
the Legal Affairs Committee.
Among the MPs, opinions regarding the criminalization of 
drug use largely divided along the axis between the political right 
and left (Hakkarainen 1992). The left opposed criminalization, 
considering the drug problem to be a consequence of other social 
problems, and, rather than a criminal, saw a drug user as a sick 
person needing help and treatment. Supporters of criminalization 
stressed that the Parliament should show young people that drug 
use is not accepted by society. The criminalization of drugs was, 
then, seen as a preventive measure and it was believed that the 
risk of punishment would deter young people from experimenting 
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with drugs. In the crucial vote in the Parliament, the government 
bill was defeated by 92–80 votes, and the use of drugs was defined 
as a narcotics offence.
The time period from the 1960s to the beginning of the 
1970s was characterized by active and relatively open political 
 discussion about drug policy, but when the basic lines of policy 
were debated and drawn the criticism of the criminalization poli-
cy suddenly disappeared, even among the leftist parties. Instead of 
active discussion, political parties and politicians took a cautious 
and reluctant attitude towards any drug policy discussion other 
than that supporting current criminal control policy and the work 
of the police.
In the 1980s, Nils Christie and Kettil Bruun, in their well-known 
book Den gode fiende. Narkokapolitik i Norden (1985), pro-
posed radical changes in Sweden and Norway, but not in Finland. 
Due to a lower prevalence of drug use and control costs, changes 
in the Finnish drug policy were not necessary, they argued. 
Although there were a considerable number of people who used 
drugs in Finland at that time, it was generally assessed that the 
authorities had the situation under fairly good control, and 
the problems were regarded to be far less extensive than in Sweden, 
Norway or Denmark (e.g. Olsson et al. 1993). However, viewing 
this from a long-term perspective, this was just wishful thinking.
In the beginning of the 1990s, acceptance of drug use among 
the Finnish population was still very low and attitudes towards 
experimenting and use were unfavourable. In the media, images 
of drug users were entirely negative. Juha Partanen (2002) even 
described Finnish public attitudes towards drugs as  ‘narco-phobic’. 
In drug policy, Finland followed a restrictive line and the police 
intervened effectively not only in drug markets but also use and 
users (Kainulainen 2009; Kinnunen 2008). However, despite 
these circumstances a dramatic shift in the scale and nature of 
drug problems occurred later in the 1990s, with thorough chang-
es in the whole panorama of drug-related issues – the prevalence 
and patterns of use; the number of socially excluded,  multi- 
problem drug users; social harms and health hazards associated 
with drug use, such as drug-related criminality, morbidity and 
 fatal overdoses.
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In the context of alarming developments, the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health appointed a cross-governmental committee to 
prepare a national strategy for tackling drugs more effectively. 
In contrast with the language of public debate at the time, the 
committee’s report, Drug Strategy 1997, broadened notions of 
the  object of drug policy by describing the issue as a complex 
and contradictory phenomenon. In the report, drug use was de-
fined not only as criminal behaviour, but also as a social issue and 
a threat to public health. The committee also distanced itself from 
the concept of a ‘drug-free society’, which was seen as an unrealis-
tic goal for a reasonable and sustainable drug policy. Consequently, 
the committee report counterbalanced the prevalent crime policy 
approach by stressing pragmatic health policy measures aimed at 
prevention, treatment and harm reduction (such as substitution 
treatment and needle exchange programmes), social support and 
advisory services. In summary, the Drug Strategy 1997 created the 
new paradigm in the Finnish drug policy, the dual tracks model, 
where both harm reduction and criminal control approaches be-
came well established and expansive (Hakkarainen, Tigerstedt & 
Tammi 2007; Tammi 2007).
Responsibility for the coordination of drug policy was given 
to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. A multi-ministerial 
group containing representatives from six key ministries in the ar-
eas of social affairs and health, justice, education, interior, finance 
and foreign affairs was founded for synchronizing activities. The 
strategy was followed and updated in governmental decisions in 
principle (Plan of Action) every four years. However, the Drug 
Strategy 1997 has never been critically evaluated or renewed as a 
whole. Furthermore, during the years, the documents of the plan 
of action have become more and more general and ritualistic in 
nature. One can ask, then, how well a strategy that is more than 
20 years old can meet the challenges of today, when drug use and 
related harms have reached a new record level.
In this chapter, we will discuss the pressures for a drug policy 
reform in the context of increasing drug use and its consequences, 
which are seen in a growing number of drug deaths during the last 
decades in Finland. First, we will draw a picture of the expansive 
growth in drug use by presenting survey results on the prevalence 
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of drug use and illustrating some key indicators of drug-related 
deaths. A conclusion to be drawn from this section is that the drug 
use situation in Finland has changed totally since the mid 1980s 
when Christie and Bruun (1985) presented their analysis. The 
Drug Strategy 1997, with its dual-tracks policy, has not succeeded 
in stopping the unfortunate development of increasing drug use 
and related harms.
In the second part of the chapter, we move to different kinds 
of pressures towards a policy reform. We will start this section by 
showing survey results on how public opinion and attitudes to-
wards drugs and drug policy have recently changed. Then we will 
review the demands and initiatives for a policy change claimed 
in different arenas of public discussion. The contributions to 
be scrutinized in this second part of the chapter involve contri-
butions presented by the police, treatment experts, researchers, 
 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), drug policy advocates 
and politicians. Data to be used in this part covers citizens’ initia-
tives, blog posts, newspaper articles and other media coverage in 
the political debate.
At the end of this chapter, we will highlight the key findings of 
the paper. We will argue that urges for a retreat (Enzensberger 1989; 
see Tham’s Introduction in this volume) from the position adopt-
ed in the criminal law in the beginning of the 1970s are growing. 
Consequently, decriminalization of all drug use should be  thoroughly 
reconsidered. That would not mean legalization of drugs, nor that 
drug use would be acceptable or recommendable, but replacing 
punishment of drug users with an approach based, first of all, 
on social support and health care (Eastwood, Fox & Rosmarin 
2016; Stevens et al. 2019; Unlu, Tammi & Hakkarainen 2020).
Increased Prevalence of Drug Use
In Finland, the development of the drug use issue has been mon-
itored with the help of population-based drug surveys, which 
were conducted approximately every four years since 1992, the 
latest survey being from 2018 (Karjalainen, Hakkarainen & 
Salasuo 2019; Karjalainen, Pekkanen & Hakkarainen 2020). 
Representative random samples of the population aged between 
15 and 69 years old were drawn from the Finnish Population 
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Information System. The institutionalized population, those with-
out a permanent address, and the Åland Islands were excluded. In 
each survey, data were collected by self-administered, anonymous 
postal questionnaires, which the respondents received by mail and 
were asked to return in a prepaid envelope. Since 2010, respond-
ing via the Internet has also been possible. The content of the 
questionnaire has concerned drug use and drug-related opinions 
and attitudes. The data was collected by Statistics Finland. The 
number of respondents has varied between 2143 and 3485. 
The response rate for the drug surveys decreased from 71% in 1992 
to around 50% in the last three surveys (2010, 2014 and 2018). 
However, a non-respondent study conducted in connection with 
the 2014 survey showed that the prevalence of illicit drug use was 
very similar among non-respondents and respondents of the origi-
nal survey (Karjalainen, Pekkanen & Hakkarainen 2020). Figure 3 
shows how the prevalence of any illicit drug use has developed 
between 1992 and 2018.
As seen in Figure 3, the use of drugs has been constantly in-
creasing. From 1992 to 2018, the lifetime prevalence of any illicit 
drug use increased from 6% to 24%, last year prevalence from 
1% to 8% and last month prevalence from almost nothing to 
3%. Hence, in 2018, almost one quarter of the Finns surveyed 
had some experience of illicit drug use. As seen in the figure, the 
use of drugs has been more prevalent among men than among 
women. In 2018, lifetime prevalence for men was 28% and for 
Figure 3. Lifetime prevalence (LTP), the last year prevalence (LYP) and the 
last month prevalence (LMP) of drug use according to gender between 
1992 and 2018 in Finland, %.
Source: Karjalainen, Pekkanen & Hakkarainen (2020).
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women 20%, last year prevalence 11% and 5%, and last month 
prevalence 5% and 2% respectively.
The most popular choice of illicit drug is cannabis. Almost 
all who reported any drug use also reported cannabis use. The 
prevalence of the misuse of medicines (prescription drugs) was 
the  second highest, followed then by amphetamines, ecstasy and 
cocaine, but all clearly at a lower level than cannabis. However, 
as shown in Figure 4, there are also upwards trends in the use of 
those drugs after 2010.
The spread of drug use varies largely across age groups. Lifetime 
prevalence of any illicit drug use according to gender and age is 
shown in Table 10. As can be seen, drug use is most prevalent 
among young adults aged 25–34 years. Almost half (45%) of 
them have tried illicit drugs at least once in their lifetime, one out 
of five reports use during the past year and one out of ten during 
the past month. In the Finnish context, these are high numbers. 
In the last 25 years, experimenting with drugs has turned from a 
relatively rare minority phenomenon to a wide-spread and rath-
er normalized activity for young adults. Along with this develop-
ment, in coming years we will have more experienced and ‘drug 
wise’ people in older age groups.
In the 1990s and 2000s it was usual that the highest prevalence 
of drug use was found in the youngest age group,  especially in 
the last year and last month prevalence categories. Due to this, 
it has been typical to describe drug use as a youth phenomenon. 
Figure 4. Lifetime prevalence of the use of different drugs between 1992 
and 2018 in Finland, %.
Source: Karjalainen, Pekkanen & Hakkarainen (2020).
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Table 10. Lifetime, the last year and the last month prevalence of 




















All 6 8 10 12 14 17 20 24
Gender
Males 7 11 12 14 16 21 25 28
Females 4 6 8 11 12 14 15 20
Age
15–24 12 15 19 26 19 21 24 26
25–34 11 16 19 20 26 37 39 45
35–44 6 9 8 11 16 23 26 32
45–69 1 2 3 5 6 6 10 12


















All 1 2 3 3 4 5 6 8
Gender
Males 2 3 4 4 5 6 9 11
Females 1 2 2 2 2 3 4 5
Age
15–24 6 9 12 12 9 13 16 15
25–34 2 3 3 4 8 11 13 18
35–44 1 1 1 1 2 2 5 7
45–69 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1


















All 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 3
Gender
Males 0 1 1 2 2 2 4 5
Females 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Age
15–24 1 3 3 4 5 3 6 6
25–34 1 1 2 2 3 4 5 7
35–44 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 3
45–69 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Source: Karjalainen, Hakkarainen & Salasuo (2019).
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However, in the last 10 years the development of drug use seems 
to have turned this pattern upside down. For example, a study 
comparing the spread of drug use among minors and young 
people aged between 18 and 25 concluded that the increasing 
trend of drug use was prevalent only in the older part of this age 
group, while the development among minors remained stable 
(Karjalainen, Hakkarainen & Raitasalo 2019). Figure 5 shows 
the trend in the prevalence of cannabis use in the last year in 
15–24-year-old and 25–34-year-old males and females.
In 2018 there were 3.8 million inhabitants between 15 and 69 
years old in Finland. Based on the survey results then, it can be es-
timated that close to 1 million Finns have tried illicit drugs at least 
once in their lifetime. However, it is important to note that most 
of them are not active users, rather, the question is about past ex-
periences in some earlier phase in their life. The number of those 
having used in the past year is around 300,000. Every month 
more than 100,000 Finns use illicit drugs. The vast  majority of 
the people included in these figures are just experimental or oc-
casional users, typically smoking cannabis a couple of times in 
a year when cannabis happens to be available. The number of 
those who smoked cannabis at least once a week was estimated at 
around 45,000, the number of daily users being roughly 12,000.
Figure 5. Last year prevalence of cannabis use between 1992 and 2018 in 
age groups below 35 years, according to gender, %.
Source: Karjalainen, Pekkanen & Hakkarainen (2020).
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Regarding the use of hard drugs, a register-based study esti-
mated the number of problematic users of amphetamines and/or 
opioids in 2012 to be 18,000–30,000 (Ollgren et al. 2014). Five 
years later, in 2017, the estimate was 31,100–44,300 (Rönkä et 
al. 2020). Findings of waste water studies conducted in Finnish 
cities between 2012 and 2018 support assessments of the regis-
ter-based study by showing a continuous increase in the samples 
of amphetamines, methamphetamines and cocaine found (Gunnar, 
Kankaanpää & Kuoppasalmi 2019; Kankaanpää et al. 2016).
Growing Number of Drug Deaths
Following the Drug Strategy 1997, opioid substitution treatment 
(OST) was approved in Finland in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
(Selin et al. 2013). Since then, OST has become an integrated part 
of Finnish drug policy. In 2015, around 3300 people received OST 
in Finland (EMCDDA 2019). The first Needle Exchange Program 
(NEP) was opened in 1997 in Helsinki and, despite a hard public 
controversy in the beginning, the practice spread rapidly (Tammi 
2007). Today, the Communicable Disease Decree prescribes mu-
nicipalities to provide health counselling services for injecting 
drug users, including the exchange of injecting equipment. In 
2017, 5.8 million syringes were given out. The purposeful adapta-
tion of NEP was a success story, since it has caused the number of 
HIV infection diagnoses to fall or remain at a low level since the 
beginning of the 2000s (Arponen et al. 2008).
While Finland has invested in OST, NEP and other low-thresh-
old services, the number of drug-related deaths has increased 
markedly. From 2015 to 2017 the number of registered drug-in-
duced deaths increased from 166 to 200. Hence, in 2017, there 
were 53 drug-induced deaths per million inhabitants aged 15–64 
years in Finland, which was clearly higher than the European av-
erage (22) but lower than the neighbouring countries of Estonia 
(130), Sweden (92) and Norway (75) (EMCDDA 2019).
The latest information reveals that this unfavourable trend has 
continued, with the number of drug-induced deaths jumping to 
261 in 2018 (Yearbook of Alcohol and Drug Statistics 2019). An 
increase in mortality rate was greatest in the 20–29 year age group 
(OSF 2019). Figure 6 shows upwards trends in the  number of 
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 cases with confirmed findings of drugs in forensic autopsies, cases 
whereby drugs are given as the cause of death on the death reg-
ister (drug-induced deaths) and cases of drug poisonings. Drug-
induced deaths are deaths that can be attributed directly to the 
use of illicit drugs. The category of chemical findings in forensic 
autopsies provides an even higher death rate, while limiting just 
to poisonings and overdoses gives a somewhat lower rate. All of 
them, however, show an upward trend.
Most of the deaths are caused by simultaneous polydrug use 
(Salasuo et al. 2009). Toxicological data indicate that buprenor-
phine, usually in combination with alcohol or benzodiazepines, was 
involved in the majority of deaths. What is typical to the Finnish 
drug scene is that buprenorphine is the most popular opioid in 
use, while the use of heroin is almost non-existant. Furthermore, 
high mortality rate among drug users is associated with margin-
alization and social disadvantages like lower  education, long- or 
Figure 6. Drug-related deaths according to drug poisonings (overdose 
deaths), cause of death (drug-induced deaths) and chemical findings in 
forensic autopsies, 2000–2018.
Source: Yearbook of Alcohol and Drug Statistics (2019).
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short-term unemployment, early retirement, divorce and inade-
quate housing conditions (Rönkä 2018). Among men under 40 
years old, drugs are now the most common cause of death.
In sum, the prevalence of drug use and related harms are not 
at an insignificant level anymore, as estimated some 30 years ago 
(Christie & Bruun 1985; Narkotikasituationen i Norden 1993). 
In concert with increased drug use, problem drug use and different 
kinds of drug-related harms, the societal costs of drug problems 
have also expanded. According to the Yearbook of Alcohol and 
Drug Statistics (2019), the direct costs of harms caused by drug 
use totalled €299.1–369.5 million in 2016. The increase from the 
total costs in 2014 was 10.2%. Taking account of the increase in 
drug use and related harms after 2016, we can state that the costs 
today are much higher. If taking indirect costs (e.g. a loss of pro-
ductivity and working hours) into consideration, the total costs of 
drug problems might come up close to a billion.
Pressures for a Change
Public opinion and attitudes towards drugs and drug policy
Public opinion and attitudes towards drugs have eased and liber-
alized substantially during the last years. This holds especially true 
for attitudes towards cannabis. In 1996, no more than 26% of the 
Finnish population aged 15–69 years old was of the opinion that 
experimenting with cannabis once or twice would be risk-free or 
include only a slight risk. In 2018, a similar belief was shared by a 
good half of the population (52%). At the same time, acceptance 
of regular use of cannabis has increased, but attitudes towards 
the risks of experimenting with heroin remain very critical. This 
indicates that a growing amount of people in Finland make a clear 
distinction between cannabis and hard drugs. Among the young 
adults, almost 75% see the risks of experimenting with canna-
bis as insignificant, with one quarter of them (26%) regarding 
the risks of regular cannabis use in the same way (Karjalainen, 
Pekkanen & Hakkarainen 2020).
Relaxed views on cannabis are reflected also in the opinions 
about criminal policy. In 2018, 42% of Finns thought that the use 
of cannabis should not be punished. In the beginning of the 1990s, 
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this outlook was shared by one quarter of people. In Figure 7, 
attitudes towards the punishment of cannabis use are shown in 
relation to some other forms of drug behaviour.
Among the people of Finland, picking mushrooms for the pot 
is a popular hobby connected to the right of common access to 
woods and forests. Perhaps due to that folk tradition, picking hal-
lucinogenic mushrooms was not seen as a punishable action by 
the majority. Conversely, opinion regarding mailing cocaine from 
abroad to Finland was seen almost unanimously as a punishable 
act. Actually, in Figure 7, only attitudes towards using or growing 
cannabis show a trend of relaxation.
When respondents were asked whether or not they agreed if 
drug use of any kind should be punished, only 20% of them were 
in favour of stopping punishment. That was more than in 2002 
(14%), when it was previously asked. These results reinforce the 
fact that the Finnish people are making a distinction between can-
nabis and other drugs. Furthermore, results indicate that it seems 
to be more difficult to show tolerance towards all drug users than 
towards cannabis users. Indeed, it might be more challenging for 
the general public to feel and show similar understanding towards 
problematic polydrug users who are visible in public places than 
towards cannabis smokers who mostly represent ordinary young 
people (Hakkarainen & Karjalainen 2017; Savonen et al. 2018). 
Due to the special nature of the cannabis issue, Figure 8 focuses 
on public opinions regarding cannabis legalization.
Figure 7. Attitudes towards punishment for various drug-related behaviours: 
no punishment, 1992–2018, %.
Source: Karjalainen, Hakkarainen & Salasuo (2019).
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While attitudes towards cannabis have relaxed remarkably, sup-
port for the legalization of cannabis has remained at a moderate 
level among the general public. Between 1998 and 2010, endorse-
ment for legalization stayed very stable, at 10–11%. However, 
during the last eight years approval has grown to 18%. At the 
same time, the share of people who are in favour of legalization 
for medical use only has grown from 40 to 54%. Hence, accep-
tance of medical cannabis covers 72% of the general public alto-
gether. Consequently, the proportion of people who are against 
any forms of legal access has dropped from 49 to 28% – less 
than one third of the Finnish population (Karjalainen, Pekkanen 
& Hakkarainen 2020).
In summary, from studying these figures, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the public opinion on policy issues did not start 
to change until recently. During the last eight years, however, pol-
icy attitudes regarding cannabis have relaxed quite rapidly. This 
has been most obvious among young people. Around one quarter 
of young adults in Finland think that the use of any drug should 
not be punishable, and a narrow majority of them would remove 
punishment from the use of cannabis.
Citizens’ initiative
A change in the social position of cannabis, which is reflected in 
public attitudes, can also be seen in increased political activism 
with relation to drugs. The most important indication of the public 
Figure 8. Opinions on whether cannabis should be legally available, 
2010–2018.
Source: Karjalainen, Pekkanen & Hakkarainen (2020).
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emergence of cannabis advocacy is a citizens’ initiative calling for 
the decriminalization of cannabis use, which had received 59,609 
certified signatures by the 1 November 2019, and then succeeded 
to qualify to the Parliament proceedings. There have also been 
some citizens’ initiatives on cannabis issues in previous years, but 
the number of supporting signatures has remained below 50,000 
– the number demanded to advance to the Parliamentary proceed-
ings. Hence, this is the first time the Finnish Parliament will deal 
with cannabis policy based on an initiative prepared by cannabis 
activists and supported by a relatively large number of citizens. 
Because of the Covid-19 pandemic, parliamentary readings of the 
initiative did not start until late autumn 2020, and the process 
will continue in the Committee of Law in 2021.
In addition to the use of cannabis, the initiative proposes de-
criminalization of possession of small amounts of cannabis for 
own use and growing of four cannabis plants for personal use (see 
also Eastwood 2020). In the initiative, it is argued that decrimi-
nalization of cannabis is needed because current drug policy has 
not succeeded in reducing the number of drug-related harms. It is 
also said that control of cannabis users randomly focuses only on 
a small group of users, wastes police resources and interferes with 
the everyday life of users. Furthermore, it is stated that removing 
cannabis from under legal control would diminish the growth of 
organized crime. Home grown cannabis plants for own use with-
out legal sanctions is seen to provide safer and better quality can-
nabis than buying it from illicit markets.
THL blog posts
Another, and earlier, impulse for a public discussion on drug policy 
was published in February 2018, when in a blog post of the Finnish 
Institute for Health and Welfare (THL) researchers proposed that 
Finland should decriminalize all drug use (Hakkarainen & Tammi 
2018). With reference to the statements of international organi-
zations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the 
Global Commission on Drug Policy, it was stated that drug use 
should instead be tackled by means of social and health care, rather 
than criminal law and punishment (see also Das & Horton 2019). 
The blog also made clear that decriminalization should  apply to 
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all drugs. The legalization of cannabis and its trade is, however, 
not timely in Finland, researchers stated in the blog.
One of the main arguments given in the blog post was that it 
would prevent harm caused by criminal control in the lives and 
careers of young people. As known, occasional use of cannabis in 
a circle of friends is a wider-spread practice in some age groups. 
Since almost a half (45%) of young adults aged 25–34 in Finland 
have tried cannabis at least once in their lifetime, it is not rea-
sonable that the current legislation defines and treats them all as 
criminals. Another argument was that it would reduce the stigma 
of drug use and support problem drug users to attend treatment. 
When a person who uses drugs does not have to fear punishment 
or other criminal sanctions, it is much easier for him or her to at-
tend social and health services for help. Also, talking about drug 
use in various services, such as health services at schools, occupa-
tional healthcare and general healthcare services, would become 
more natural for both parties if drug use was no longer labelled as 
a criminal behaviour.
In general, the blog post argued that the criminal sanctions 
work poorly in the prevention of the use of drugs, and the related 
harms, and they are also ill suited to the values of today’s  society 
or to public health thinking. Instead of being punishable, new 
means and procedures are needed to prevent drug use and reduce 
harm. Lessons can be drawn, for example, from how smoking 
has been reduced without criminalization. Furthermore, the au-
thors referred to positive experiences of decriminalization in 
Portugal in 2001 (Greenwald 2009; Hughes & Stevens 2010), 
and the plans to apply that model by our neighbouring country, 
Norway (NOU 2019).
Later in June another blog post was published where authors 
reviewed the discussion and proposed that a reform of nation-
al drug strategy should be taken in the agenda of the next gov-
ernment (Eskola et al. 2018). This blog post also paid attention 
to a relatively high number of drug-related deaths in Finland. 
In general, authors argued that there is evidence showing that 
strictness of drug policy seems to have a stronger impact on how 
drug users are treated rather than on the prevalence of drug use 
(e.g. Reuband 1998), and that individuals in countries with more 
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 liberal approaches to drug use are showing a greater confidence in 
engaging with services and in seeking help than individuals living 
in countries with harsher approaches to drug use (Benfer et al. 
2018). This blog post was signed by Juhani Eskola, the general 
director of THL, expressing an official stance of the institute.
Media and increased public discussion
The February 2018 blog post immediately created a lively discus-
sion. It was downloaded over ten thousand times in a couple of 
weeks and it was widely reported in newspapers, on radio and on 
television. It evidently was a kind of surprise for the public that 
this kind of proposal was delivered from the institute, which is 
a respected national body and the Finnish government’s leading 
health and welfare agency working under the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health. In social media, THL was given credits due 
to the radical opening of the discussion and it was also stated that 
the blog justified the criticism of current drug policy and made it 
easier for other people to express alternative views too.
The blog was reviewed and commented on in editorials of six 
newspapers. For example, Helsingin Sanomat, the biggest and 
most influential newspaper in Finland, provided its editorial 
with the headline, ‘Required contribution’.2 The newspaper de-
scribed the content of the blog but didn’t take a stance for or 
against decriminalization. Editorials of five other newspapers also 
saw the blog as a welcome input for discussion, but expressed 
their reserved attitude by emphasizing that drugs are dangerous3 
or that decriminalization would increase liberal attitudes towards 
drugs, especially among the youth.4 Furthermore, Savon Sanomat, 
Kaleva and Huvudstadsbladet stated that in Finland it would be 
 2  Tarpeellinen puheenvuoro, Helsingin Sanomat 15.2.2018 (editorial).
 3 Huumeet eivät ole harmittomia – rangaistuksista luopuminen lisää käyt-
töä, Ilta-Sanomat 16.2.2018 (editorial) and Harmitonta huumetta ei ole, 
Länsi-Suomi 22.2.2018 (editorial).
 4 Huumeiden salliminen synnyttäisi uusia ongelmia, Savon Sanomat 
17.2.2018 (editorial), Huumeita vastaan uusin tavoin, Kaleva 17.2.2018 
(editorial) and Straff eller vård – är avkriminasering en lösning?, 
Hufvudstadsbladet 13.5.2018 (editorial).
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reasonable to wait and see what happens in Norway if drug use is 
decriminalized there.
In the following weeks, innumerable newspaper articles were 
published and TV and radio programmes broadcast. In addition 
to the authors, the media interviewed different kinds of experts 
in drug issues. Academic researchers and experts specialized in 
addiction problems in health and social care were mostly support-
ive of arguments for decriminalization, while police authorities 
expressed a lot of reservations and were mostly against any lib-
eralization of drug policy or control of drug users. For example, 
academic experts of criminal law stated that criminal penalties 
are unnecessarily harsh and ineffective measures in the control of 
drug use, and also violate the usual practice of the Finnish judi-
cial system.5 Social workers in drug treatment were accompanying 
the experts of criminal law by emphasizing how stigmatization 
of drug users creates shame and delays them in seeking help and 
treatment.6 Police authorities, on the other hand, stressed that 
due to general deterrence it is important to intervene in drug use, 
 especially among young people.7 In general, the police tend to 
 argue that control of use and users is useful for them in uncov-
ering and investigating more serious drug crimes, such as drug 
dealing and smuggling. Hence, contrary to treatment experts, 
the police were clearly not ready for a retreat in criminalization 
of drug use, not even if it also emphasized the importance of 
drug treatment.
In November 2019, when the citizens’ cannabis initiative 
qualified to be submitted to Parliament for consideration, public 
 debate on drug policy increased again. Actually, the whole pro-
cess around the citizens’ initiative has been accompanied by lively 
public discussion in newspapers, radio, television and social me-
 5 Pitääkö huumeista rangaista vai ei?, Helsingin Sanomat 15.2.2018, 
‘Rikoslakia huudettu apuun ähkyyn asti’ – professori poistaisi rikoslais-
ta liikennerikkomuksia ja huumeiden käytön, Rikos–Uutiset–MTV.fi 
17.3.2018 and Kriminaalipolitiikka vaatii visiota, (rikosoikeuden pro-
sessori Kimmo Nuotion syntymäpäivähaastattelu), Helsingin Sanomat 
18.4.2019.
 6 Pitääkö huumeista rangaista vai ei?, Helsingin Sanomat 15.2.2018.
 7 Huumausaineiden käyttörikoksista suureen osaan liittyy muita, vaka-
vampia rikoksia, Savon Sanomat 6.5.2018.
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dia. Since the case is not yet closed, the initiative will also fuel 
policy discussion in the long term.
Mobilization of NGOs
Proposals for the decriminalization of drug use and re-evalua-
tion of the national drug strategy got support from key NGOs 
working in the field of drug problems. These organizations were 
A-Clinic Foundation,8 Sininauhaliitto,9 EHYT ry,10 Humaania päi-
hdepolitiikkaa-yhdistys (HPP) ry11 and Irti Huumeista ry.12 Some 
of them didn’t want to commit to decriminalization yet, but they 
all agreed that it would be time to update and re-evaluate the na-
tional drug strategy. For example, EHYT ry. included a claim for 
a new national drug strategy in its four objectives suggested for the 
new government after the Parliamentary elections in spring 2019. 
Sininauhaliitto visited all parliamentary parties while lobbying for 
a new drug strategy, and the head of the organization was an ad-
vocate for the decriminalization policy. HPP was extremely active 
in social media, and they also arranged a successful seminar ‘Drug 
Policy – Now!’, with foreign speakers from Portugal, Norway and 
the UK. The seminar also included a panel discussion with Finnish 
politicians from all Parliamentary parties and the Pirate-party.
 8 The A-Clinic Foundation is a non-governmental and non-profit organi-
zation and service provider that was founded in 1955. The central office 
is involved in national and international activities in the fields of preven-
tion, information, development and training (see more https://a-klinikka 
saatio.fi/en). 
 9 Sininauhaliitto is a member of the The International Federation of the 
Blue Cross, which is a politically and denominationally independent 
Christian organization consisting of about 40 member organizations en-
gaged in the prevention, treatment and after-care of problems related to 
alcohol and other drugs (see more https://www.sininauhaliitto.fi/).
 10 EHYT Finnish Association for Substance Abuse Prevention is an NGO 
working in substance abuse prevention with a broad and collaborative 
approach. EHYT’s membership comprises around one hundred national, 
regional and local organizations (see more https://ehyt.fi/en/). 
 11 HPP, Society for Humanistic Drug Policy is a member of the International 
Drug Policy Consortium (IDPC) and is promoting a drug policy reform 
in Finland (see more http://hppry.fi).
 12 Irti Huumeista ry is a voluntary NGO founded 35 years ago with the aim 
of preventing drug use and supporting parents of drug users (see more 
https://irtihuumeista.fi/).
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In a small country with good cooperation between government 
and civil society like Finland, NGOs have had good opportunities 
to influence official politics, to be included in working groups and 
in the drafting and implementation of the national action plans. 
Consequently, mobilization of NGOs dealing with drug issues 
had a very important role in furthering discussion on drug policy 
at different levels of civil society. In addition to their own initia-
tives, representatives of the above-mentioned organizations were 
often interviewed as experts or used as news sources in different 
forums of mass media.
Politicians
When the first round of the debate got started by the THL blog 
post, relevant ministers, the Minister of Justice and the Minister 
of the Interior were interviewed about their standpoints by the 
media. They were all reserved and not in favour of decriminal-
ization. The Minister of Social Affairs and Health, representing a 
party in political Center, was afraid that decriminalization would 
lead to an increase in drug use.13 The Minister of Justice, repre-
senting a party in political Right, accompanied this by saying that 
drug use should not be made easier in any way, while his party 
mate, the Minister of the Interior, stated that the police should 
focus on drug markets and supply.14
However, on the second round of the debate, the setting had 
changed because of the parliamentary elections and a new govern-
ment appointed in spring 2019. The new government, consisting 
of Social Democratic Party (SDP), Centre Party, Green League, 
Left Alliance and Swedish People’s Party (RKP), have shown inter-
est in updating at least some drug policy. In the government pro-
gramme it undertakes an updated and joint strategy for  alcohol, 
drugs, tobacco and gambling, as well as a decision in principle 
for drug treatment and harm reduction (Osallistava ja osaava 
Suomi 2019). In the public debate, three ministers of the new gov-
ernment said they supported decriminalization of all drug use, 
 13 Ministeri Saarikko THL:n huumekananotosta: Suomessa rangaistusten 
poisto voisi lisätä käyttöä, Ilta-Sanomat 15.2.2018.
 14 THL:n johto toivoo keskustelua huumeiden käytön laillistamisesta – 
kokoomusministerit eri linjoilla, Talouselämä 15.2.2018.
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while the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice took a re-
served view by saying that this government will not move forward 
in that direction. A statement supporting the decriminalization of 
all drug use presented by the Minister of Interior and the party 
leader of the Green League got special attention due to the fact 
that she is also a responsible minister of the police.15
There were also opposite views between political parties.16 
Those most strongly against decriminalization seemed to be the 
Christian-democratic Party, right-wing populist Finns Party and 
right-wing liberal-conservative National Coalition Party, who are 
all in opposition in the Parliament at the moment. Social dem-
ocrats have also been reluctant with regards to decriminaliza-
tion, but they have stressed the importance of developing better 
treatment and harm reduction measures. The Green League has 
made a decision in their political programme that they support 
decriminalization, while the Left Alliance Party has defined it as 
a question of consciousness that leaves freedom to choose to in-
dividual MPs. The Minister of Justice and the party leader from 
RKP has opposed decriminalization, but the official mouthpiece 
of the  party, Huvudstadsbladet, has taken a stance supporting de-
criminalization in an editorial.17
Furthermore, drug policy reform has been debated in the youth 
organizations of the parties and some of them (Green League, 
Left Alliance and RKP) have taken a supportive stance towards 
decriminalization.18 Also, some individual members of youth 
 15 Ohisalo: Vihreät kannattaa huumeiden käytön rangaistavuudesta luopu-
mista, Yle.fi 30.10.2019.
 16 Katso puolueiden kannat: Vihreät haluaa, ettei huumeiden käytöstä rang-
aistaisi – Li Andersson ehkä -linjalla, Iltalehti 27.2.2018. Vihreä aalto 
etenee maailmalla, mutta milloin kannabis laillistetaan Suomessa? Näin 
vastaavat puolueet, Yle 18.3.2018, https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10663151, and 
Haavisto ja Andersson luopuisivat huumeiden käytön rangaistavuudes-
ta – Halla-aho eri linjoilla: Huumeet aiheuttavat selkeitä ongelmia ja li-
säävät rikollisuutta, Suomen Uutiset 8.4.2019.
 17 Cannbisdiskussionen gick upp i rök, Huvudstadsbaledet 26.11.2019 
(editorial).
 18 Fler ungdomsförbund för avkriminalisering: ‘Kriget mot drogerna har 
inte fungerat’, Yle 2.5.2018, https://svenska.yle.fi/artikel/2018/05/02 
/fler-ungdomsforbund-for-avkriminalisering-kriget-mot-drogerna-har-in 
te-fungerat.
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 organizations of other political parties (Centre Party, National 
Coalition Party and SDP) have publicly defended reforming views. 
This indicates that younger generations, who see drug issues dif-
ferently from older ones, are pushing changes in their parties.
Retreat: A Redistribution of Labour between Social  
and Health Care and Criminal Control Policy
At the time of writing this chapter, solutions are still open. 
Preparation of the national strategy for alcohol, drugs and addic-
tions (including tobacco and gambling issues), and the decision in 
principle on drug treatment and harm reduction have been going 
on for a while under the Ministry of Social Affair and Health, 
but have not yet been launched. Debate in the Parliament about 
the citizens’ initiative calling for the decriminalization of cannabis 
use has just started. In the first public hearing arranged by the 
Committee of Law in February 2021, THL proposed decriminal-
ization of all drug use and got support from a professor in crimi-
nal law at the University of Helsinki, while a representative of the 
police was against any decriminalization. Whatever the coming 
resolutions will be, it is evident that the debate on drug policy will 
be continued.
When studying the central trends of the development of the 
drug situation in Finland in the past two decades it becomes 
apparent that, regardless of the strict criminal policy and the 
dual-tracks reform done in the late 1990s, drug use and relat-
ed harms have been continuously increasing. In fact, a growing 
number of young people experimenting and using drugs makes 
them the targets of police control and vulnerable in terms of ex-
clusion from schooling and the labour market. As reported by 
drug users, the criminal control has a stigmatizing effect that 
is difficult to escape (Heinonen 1989; Kainulainen, Savonen & 
Rönkä 2017; Kontula, Aleskerov & Neuvonen 2020). Having 
a recorded  history of drug use often has a negative impact on a 
person’s life, and its disclosure can be a barrier to access to edu-
cation or employment. A growing number of experimenters and 
occasional users may also lead to an increasing number of prob-
lematic drug users in need of support and services. However, the 
criminalization of drug use clearly makes it difficult to seek help, 
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support and treatment. Avoiding or delaying seeking help exposes 
individuals to fatal overdoses and other detrimental consequenc-
es. Altogether, this unfavourable development gives us a reason to 
ask whether the Finnish society should seriously consider a retreat 
in the drug policy field. As Enzensberger (1989) states, although a 
retreat might include violating earlier principles and moralities, it 
might bring along solutions that are more important and healthier 
for the society than stubborn refrain in old models and holding 
back from doing something.
How probable would this kind of development be in Finland? 
Are we ready to retreat from old principles and conceptions of 
drug policy and try to find new directions? We think that there are 
some signs and processes going on that call for chance.
First, in the creation of novel drug policy lines a very basic 
aim was to protect youth, especially minors, and keep them off of 
drugs. Today, however, the core of drug use lies in the young adult 
age group – a more independent, resourceful and  self-assertive 
group of people to be controlled than teenagers. They want to 
judge and decide their personal habits and pleasures by them-
selves, and many of them see current control policy as unjust 
or irrelevant. Defining half of the age cohort as criminals is also 
problematic from the point of view of society.
Second, young generations think about drugs and sustainable 
drug policy lines differently than old generations who have been 
responsible for deciding the current drug policy (Hakkarainen, 
Karjalainen & Salasuo 2020). A majority of young people and 
young adults personally know people who have used drugs, 
and many of them have also experimented with cannabis or 
other drugs themselves. This makes young generations more 
drug-wise than older generations, meaning that demonizing and 
 narco-phobic images of ‘the war on drugs’ do not affect them in 
the same way (Parker, Aldridge & Measham 1998). In the com-
ing years, these young generations will be in leading positions in 
society. Their appearance is already evident in public discussion.
Third, attitudes among the parents of young people are also 
changing, especially regarding the risks of experimenting with 
cannabis. Similarly, their opinions on drug policy may also be 
changing as they realize the consequences of the present  criminal 
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control and insufficient availability of treatment services for 
their offspring.
Fourth, regarding values, principles of fundamental and human 
rights are becoming more important in society and policy-making. 
The current calling is for equality and personal integrity instead of 
control and surveillance. Avoiding stigmatization and promoting 
equality and uniform rights to treatment and services are also de-
manded for people with problematic drug use. A question about 
equality between citizens of different countries might also rise in 
importance if decriminalization policy, or even more radical re-
forms like legalization of cannabis, continue to spread globally 
(Decorte, Lenton & Wilkins 2020; Eastwood, Fox & Rosmarin 
2016; Unlu, Tammi & Hakkarainen 2020).
Fifth, different kinds of reforms, like decriminalization in 
Portugal (Greenwald, 2009; Hughes & Stevens 2010) and some 
other countries (Unlu, Tammi & Hakkarainen 2020); and legal 
access to medical cannabis and legalization of recreational canna-
bis in Canada, Uruguay and several US states (Decorte, Lenton & 
Wilkins 2020), are followed with great interest among the media 
and people in Finland. If Norway, as a neighboring Nordic coun-
try, will decriminalize all drug use as proposed by the government, 
it will surely create a lot of attention in Finland, as already men-
tioned, for example, by some editorials commenting on the first 
THL blog post. All in all, public discussion and the general drug 
policy climate in Finland seem to be changing in concert with 
wider international trends. Consequently, there is now much more 
room for a rational drug policy debate and different alternatives 
in public discussion than in previous decades.
Sixth, the present legislation complicates the development of 
harm reduction measures (Kainulainen 2020). Enabling new mea-
sures in the prevention of drug deaths creates a challenge to the 
current criminal control policy. For example, recently, the City of 
Helsinki began an initiative to establish a drug consumption room 
in its area, but no action has been taken since the Criminal Code 
was seen to be an obstacle (Unlu et al. 2021). The same obsta-
cle was met in a project known from some other countries (e.g. 
Measham 2019) that would have tested drugs in order to give 
people who use drugs information about potentially dangerous 
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 content of the substances. These cases show how local actors who 
are dealing with drug problems and related harms can – and nowa-
days will – challenge the national authorities and policy (Blickman 
& Sandwell 2020; Jauffret-Roustide & Cailbault 2018).
Even though it is too early to declare that a change is coming, 
it is less likely that nothing will change. As previously said, when 
Finland defined its drug policy line for the first time the emphasis 
was put almost entirely on criminal control policy. Remarkable 
changes in the drug situation in the 1990s forced the state to coun-
terbalance the criminal control policy with prevention, treatment 
and harm reduction. In the present context of increasing drug 
use and related harms, one possible option to develop Finnish 
drug policy would be to take a further step and put the emphasis 
clearly on social and health care regarding personal consumption 
of drugs. This would mean a retreat from the criminalization of 
drug use. In the redistribution of labour, collaboration between 
the police and other authorities in preventing drug use would still 
be important, but the real focus of police work would be redirect-
ed towards the markets and drug dealing. At the same time, this 
would need new investments and efforts in prevention, social and 
health care, and treatment services from society.
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The majority of nations, including the Nordic countries, still pe-
nalize the production, distribution, and personal possession of 
certain types of drugs. In this chapter, the Icelandic drug situa-
tion and drug legislation will be examined (pop. 370,000). Iceland 
has, over time, adopted a restrictive response to the production, 
possession, and sale of drugs modeled after international legal 
policy measures. The study draws on official documents, such 
as police and local public health statistics, survey data, records of 
parliamentary debate, media accounts, and previous research. The 
legal situation regarding drugs is described, depicting both histor-
ical and current legal changes that have, and are, taking place in 
Iceland. Noteworthy events in the local debate on drugs during 
two different time periods are presented and discussed. First, the 
period of 1980–2000, followed by later developments in the new 
millennium. The number and nature of drug cases known to the 
police is examined during the period of 2010–2019, in addition to 
what substances have been seized by police during the same peri-
od. Prevalence of cannabis use among adults over time, the most 
frequently used drug in Iceland, is presented and analyzed, with a 
focus on what local research indicates as characterizing drug use 
in general. The opioid crisis recently hit Iceland, dominating the 
public debate on drugs. Figures presented involving drug-related 
deaths show how much opioids are implicated in these deaths.
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In the wake of a public debate about drug abuse in society, 
signs of a retreat in the control of drugs can be detected in the 
most recent years in Iceland. Instead of a predominantly crimi-
nal justice response toward possession of drugs, abuse of drugs 
is increasingly being viewed as a public health problem. A case 
in point demonstrating this shift is a recent legal change allow-
ing safe havens for drug addicts, in addition to a 2021 proposal, 
yet not passed, from the Minister of Health decriminalizing the 
possession of drugs for personal use. However, a major shift to-
ward a radically different drug policy is contended to be unlikely 
in Iceland unless a broader legal change occurs internationally. 
Finally, an attempt is made to explain why concerns about drugs 
have become so profound in recent decades.
Concern Over Substance Use in Iceland
Iceland has a long history of national concern over substance 
use. Alcohol, for example, was prohibited from 1915–1922 and 
beer was illegal until 1989 (Gunnlaugsson 2017). However, the 
revoking of beer prohibition did not signal the end of the strug-
gle against intoxicating substances in Iceland. A rejuvenated rigor 
took over Icelanders’ battle against drugs, which has not yet fad-
ed. Interestingly, the arguments used to justify the ban on beer are 
not dissimilar to those we observe today to justify the prohibition 
of drugs (Gunnlaugsson 2012). The advocates of beer prohibi-
tion repeatedly argued that beer posed a threat to the health and 
well-being of society, primarily to young people, just as is current-
ly seen today with cannabis and other drugs.
Several different kinds of measures have been employed in 
the fight against drugs in Iceland over time. On one hand, we 
see various non-punitive measures being adopted – drug preven-
tion drives, educational programs, peer group efforts in school, 
etc. – all with the objective of teaching young people to say No 
to Drugs, or political campaigns such as Drug Free Iceland by 
2000, to cite a few examples (Einarsson & Björnsson 2001). 
Substance use treatment has also been readily available for de-
cades in Iceland. Accessibility to treatment is believed to be high, 
resulting in a smaller treatment gap than in most other countries 
(Hansdóttir, Rúnarsdóttir, & Tyrfingsson 2015). More than two 
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thousand individuals are admitted to treatment clinics for alcohol 
and drug related problems in Iceland each year, including about 
six hundred new admissions.
In most recent years, Iceland has been internationally recog-
nized for its success with the Youth in Iceland project (see, for 
example, Young 2019). The project includes several components 
linking together research, policy, and practice. Local social sci-
entists play a key role in mapping out the scope of the substance 
use problem and in identifying different risk factors. Moreover, 
state funding for organized leisure activities among youth was 
increased and children banned from being outside after specific 
hours at night, to name a few of the measures adopted in the 
program. Teenage consumption of alcohol, drugs, and tobacco 
was significantly cut in the new millennium. This positive devel-
opment has predominantly been linked to the various prevention 
measures employed among youth in Iceland in cooperation with 
their parents and local community. Non-punitive policy measures 
against alcohol and drug use are presumably associated, with sat-
isfying results.
Contrarily, various punitive policies are also being employed. 
This refers to criminal justice responses: drug possession for 
 personal use being sanctioned by the special penal code; importa-
tion of drugs; and production and sale being heavily sanctioned 
by criminal law (Gunnlaugsson & Galliher 2000; Gunnlaugsson 
2015). Many of the drug police enforcement practices have been 
shown to be influenced by US drug control policies, not only in 
Iceland but throughout the world (Gunnlaugsson & Galliher 
1995; Nadelmann 1993). Undercover practices were encouraged 
by US agents to be integrated into drug police investigations, and 
Icelandic drug police officers were sent to the US for training in 
American methods of narcotics control (Mannlíf 1992).
Legal Status of Drugs in Iceland
Icelandic legislation on controlled substances dates back to 1923, 
when an international drug convention, of which Iceland was 
a member, passed what has been referred to as the opium laws. 
These laws, in charge of the Ministry of Justice, were largely un-
enforced, but in the late 1960s, with international concern about 
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drug use among the young heating up, Iceland’s narcotics laws 
were revised and extended to make cannabis and LSD illegal also 
(Gunnlaugsson & Galliher 2000). In 1974, new drug laws were 
passed by Alþingi (the Icelandic parliament), which were intended 
to replace the old opium laws by imposing more severe penalties 
for major drug violations. These laws were officially intended to 
unify and coordinate laws against the alleged ‘use of drugs which 
is becoming a serious social problem manifested in scientific rev-
elations of the harmfulness of these substances’ (preamble to law 
no. 65/1974). For major violations, a person could be sentenced 
to a maximum of 10 years in prison, instead of six years, as pro-
vided for in the opium laws.
In contradiction to a 1951 legislation separating the police and 
the courts, in 1973 Alþingi established law no. 52, a specialized 
drug police unit to be supervised by a separate drug court. The 
creation of this joint police–court apparatus in Reykjavík demon-
strates the degree of concern associated with this new and fright-
ening problem in Iceland. The total number of drug police officers 
was seven in 1984 and had increased to approximately 20 by the 
new millennium, making it the largest specialized police force in 
the nation (Gunnlaugsson & Galliher 2000). Complete separa-
tion of the executive and judicial powers was not achieved until 
1992. Consequently, the independent drug court in Reykjavík was 
disbanded in the same year. Still, the separate drug police force 
was operational until 2016, when a centralized police investiga-
tion unit was established to deal with different types of crime. 
One of the primary tasks of this new unit was to investigate the 
importation and distribution of drugs.
The maximum penalty for drug offenses as of 2021 is 12 years 
in prison, with the upper limit being increased from 10 years in 
2001 in the wake of the entrance of ecstasy in the country. The 
possession of drugs for personal use is prohibited in Iceland by 
the local special penal code (law no. 65/1974). Blood or urine 
samples are not used by police to establish pure use of drugs, 
apart from in instances involving the driving of a vehicle – only 
possession of drugs is punishable. The violation of this article, 
until 2018, was followed by a note in the criminal record of the 
offender and maintained for a period of three years. Despite this 
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three-year period, a violation of this code was accessible to local 
authorities for longer than three years – up to 10 years (Mbl.is 
2014). Local employers are increasingly asking for the criminal 
records of job applicants; thus, being on record for a drug viola-
tion can easily jeopardize future job prospects of those caught for 
the personal possession of drugs.
Drugs in Iceland during 1980–2000
The criminal justice approach to drugs has been supported by pol-
iticians and members of Alþingi from the beginning. Criticism of 
the punitive approach was hardly ever voiced in the 20th century 
in Alþingi and alternative policies have only been introduced in 
the last few years. A case in point from the 1980´s is an Alþingi 
resolution following two relatively large cases of importation of 
cannabis to Iceland, which was passed unanimously. The pro-
posal called for increased cooperation and coordination between 
 customs and other control agencies, and an improvement in all 
investigative police methods. As stated by the sponsor of this bill, 
‘… we have seen terrifying figures which strongly suggest that 
there is enormous consumption of drugs in society and that only 
a tiny portion [is] being seized by control people … drug use ruins 
the lives of a number of young people’ (Alþingi Debates 1983–
1984a: 2). Another MP noted during the debates that ‘Powerful 
crime cartels have reached Iceland, and ruthlessly their drug deal-
ers bring their nets to grab young people who, suspecting no evil, 
subsequently become addicted’ (Alþingi Debates 1983–1984b: 1).
An example of a punitive practice is police searches of pri-
vate homes, which have occurred frequently over the years 
(Gunnlaugsson & Galliher 2000). In the 1980´s and 1990´s, up 
to 200 such searches were conducted annually by the police, ei-
ther with a warrant or without. On average, approximately 500 
persons were arrested each year from 1987 to 1994 on suspicions 
of drug violations, when the total population of Iceland was ap-
proximately 250,000 (Gunnlaugsson & Galliher 2010). Most 
involved private possession (75%), and the remainder involved 
sales and importation. Wiretapping has also routinely been em-
ployed. During a three-year period in the early 1990´s, the courts 
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issued a total of 29 warrants permitting the police to tap a total 
of 42 telephone numbers for up to 2 months, all cases involving 
drug violations.
A deputy director of the local drug police had previously stat-
ed in a local media interview that the drug problem had inten-
sified in recent years in Iceland, or since drugs first appeared in 
Iceland around 1970 (Morgunblaðið 1979). He stated that since 
the creation of the drug police, a total of 4000 young people had 
been implicated in drug investigations, that young people had 
died because of drug use, and that heroin had made its entry into 
Iceland. News reports, such as this one, have been frequent over 
the years in Iceland. Escalating drug use among youth, large-
scale drug seizures, mass arrests for drug smuggling and sales, 
and long-term prison sentences typically make the headlines (see, 
for example, Gunnlaugsson & Galliher 2010). Nevertheless, in 
1979, when the news report was published, no official evidence 
suggested the deaths of young people were due to drug overdoses 
(Kristmundsson 1985) and very few signs indicated the existence 
of heroin in Iceland, which is still the case today (see Table 11). 
Even though this news reporting appears exaggerated today, sug-
gesting a moral panic, as often seems to be the case with drug 
media reporting (Goode & Yehuda 2009), this news report can 
also be viewed as a public warning and a call for serious steps to 
be adopted by local authorities toward this new social challenge 
facing the nation.
The most notorious drug police case resolved during this era, 
which was inspired by US undercover techniques, was an agree-
ment made in 1992 with an ex-convict who was asked to oper-
ate as an agent provocateur (Gunnlaugsson & Galliher 1995). 
The agent was asked to purchase 1.2kg of cocaine from an ac-
quaintance whom he had met in prison the preceding year. The 
 acquaintance was reportedly not interested in selling the drugs 
in Iceland. However, the informant was persistent and the 
 acquaintance grudgingly agreed to sell most of the drugs he had in 
his possession, even though it was originally planned for sale 
in Denmark. The director of the drug police and several of his 
officers, with none of the latter being informed of the complete 
story, subsequently initiated a major drug bust. This involved a 
car chase in which an officer was seriously injured. An Icelandic 
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law school textbook argues that such law enforcement practices 
are hardly within legal limits and, by all means, it is better that a 
police officer be an agent rather than an ordinary citizen, with it 
not being feasible to use convicts to meet the demands of an inves-
tigation (Þórmundsson 1980). However, the Supreme Court con-
firmed the seven-year sentence against the suspect, even though 
the court recognized that the director had not consulted sufficient-
ly with the Reykjavík police. Despite this lack of consultation, it 
was not believed to be enough to grant acquittal or reduction of 
the penalty (Morgunblaðið 1993).
According to police records, cannabis was the most common of 
the illegal substances seized in Iceland in the 1980´s and 1990´s. 
LSD occasionally popped up, with amphetamines in powder form 
being stable on the market and cocaine entering the market in the 
1990s (Gunnlaugsson & Galliher 2000). Close to 150kg of can-
nabis, or more than 80% of the drugs seized by the drug police 
during the 1985–1995 period, involved cannabis, approximately 
15kg of amphetamines, less than 4kg of cocaine, and a few thou-
sand doses of LSD.
In the mid 1990s, with the entry of ecstasy in Iceland, the drug 
problem escalated to new dimensions. Soon after the substance 
appeared, its use created a major public uproar and insecurity in 
Iceland. Jónasson and Gunnlaugsson (2015) have identified all 
the elements of a moral panic in Icelandic society with the ap-
pearance of the ecstasy tablet. Initially, it was the police, media, 
and other interest groups that predominantly focused on ecstasy 
use and the threat it posed to the Icelandic society. The public, 
subsequently, demanded through various grassroots efforts that 
the government act promptly, painting drug dealers as folk devils 
who should receive much harsher punishment. The state, conse-
quently, responded to this public outcry by making punishment 
heavier, promising more funds to the drug police, and agreeing on 
new police laws.
Drugs in Iceland in the 2000's
In the new millennium, drug cases increased in Iceland, with a 
variety of different drugs being seized by the police. During 2002–
2007, the police seized more than 200kg of cannabis, more than 
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100kg of amphetamines, and approximately 30kg of cocaine. The 
number of doses of ecstasy and LSD seized were also in the tens 
of thousands during the same period (National Commissioner of 
the Icelandic Police 2008).
In 2007 and 2009, the total amount of drugs seized from two 
boats on the east coast of Iceland exceeded all the drugs seized by 
police during the entire 2002–2007 period. In the 2009 boat case, 
labeled as ‘skútumálið’ (the yacht case), the police seized a total of 
55kg of amphetamines, 54kg of cannabis, and about 9000 ecstasy 
tablets. The six people implicated in the case received a total of 
40 years in prison for this attempt to smuggle drugs into Iceland 
(Supreme Court 2009). Moreover, reportedly home-grown mar-
ijuana was increasingly replacing importation of cannabis, with 
hundreds of plants seized by local police and numerous individu-
als arrested (Visir.is 2007).
During 2014 to 2018, wiretapping was used even more 
 frequently than before by the police, and requests for the 
same were very seldom rejected by the courts. A total of 251 
permits were issued to the police to tap phones, with about one 
quarter involving drugs (Böðvarsdóttir 2020). Police searches of 
suspicious  persons for drugs and at random have routinely been 
resorted to by the local police, in addition to the use of sniffer 
dogs for looking for drugs, especially where young people hang 
out, at local music  festivals, etc. (Mbl.is 2018). Dog sniffing of 
passenger baggage at airports and docks is also customary, with 
international mail and parcels from abroad being scrutinized by 
customs in local post offices.
In 2016, two persons were sentenced to eight and four years 
in prison for the importation of 193g of cocaine, 10,000 MDMA 
doses, and 9kg of amphetamines through the international air-
port in Keflavík. This case was labeled as ‘burðardýrsmálið’ (drug 
mule case) and included smuggling from Holland (Supreme Court 
2016). The person who received eight years in prison, a Dutch 
woman, attempted to help the police in catching the principal of-
fender but to no avail. The stiff sentence she was awarded for 
simply being a drug courier was reportedly due to the amount of 
hard drugs being smuggled. How many of the inmate population 
in Iceland have served time in prison for drug-related offenses?
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In the 21st century, about one third of the entire inmate popu-
lation has routinely been serving time in prison for drug-related 
offenses. In 2018 and 2019, the ratio of drug offenders reached a 
historic high of 40% of the total inmate population (Prison and 
Probation Administration 2020). In 2016, a total of 100 inmates 
served time in prison for drug importation, production, or sale. In 
the 1980s, and well into the 1990s, the rate of drug offenders 
in prison was considerably lower, less than 10% of the prison 
population (Gunnlaugsson & Galliher 2000).
Drug Crimes Known to the Police
Figure 9 indicates the number of drug violations recorded by the 
Icelandic police each year since 2010, followed by Table 11, which 
shows the type and amounts of drugs being seized by the police. 
Both show an increase in the new millennium.
As can be seen in Figure 9, the total number of drug offenses 
increased markedly during 2010–2014, from about 1500 offenses 
in 2010 to about 2400 offenses in 2014, a peak year. Since 2015, 
Figure 9. Total number of drug offenses in Iceland, 2010–2019, including 
only possession of drugs, and the number of offenses per 100,000 
inhabitants.
Source: National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police, annual reports, 
2020.
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the total number each year has become more stable, with about 
2000 offenses registered annually in Icelandic police records, in-
cluding cases under police investigation for suspicion of drug vi-
olations (National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police 2020).
These offenses, as before, consist predominantly of possession 
of drugs and, in smaller portions, of importation, production, and 
distribution of drugs. About 70% of these offenses involved the 
possession of drugs for personal use. As can also be seen in Figure 9, 
the number of drug offenses known to the police has been hov-
ering around 600 offenses per 100,000 inhabitants during most 
recent years.
As can be seen in Table 11, a variety of drugs have been seized 
by police in the past few years. The total amount of drugs ap-
parently increased during the time period 2011–2019. The most 
notable increases included cannabis, cocaine, and amphetamines, 
with a peak year in 2019. Most of the drugs seized by the police 
in 2019 comprised of amphetamines (55kg), cocaine (40kg), can-
nabis (hashish/marijuana) (35kg), and about 2500 ecstasy doses. 
Heroin was hardly ever seized by police during this time period.
The minimum fine stipulated for possession of drugs is approx-
imately €350 for cannabis and more for ecstasy and cocaine. If the 
amount of cannabis seized is 10g, the fine is approximately €650 
(Ministry of Justice 2018). Many of the drug offenses for posses-
sion of drugs occur during routine police checks on the road or 
while investigating criminal cases where drugs are found on crime 
suspects etc. With the legal change in 2018, drug fines of less than 
100,000 Icelandic kronas (approximately €700) are no longer 
registered on the criminal record. The Justice Minister reported 
in Alþingi to a query by a Pirate Party member of parliament, 
that if the legal change had been made 6 months earlier, more 
than 100 persons only registered on criminal record for a mini-
mum drug fine would have escaped this notification (Ministry of 
Justice 2018).
The ratio of those driving while on drugs has increased signifi-
cantly in recent years (National Commissioner of the Icelandic 
Police 2020). In 2014, the total number of cases of driving while 
intoxicated (and not inebriated) was slightly short of 1500. In 
2018, the number had reached almost 2500. In 2018, the number 
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of cases of driving while intoxicated on alcohol was about 1700 
– or a significantly lower number than the cases involving drugs. 
The overall rate of driving while intoxicated from alcohol or oth-
er drugs had previously been found to be comparatively high in 
Iceland (Gunnlaugsson & Galliher 2000).
Nature and Extent of Drug Use in Iceland
International surveys indicate that drug use among 10th graders is 
generally lower in Iceland than in most other European countries 
(ESPAD 2020). The average in Iceland for lifetime prevalent use 
of cannabis, by far the most frequently used illegal drug, was, for 
example, 6% in 2019, while the European average (16%) was 
significantly higher. Iceland had the lowest levels of cannabis use 
among Nordic nations, with Sweden (8%), Faroe Islands (9%), 
and Norway (9%) coming close to Iceland. Finland (11%) and 
Denmark (17%), however, reported higher levels. As mentioned 
above, the Youth in Iceland project has been cited as being de-
cisive in the positive development of drug use among youth in 
Iceland, with lower rates in 2019 than in previous ESPAD surveys.
Surveys of cannabis use among Icelandic adults (citizens over 
18 years old) have not been measured as regularly as among ad-
olescents. Population surveys conducted by the Social Sciences 
Research Institute, affiliated with the University of Iceland, during 
1997–2019 suggest an increase in the lifetime prevalence of can-
nabis use (Figure 10) in this time period. Approximately 33% 
admitted to using cannabis at least once in 2019, with close to 
5% admitting to its use in the last 6 months (Gunnlaugsson & 
Jónasson 2019). As Figure 10 shows, this suggests an increase 
from 2013, when the lifetime figure was 23%, and 2002, when 
the figure was 19%.
Therefore, use of cannabis among youth appears to be going 
down over time but, at the same time, increasing in the adult 
population. According to the 2019 survey of cannabis use among 
adults in the last 6 months (5%), as shown in Figure 10, it can 
be roughly estimated that up to 15,000 might be active canna-
bis users in Iceland, out of a total population of around 370,000 
 citizens. In comparison, active users of alcohol have been esti-
mated to be at least half of the adult population (Directorate of 
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Health 2017), or much higher than levels of cannabis use. The 
apparent pattern of cannabis use among adults is described in 
the section below.
As Figure 11 suggests, most lifetime use seems to take place 
among younger age groups. Use appears to be experimental, tem-
porary, perhaps most out of curiosity, many discontinuing its use 
altogether when they grow older as work and family obligations 
gain precedence (Gunnlaugsson 2018). Prevalence of this type 
of use over time probably linked to fashion waves, music taste, 
and other cultural fads – mostly international in nature – among 
younger age groups. Occasionally, experimental and social use 
appear to be trendy in popular culture and accompanied by in-
creased access to drugs and more use, sometimes being less trendy 
with less use. The next sections further analyze drug abuse in 
this group.
Only a minority of these temporary users seem to require help 
from the social and health care services because of their use, i.e. 
the vast majority of this group are not drug abusers. These us-
ers are, for the most part, ordinary citizens who are not  involved 
in any other forms of criminality, apart from using illicit drugs. 
However, all of them are at risk of being pursued by the police 
and criminal courts. Understandably, none of them want po-
lice involvement or criminal indictment for their use of drugs. 
Figure 10. Percentage among adults (18 yrs and older) admitting cannabis 
use in their lifetime in 1997, 2002, 2013, and 2019.
Source: Gunnlaugsson 2018; Gunnlaugsson & Jónasson 2019.
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Therefore, a pressing question emerges: Where is the drug abuse 
problem most pronounced? Interestingly, the most pressing and 
recent drug problem in Iceland has not only involved illegal drugs 
but also drugs originating mostly from the pharmaceutical indus-
try and the medical profession.
Icelandic Opioid Crisis
With respect to legally prescribed drugs originating from the 
pharmaceutical industry, the picture for Iceland becomes more 
complicated than that suggested from the above picture of exper-
imental and temporary drug use in Iceland (Gunnlaugsson 2019). 
The use of prescription drugs, or other synthetic drugs, seems to 
be widespread across different social groups, rather than being 
found only among socially distinct groups.
Apparently, a lot of prescription drugs are in circulation in 
Iceland. According to Nomesco (2017), more opioids are pre-
scribed in Iceland than in any other Nordic country. Iceland 
also appears to be the leading Nordic country with respect to 
prescribing medical treatment for ADHD and in terms of anti-
depressant consumption. In the last decade, the use of antidepres-
sants reportedly increased by about half in Iceland, and the use of 
Figure 11. Percentage of adults older than 18 yrs who, in 2019, admitted 
cannabis use in their lifetime, by age.
Source: Gunnlaugsson & Jónasson (2019).
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ADHD  prescription drugs exhibited a whopping 165% increase 
(Arnórsson 2018). Even though prescriptions for insomnia and of 
sedatives have decreased somewhat in the country in the last de-
cade, Iceland still leads Nordic nations for consumption of these 
drugs, also ranking among the highest in the world. Moreover, 
close to 20% of all women and about 10% of all men in Iceland 
received a prescription for an antidepressant in 2017. Most of the 
increase for these prescriptions in recent years has been among 
those who are 40 years old or younger (Jónsson 2018a).
Some of the opioid prescriptions end up on the black market. 
In addition to other sources, the smuggling of medical drugs from 
other countries is also prevalent. According to the head physician 
at a local rehab center, access to different types of drugs – both 
legal and illegal – is easy in Iceland and their prices have remained 
stable or reduced (Ólafsdóttir 2019). A new comparative Nordic 
study on drug dealing over social media platforms observed a 
high degree of drug dealing activity in Iceland. All kinds of drugs 
are available in closed groups, including prescription drugs in ad-
dition to illegal drugs (Demant et al. 2019). A total of 30 private 
Facebook groups with several thousand members were found on-
line in Iceland. One seller in these groups stated in an interview, 
‘my customers are just ordinary citizens.’ Recently, news reports 
have shown large seizures of cocaine by police (see Table 11), 
with cocaine reportedly flooding the market like never before 
(Brynjólfsson 2019; Helgason 2019).
High Number of Drug-Related Deaths
The medical drug situation in Iceland described above may come 
as a surprise since Iceland is a country of low drug use  according 
to the ESPAD study of young students mentioned above. 
Furthermore, this claim might be unexpected since Icelanders 
consume less alcohol than most western nations, even though 
the gap between Iceland and other countries has been shrinking 
(OECD Health Statistics 2020). The opioid situation in Iceland 
has  created significant national concern because opiates are highly 
addictive and can easily result in different types of health risks, 
in addition to other problems, such as accidents on the roads. 
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Moreover, opiates are often used with other substances, such as 
alcohol and other drugs, thereby creating toxic cocktails.
Resultantly, numerous drug-related deaths have been reported 
in Iceland. From 2015 to 2017, a total of 85 drug-related deaths 
from different drug-related intoxications were reported (see 
Figure 12), including a total of 42 citizens dying due to opiate 
abuse. Opiate abuse was the most frequent cause of deaths due to 
intoxications for this time period, exceeding deaths due to illegal 
drugs by a large margin. The opiates mostly consisted of mor-
phine, codeine, demerol, tramadol, and fentanyl (Jónsson 2018b). 
In 2018, as can be seen in Figure 12, a total of 39 related deaths in 
Iceland were reportedly related to drug overdoses, and more than 
half of them were opioid-related (Magnúsdóttir 2019; Yaghi 
2019). According to the New York Times, deaths due to opioid 
drug overdoses are comparatively high in Iceland, and about half 
of the rate in the US (Katz 2017). This rate translated to 6.6 deaths 
per 100,000 Icelandic citizens in 2018. The total rate of drug-re-
lated deaths during 2010–2019 was however higher, as can be 
seen in Figure 12. The total rate of drug-related deaths during 
2010–2019 was from 7.1–11.1 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, 
as can be seen in Figure 12. Moreover, as shown in Figure 13, 
males had a higher drug-related death rate than females for most 
of this time period.
Figure 12. Total number of drug-related deaths and drug-related death rate, 
2010–2019.
Source: Directorate of Health 2021.
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Why does the situation of prescription drugs and drug-related 
deaths appear so grim in Iceland? Perhaps prescription drugs are 
more accessible in Iceland than, for example, in the other Nordic 
nations. The Directorate of Health in Iceland, therefore, estab-
lished an online prescription database for physicians in 2016 to 
prevent people from receiving multiple prescriptions for medi-
cations from different doctors. In July of 2018, regulations con-
cerning prescription drugs were tightened further, making it more 
challenging than before to legally obtain drugs of this type. The 
impact of tighter regulations has indeed resulted in fewer opi-
ate prescriptions in most recent years, yet Iceland is still leading 
Nordic nations in the number of prescriptions (Directorate of 
Health 2021). However, if drugs are smuggled in large quantities 
from abroad, such measures might not show much impact on lo-
cal black-market availability.
The supply and availability of drugs do not account for the 
high demand for these types of drugs in Iceland. Prescription 
drugs probably carry less stigma than illegal drugs and, there-
fore, may appear more attractive to larger groups of ordinary citi-
zens than illicit drugs. As for legally prescribed drugs, alternatives 
to drug use, such as consulting and therapy – increased access to 
social and psychological services – are options that perhaps have 
not been utilized to the same degree as in other Nordic nations.
Figure 13. Drug-related death rate per 100,000 inhabitants in Iceland by 
gender, 2010–2019.
Source: Directorate of Health 2021.
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Risk Factors and Drug Abuse
Studies show that alcohol and drug dependence can affect 
anyone; for instance, alcoholics seem to belong to all walks of 
life. Nevertheless, research indicates that a significant section 
of those who hit rock bottom due to heavy drug abuse, especially 
those who inject drugs, face various personal and social prob-
lems  (see, for example, Curry 1994 and Zilney 2011). Low formal 
 education, limited work experience, health care problems, and 
crime-prone lifestyles are all factors associated with drug abuse 
(Goode 2015), and to a much larger degree than found in the 
general population. Research findings of this type on drug abuse 
in Iceland, fueled by the local opioid crisis, have raised questions 
about the most effective way to respond to the problem of drugs.
A recent study conducted in Iceland seems to support the above 
social portrayal of heavy drug abuse. Based on data from a na-
tional rehab clinic in Iceland, where information about close to 
200 patients suffering from hard drug abuse (use of needles) was 
utilized during a two-year period, Aradóttir located (as cited in 
Gunnlaugsson 2015) a distinct social pattern. About half of the 
sample admitted upon entrance to the clinic that they had earlier 
been diagnosed with a disability of some sort and had limited 
work experience. The majority had only completed compulsory 
education. About 60% of the hard drug users in this study had 
previously been arrested or charged for drug violations, while 
only 25% of other patients at the clinic had the same experience. 
About one third admitted to having prior police history of thefts, 
frauds, or violence. Thus, it is evident that most hard drug users 
are crime-prone with prior police history. The vast majority suf-
fered from mental health problems, depression, anxieties, and ten-
sion. More than 70% of these drug users had considered suicide 
and about half had attempted suicide. More than half had been 
diagnosed with liver problem C and a few with HIV. Of the fe-
males, the vast majority had experienced violence and about 75% 
of them reported having been sexually victimized.
Admissions to the national rehab center are in the thousands 
each year, as previously mentioned. Increasingly, more patients in 
this group are admitted due to drug dependence, and the rate of 
alcohol abuse alone has diminished in recent years (SÁÁ 2021). In 
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2017, close to 40% of those admitted did not have any permanent 
housing, thereby suggesting poor social conditions, and about one 
quarter resided with their parents.
A survey conducted in Icelandic prisons in 2015 indicated sim-
ilar results of poor standing among prisoners. The vast majori-
ty of inmates suffered from serious alcohol and drug problems 
and had been diagnosed with a variety of personal and social 
problems, including ADHD and reading and writing difficulties 
(Hlöðversdóttir 2015; Gunnlaugsson 2018).
Therefore, there seems to be a high polarization of drug users in 
society. A large part of the population, particularly young people, 
appear to be willing to experiment and use drugs recreationally 
without apparently harming themselves. A large minority, howev-
er, end up becoming serious drug abusers with multi-faceted per-
sonal and social problems, posing a risk to themselves and others. 
Research, both in Iceland and elsewhere, roughly seems to draw 
up this polarized picture of the drug problem.
Is the criminal justice response the appropriate measure to 
deal with the kind of behavior described above? Is an unregu-
lated black market of drugs, including opioids, where consum-
er protection obviously is limited and appropriate education on 
how dangerous these drugs can really be not available, acceptable 
in modern-day welfare societies? In the wake of a public debate 
where questions of this type have appeared, harm reduction prin-
ciples have slowly emerged in Iceland in recent years to tackle 
this profound problem with a new approach. The long history 
of treatment availability in Iceland, and wide recognition of its 
success in dealing with substance use, has undoubtedly helped in 
paving the way for an alternative approach.
Consequently, local harm reduction programs have been es-
tablished in Iceland. As early as 2009, the Red Cross in Iceland 
launched a project on wheels, Frú Ragnheiður (Mrs. Ragnheiður), 
driving around the streets of the capital for six evenings a week 
(Frú Ragnheiður 2020). The vehicle is a specially equipped med-
ical reception for the homeless and people with drug addictions, 
offering medical care and general health advice to individuals, as 
well as a service that exchanges old needles for new. In 2018, ap-
proximately 450 individuals sought assistance from this program.
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New Drug Alternatives in Iceland?
A widespread consensus to continue with the firm stand against 
drugs has existed for a long time among Icelandic authorities. The 
public, at large, seems to support this national effort and moral 
sentiment. As population surveys have repeatedly indicated, there 
exists widespread opposition in Icelandic society toward drug use. 
In 2014, the vast majority of Icelanders were in favor of offering 
more rights to the police to investigate drug crimes. Most respon-
dents believe drug use to be the most serious crime in Iceland and 
substance use to be a decisive factor in the genesis of local crime 
(Gunnlaugsson 2018). In May of 2019, about 26% of all respon-
dents favored the legalization of cannabis and 35% were in favor 
of the decriminalization of the possession of drugs for personal 
use (Gunnlaugsson & Jónasson 2019), so the significant majority 
of Icelanders were against both the legalization of cannabis and 
the decriminalization of drug use.
However, support for alternative drug policies has increased 
somewhat in recent years, suggesting a retreat from the punitive 
stand. As a case in point, about 80% of all respondents opposed 
the legalization of cannabis in 2012, with fewer, or less than 70%, 
opposing legalization in 2019 (Mbl.is 2019). Local efforts such as 
Frú Ragnheiður and evidence on the nature of drug abuse, as for 
example reflected in the opioid crisis, have paved the way for new 
approaches to the drug problem. Resultantly, the notion that drug 
abuse should be defined and treated as a public health problem 
instead of a criminal justice issue has become more prominent 
(for example, Holm 2015). In the last few years, alternatives to 
current drug legislations have consequently appeared in Iceland. 
Proposals have been introduced in Alþingi, with the intent to re-
vise the local narcotics legislation. The primary focus has been on 
softening the ban on drugs to some extent, i.e., decriminalizing 
personal possession and use of drugs, particularly cannabis (see, 
for example, Alþingi 2012–2013). These proposals have typically 
generated widespread public debate in society. Even though not 
put into immediate effect, they still served to open up the drug 
debate in society, providing a platform for alternative actions ad-
opted by the government later.
More active public debate on drugs can indeed be detected 
in Iceland. Different opinions have been raised on tackling the 
87Drug Controls in Iceland: Any Retreat in Sight? 
local drug issue, with seminars and conferences critically deal-
ing with the drug problem (see, for example, Heilsutorg 2014). 
Local grassroots groups (for example, Snarrótin 2020) offering 
alternative perspectives on the drug problem have also emerged. 
Individual political parties, such as the Pirate Party and young 
members of the Independence Party, have increasingly voiced al-
ternative approaches in their party agenda.
In 2014, the Minister of Health from the Independence Party 
publicly announced at a meeting with young members of his party 
that decriminalization of personal possession of drugs should be 
seriously considered by the local legal body. Subsequently, an ex-
pert committee was established to revise and introduce new drug 
legislation on the issue (Bjarnar 2014). This move by the Minister 
of Health was unusual because drug controls and drug legisla-
tions, as previously mentioned, are formally located within the 
Ministry of Justice, and so this possibly reflects new voices in so-
ciety that believe drug abuse to be a public health problem rather 
than a crime problem.
A report from the committee was eventually submitted to 
Alþingi in the name of the Minister of Health (2016). The most 
noteworthy recommendation in the report was the discontin-
uation of registering minor possession of drugs on the criminal 
register and stopping the use of urine tests to determine whether 
individuals are driving while intoxicated. In 2018, as previously 
mentioned, provisions concerning the criminal register notifica-
tion were revised by the state prosecutor. Moreover, a proposal 
establishing a safe place for needle change and drug use was also 
included in the report. Such a safe site for those most affected by 
serious drug abuse would enable health workers to step in and 
assist them.
In May of 2020, Alþingi passed a new legal provision per-
mitting local governments to open safe places for drug addicts 
(Alþingi 2020). However, as of early 2021, this place had not yet 
been opened, apart from the Red Cross program Frú Ragnheiður 
mentioned above. A critique raised belonged to the capital area 
police chief. Drugs used by addicts are controlled substances, and 
the local police are obligated to confiscate them. The police can-
not look the other way and do nothing while illegal possession 
and the use of drugs are occurring in front of their eyes (Pétursson 
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2019). Despite opposition from the Icelandic police, a legal change 
allowing safe places for drug addicts was still approved by the lo-
cal legal body.
As for driving while intoxicated, since 2018, drug residuals 
found in urine samples cannot serve as a basis for conviction; only 
blood samples can be used (Icelandic Transport Authority 2018). 
In the past, many drivers who had drug residuals in their urine 
sample, such as THC from cannabis, which may have been con-
sumed up to a month earlier, were at risk of being convicted for 
driving while intoxicated. Currently, only those who exhibit signs 
of drug intoxication at the time of driving, as shown in blood 
samples, can be convicted for driving while intoxicated (DWI).
These legal actions can be considered a sort of policy shift 
from the punitive stand against drugs and a minor step toward the 
decriminalization of the personal use of drugs, in addition to only 
punishing those who are shown to be intoxicated while driving a 
vehicle. This suggests a retreat in the battle against drugs, mov-
ing away from restrictive policies to a somewhat softer approach. 
However, possession of drugs for personal use is still punishable 
by Icelandic law, resulting in a fine.
In the fall of 2019, a new drug bill was introduced in Alþingi 
(Alþingi 2019a). Nine MPs out of a total of 63 members, repre-
senting five of the eight political parties in Alþingi, introduced 
a proposal calling for the decriminalization of possession of all 
drugs for personal use. The type and quantity of drugs were not 
specified in the preamble of the bill. Under this bill, receiving and 
buying drugs above an unspecified limit for personal use will con-
tinue to be illegal. Possession of drugs for personal use will only 
be regarded as a public health issue and not a penal one. The im-
portation, production, and distribution of drugs continues to be 
prohibited. If this bill is passed, according to the preamble, super-
vised drug sites for serious drug abusers will become possible for 
the first time. An important reason for not establishing such sites 
earlier was that the possession of drugs for personal use is prohib-
ited and punishable by at least a fine. This makes it challenging, if 
not impossible, for health care workers to provide the necessary 
health services to hard drug abusers. The positive outcome of the 
Portugal experience of decriminalization was  cited as a source to 
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justify the objectives of the proposal. However, as previously not-
ed, safe places for drug addicts have now been allowed by the 
legal body.
This new proposal was finally defeated in an Alþingi vote by 
a large margin in late June of 2020 after a heated debate (Hrönn 
2020). Realistically, it did not seem likely to be passed. Two of the 
political parties in the present coalition government in Iceland did 
not have representation among the sponsors of the bill. A pro-
posal originating from the opposition is not likely to be passed. 
However, a proposal departing from the punitive stand on drugs 
had reached the legislative agenda in Alþingi and so symboliz-
es new voices and directions in dealing with the country’s drug 
problem. An editorial in the most-read local newspaper openly 
supported the proposal, stating that the war on drugs had been 
lost (Sigurþórsdóttir 2019).
Interestingly, in January of 2021 the Minister of Health an-
nounced plans to introduce a new bill in Alþingi calling for decrim-
inalization of small amounts of drugs for personal use (Pearson 
2021), based on the assumption that drug addiction is more of a 
public health issue than a crime problem, similar to the earlier bill 
defeated in June of 2020. As a possible obstacle, the Directorate 
of Health repeatedly opposed a legal change of this type (see, for 
example, Alþingi 2019b). Yet in January of 2021, a new direction 
could be detected. In a formal statement about the new bill, the 
Directorate of Health revealed a favorable stand on decriminal-
izing small amounts of drugs for drug addicts (Þórisdóttir 2021), 
although added a reservation that this was only to be approved 
if the legal reform was to be properly placed within a broader 
social policy on drugs. Therefore, it can be argued that a possible 
paradigm shift in dealing with drug abuse might be in the making 
in Iceland. However, the bill did not make it to a vote before the 
Alþingi recession in June of 2021, and therefore did not pass.
Concluding Remarks
The free market is a fundamental doctrine of the European 
Union, the World Trade Organization, and other powerful insti-
tutions (Sulkunen 2009). However, the free-market ideology has 
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not yet penetrated to any significant degree into the market for 
illegal drugs that are mostly used for recreational purposes in the 
western world. Punitive measures in the area of drug use are vig-
orously and morally defended by western authorities, including 
Nordic nations, as shown in this book, using the state apparatus 
to seek out and prosecute both drug producers and sellers – and 
in many countries, also drug users.
These efforts by the state are, in one way or another, justified 
by the principles of protecting the public – a similar battle to the 
one western authorities lost a long time ago in the struggle against 
alcohol (Gunnlaugsson 2012). Even though actions adopted by 
governments to curb drug use contain the potential for subverting 
legal traditions of individual freedom, they are still believed to be 
necessary for ensuring public good.
Why has the state been able to both introduce and maintain this 
punitive grip over drugs in modern society? The relatively short 
history of the influx of drugs to the western world in the 1960´s 
and 1970´s most probably has something to do with the intensity 
of punitive state reactions today. As a case in point, tobacco and 
alcohol have a much longer history in western societies, with both 
being legal despite posing immense health risks. For Iceland, a 
small island nation far away from neighboring countries, drugs 
have been seen even more as an outside imposition threatening 
the nation, especially the young, possibly undermining the future 
of the nation. Drug use is risky and regular media reporting on 
devastating stories of drug abuse understandably alarms the gen-
eral public.
A recent United Nations World Drug Report was blunt in its 
conclusion, claiming that criminal sanctions for drug use are not 
beneficial (World Drug Report 2014). It is certainly worthwhile 
and interesting to speculate on what future drug legislation devel-
opments will occur, or will look like, in Iceland or other Nordic 
countries. Is it probable that many recreational drugs, such as 
cannabis, will be defined and regulated by law in the same manner 
as we define alcohol today, or even tobacco, as has been the case 
in, for example, many US states and Canada? General alcohol and 
tobacco prohibition seem somewhat out of place in modern-day 
society and are incongruent with our ideas of freedom and human 
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rights, despite alcohol problems and the harms of tobacco both 
being well-known and serious (Gunnlaugsson 2012). Will, simi-
larly, the current prohibitive drug legislations be perceived in the 
future as both archaic and unjust, and perhaps even futile? In this 
respect, it is noteworthy that the use of tobacco has significantly 
decreased in recent years in many western societies without pu-
nitive measures. Perhaps the same can happen with recreational 
drugs, with its use being regulated through social and cultural 
norms instead of resorting to action by the criminal justice system.
If some of the drugs currently banned will eventually be reg-
ulated, or even legalized, will this inevitably result in increased 
public use with more health-related risks than we experience to-
day? By allowing free-market forces to realize their full impact, 
legalization of the most common drugs – for example, cannabis 
– will most probably result in more general use of the drug, just 
as was the case previously with alcohol use (Gunnlaugsson 2017). 
The temporary and experimental use of drugs, which primarily 
characterizes use today, as shown in this chapter, will most likely 
be replaced by more widespread and permanent use of drugs in 
older age groups. Preliminary results from the legalization of mar-
ijuana in the US have been followed by lower prices, a dual legal 
and illegal market, and – in some instances – more problematic 
use (Savona, Kleiman & Calderoni 2017). Yet, it is probably too 
early to be conclusive about the outcome of the recent legalization 
in the US and Canada. Nevertheless, we might still expect that 
these changes are not altogether unproblematic.
Contrarily, it is not self-evident that the legalization of drugs 
necessarily includes free marketization and increased drug use. 
The supply of drugs and market availability could instead be reg-
ulated through similar sources as common medicines and drugs. 
Even state monopoly on alcohol sale restrictions, as are currently 
present in several Nordic nations, are also possible options for 
distributing recreational drugs. Sale arrangements, however, rely 
on political decisions and, obviously, many different policy choic-
es are open to policymakers if the ban on drugs is relaxed, or even 
lifted, in the future.
As for the decriminalization of the possession of drugs for per-
sonal use, it is evident that it does not include the free  marketization 
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of drugs. The production and sale of drugs continue to be banned 
and will, therefore, not be placed on the free market with de-
criminalization. As early signs suggest (Drug Policy Alliance 2019; 
Hughes & Stevens 2010; Quintas & Arana 2017), decriminaliza-
tion policies do not necessarily result in increased drug use where 
these policies have been enacted.
As for Iceland, which only legalized beer in 1989, a major le-
gal change might seem unlikely. More liberal alcohol policies, 
including the legalization of beer, have indisputably increased 
the total amount of alcohol consumed in Iceland in recent years 
(Gunnlaugsson 2017). Alcohol use among youth, however, has 
not increased as many beer opponents had feared. Some new, 
local signs pointing toward a retreat of the firm punitive stand 
against drugs have, nevertheless, appeared in Iceland, suggesting 
a possible paradigm shift in the future. This retreat has largely 
centered on reacting against drug abuse, fueled by the local opioid 
crises. As the review above indicates, the notion that drug abuse is 
a public health issue instead of a crime problem has increasingly 
gained a foothold in Icelandic society. This has been most clearly 
shown in the legal change allowing safe havens for drug addicts 
in 2020 and a new decriminalization proposal from the Minister 
of Health in 2021.
However, recreational drug use as a legally and socially accept-
ed policy in Iceland might seem farther away, as public opinion 
surveys have repeatedly shown. Social and cultural aversion of 
drugs in Iceland, revealed in local surveys, do not suggest immedi-
ate public support for decriminalization proposals. Nevertheless, 
more active public debate on drug policy alternatives in most 
recent years might possibly change the public mind in the fore-
seen future. Legal reforms, including reduced punishment for the 
importation, production, and sale of drugs, not to mention le-
galization of all drugs, have moreover not yet appeared in the 
legislative body of Alþingi. The criminal courts routinely mete 
out relatively harsh punishments for these types of drug offenses 
without any notable opposition from the public or government 
officials alike. Recent prison figures of drug offenders show no 
retreat of punitive practices, reaching a historic high in 2018 and 
2019 with about 40% of the total inmate population serving time 
for drug-related offences.
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A thorough restructuring of the Icelandic drug laws toward a 
non-punitive drug policy, where the production, sale, and use of 
drugs are legally regulated, seems more likely to be adopted in 
Iceland as part of a broader multi-nation effort, rather than Iceland 
acting alone. Nordic nations, being internationally recognized wel-
fare societies, could be ideal candidates to adopt alternative and 
more humane drug policies in the future. Nordic nations, howev-
er, currently offer different drug policies, as shown in this book, 
which might make a unified Nordic drug policy seem unlikely.
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5. From Medicine to Morals, and Back 
Again? The Changing Perceptions of ‘the 
Drug Problem’ in Norway since 1965
Paul Larsson
This article will deal with how the public and political discourse 
has changed in Norway during the last five decades concerning 
the ‘the drug problem’. The basic idea is that these changes are 
related to the ways the drug problem is perceived and presented 
in the public discourse and official publications. The reasons for 
these changes in perception are related to factors such as exter-
nal pressure to implement penal regulations of the field but also 
changes in youth culture and how it is conceived by the public, 
media, and the political elite (NOU 2019: 26; Ot.prp nr. 5 1971–
72; Skretting 2013; St.meld. 66 1975–76).
Hauge (2009) and Lind (1974) stated that, until the mid 1960s, 
Norwegian state officials implemented the international laws con-
cerning drugs, such as the single convention, without giving them 
too much attention. Drugs were not seen as a substantial problem 
in Norway, at least not a crime problem, so the effects or rele-
vance of these laws did not cause much worry. The main strategy 
towards the drug problem from the 1930s until the early 1960s 
was health oriented (Lind 1974; Pedersen 2020). Drugs were not 
a hot topic in the press or in politics, they was mainly regarded 
as a medical problem for experts to deal with. The first two police 
officers working part-time with drugs were appointed in the Oslo 
PD in 1965. This relaxed approach was to change dramatically in 
the years to come. One of the most interesting features of this pro-
cess of penalization was the creation of the drug user as deviant 
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and criminal, and the development of new and expanding catego-
ries of crime. Drug users used to be conceived as a health problem, 
in need of care and assistance. The criminalization of drugs was 
a move from medicine to morals. The normal reaction towards 
drugs changed to one of police involvement, sentence – normally 
a fine – and an attached stigma. In line with classic stigma theory, 
deviance is not something that originates from the person itself 
or the act, but instead our way of reacting to certain acts under 
certain circumstances by certain people (Franko 2020). The crim-
inal drug addict became associated with youth with certain traits 
– long hair and often with social, mental, and health problems. As 
Lind points out as early as 1974, the ones who came to be labelled 
as drug addicts and rounded up by the police were not the average 
youth experimenting with drugs, but a sad representation of mar-
ginalized segments of Norwegian society.
Table 12 shows the growth in cases investigated from 1968 to 
1998. There are no other forms of reported crimes that are even 
close to this rate of expansion. The numbers continued to grow 
until 2013, when they peaked at an all-time high with more than 
47,000 cases reported (Table 13).19 Since this time there has been 
a marked decline, as with other forms of registered crime. The 
numbers show the most dramatic increase in the 1990s.
 19 Table 12 represents investigated cases while 13 deals with reported cases. 
The numbers of reported cases will be higher than those investigated 
since cases will be dropped for different reasons. 
Table 12. Investigated drug cases, 1968–1998. 
year total drugs theft
1968 51,830 201 41,933
1973 86,992 1,262 73,795
1978 105,263 1,617 88,108
1983 159,598 3,793 133,052
1988 220,338 6,229 181,314
1993 248,203 11,739 194,907
1998 292,233 30,291 206,786
1998:1968 5,6 150,7 4,9
Source: Haslund (1999).
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Table 13. Reported drug cases, 1993–2017.20
1993 1996 2001 2004 2009 2013 2017 
12,714 26,532 46,251 37,259 39,280 47,286 33,585 
Source: Reported Crimes.21
Not only did the number of cases and police resources increase, 
so too did the severity of punishments and sentences. Christie and 
Bruun (1985) document the developments in the scales of punish-
ment, from a maximum of two years imprisonment in 1964 to 21 
years in 1984. This raises two questions: what can explain these 
numbers? How can we make sense of them?
The common response to this growth in numbers is that they 
simply reflect the developments of the drug problem. ‘Look at 
these numbers, something must be very wrong in society when we 
create harsher laws but numbers still keep rising.’ The answer to 
this claim has often been that we need still tougher laws and more 
police resources to scare off traffickers, pushers and users.
Another response is that the numbers primarily mirror the 
control activity in the field. The more police and customs resourc-
es that are used, the higher the number of cases detected. In this 
 perspective, drug-related crimes are a more or less inexhaust-
ible resource where police ‘round up the usual suspects’. This is 
pointed out by Lind (1974) when she documents that approx-
imately 5% of the cannabis users in Oslo were apprehended 
by the police. In general, users reflected the general population, 
however the ones caught more often had personal, social, and 
medical problems. They confirmed the stereotypical image of the 
‘drug addicts’. 
We know from data on self-reported use that there was a clear 
increase in drug use in the 1970s (Haslund 1999). This increase 
was not in any way close to the growth in the number of inves-
tigated cases. The alarming development in the 1990s, with an 
increase in reported cases of approximately 300%, cannot be 
 20 In the period 1993 to 2013, the percentage of drug cases compared to 
all recorded crimes increased from 5.5% to 18%. There has been a drop 
since 2013, not only in drug reports but all reported crime (Larsson).
 21 Tabell 4 Lovbrudd anmeldt, etter type lovbrudd. 1991–2001 (ssb.no).
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 explained by the rise in use alone – the main explanation is related 
to policing. The period was characterized by stability and a sharp 
rise in the use of ecstasy and pills at the end of the century, of-
ten linked to the techno and rave culture, which later went down 
again (Stene 2003).
When it comes to sentencing, Hauge (2008 and 2015) docu-
mented that the peak came early, in the 1980s. Since that time 
there has been a move from imprisonment towards fines for users. 
Today, fines dominate (Larsson 2011; NOU 2019: 26). Sanctions 
against traffickers and dealers are still severe and disproportionate 
compared to the levels of punishment for other crimes in Norway 
(Träskman 2012).
Towards a Moral Panic? 
Christie’s article, ‘Long haired life-style’ (1968), described the re-
actions of panic by parts of the establishment concerning the small 
groups of strange looking, highly visible youngsters in Oslo at the 
end of the 1960s. As researchers in the field have pointed out, drug 
use is nothing new, but the visible presence of long-haired, weirdly 
dressed youngsters smoking cannabis, combined with a growing 
interest in drugs among the public, media, and politicians, created 
an atmosphere verging on panic (Skretting 2013). As Lind (1974) 
pointed out, there was indeed a growth in the use of some sub-
stances from the mid 1960s, but the way the media presented this 
blew it way out of proportion. Drug use was depicted as epidemic 
and youngsters could get hooked after more or less one puff of the 
pipe. The result was not only wasted lives and early death but also 
a threat to our morals, society, and culture. ‘The point is that the 
development only goes in one direction, towards moral and phys-
ical decay, loss of sense of reality, a dissolution of the self … Sadly 
there are thousands of examples that just one little try might lead 
to dependency and damage done …’22 (Lind 1974: 39). The debate 
and the reactions seem to have all the basic ingredients of a moral 
panic, as Stanley Cohen described, with a clear enemy, a threat to 
society and norms, a black-and-white, exaggerated, and one-sided 
 22 These arguments are from one of the first interpellations on drug pro-
blems in the Norwegian Parliament in 1967.
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depiction of the problem in media and strong societal reactions 
(Cohen 1972/2009). Drugs shifted from medicine to morals. The 
level of punishment was raised. The main legal argument then, as 
now, was a general preventive one – that the threat of punishment 
would scare off users and the wider normative effects it would 
create (Christie & Bruun 1985). But we also see clear traces of an-
other penal logic – punishment as social defence (Flaatten 2014). 
The drug situation at the time was described by many as an epi-
demic23 wildfire, with strong measures seen as appropriate to stop 
the destruction of the youth and save society.
Use and possession was criminalized in 1965. As mentioned, 
Legemiddelloven of 1964 came as a follow-up to the UN Single 
Convention and was adopted before the ‘new’ drug problem 
came to Norway. In accordance with the Convention, the law was 
aimed at the illegal possession and sale of drugs, and contained 
no explicit provision for use. Prohibition of use, however, was 
included in the 1965 regulation, and was used as a legal basis 
to impose penalties for use in the first drug cases that came to 
court this year (Skretting 2013). Lind (1974) points out that the 
legal status of punishment for use was disputed. The dispute end-
ed with a Supreme Court decision in favour of using punishment 
in May 1967.
The end of the 1960s was a time of change and flowering of 
counterculture. The use of different substances was often associat-
ed with radical changes and seen as a general threat to established 
society by more conservative elements of society. It is pointed out 
that Nixon’s war against drugs was more a war against blacks 
and radical groups (Hari 2015). By chasing drug use among cer-
tain visible groups the police activity had aspects of ‘cleaning up’ 
elements seen as threatening, unwanted, and deviant.
An interesting detail is that this more or less coincided with 
the removal of the vagrancy paragraphs that made consumption 
of alcohol in public illegal in Norway (the vagrancy law). This 
highly discriminating law, which more or less without exception 
punished poor drinkers, was abolished in 1970 (Mathiesen 1975). 
The public was waiting for the streets to overflow with  drunkards. 
 23 The Norwegian director of health, Karl Evang, and the Swede Nils Bejerot 
were among the proponents of the idea of an epidemic perspective.
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Instead, what happened was that the police changed from pursu-
ing old-sailors, helpless drunks, and vagrants and started to catch 
a new group of deviants, the long-haired youths associated with 
drug use.
1970s and Early 1980s – Hunting the Drug Shark!
The repeated raising of the level of punishment during the 1970s 
and 1980s was not primarily aimed at the drug users.24 Instead, 
the cynical Mr. X or drug shark became the main enemy. This 
started in 1972 with the raising of the maximum punishment for 
drug related crimes to 10 years. We were told there was a drug 
industry – we are not talking of the legal, multibillion-dollar drug 
industry – controlled by cynical criminals with immense powers 
and riches. In Nordic language they were known as bakmenn, 
literary men behind the scenes. These facilitators speculated in 
turning people into drug slaves to reap even higher profits. The 
goal of the police was to ‘take out’ these sharks, and Denmark 
was the first Nordic country with its own police force dedicated to 
this goal.25 Arresting these villains would stop drugs from entering 
the streets and deter others joining the trade. They were nothing 
but plain killers peddling their poison on kids and turning them 
into slaves of ‘lifelong torture’.26 Severe punishment would make 
it less ‘attractive’ for drug traffickers to search out the Norwegian 
market and would have a deterrent effect (Lind 1974; Skretting 
2013). Therefore, heavy penalties and wide police powers were 
appropriate and needed.
The problem with this approach, based on commonly shared 
beliefs, was that it had some basic flaws. Drug markets are not 
controlled by a handful of people. Instead, they are flexible and 
 24 The belief in the deterrent effects of punishment towards users may have 
been a constant, but the idea of how punishment was having such an 
effect has varied. There have been periods when a ‘scared straight’ idea 
has been dominant, with the threat of police action seen as keeping kids 
away. Today, however, there is a belief in the normative effects of punish-
ment, usually described as ‘sending the right signals’ (often underlined by 
the police) and as a ‘last threat’ in preventive policing (described below).
 25 Statsadvokaten for særlig økonomisk kriminalitet, known as bagmands-
politiet, was established in 1973.
 26 From Ot. tidende nr. 49, sak, nr. 4, 1967/68 (Lind 1974: 50).
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highly adjustable. The police and customs confiscate tons of 
cannabis, heroin, cocaine, and other drugs, but there are always 
plenty more and the market also adjusts with the production 
of new drugs, often more dangerous than the original ones 
(Bewley-Taylor 2012; Nutt 2012). The level of punishment 
seems to have a marginal effect on smuggling, production, and 
consumption (MacCoun & Reuter 2001; Paoli, Greenfield, & 
Reuter 2009).
Once in a while, a drug baron controlling at least parts of the 
drug trade in some countries pops up (Zaitch 2002). But research 
has documented, at least since the time of Bødal (1982), that the 
‘sharks’ that end up in prison are users themselves, with few ex-
ceptions, often with dire problems. They look confusingly similar 
to the ordinary prisoner – people with multiple social, health, and 
medical problems.
Even more depressing was the fact that removing actors that 
seemed to be big time players of central importance made little 
difference at all (Woods 2017). Arresting a trafficker (Gjermund 
Cappelen, known as GT) who admitted to having smuggled 20 
tons of hash to Norway in a 20-year period made no visible dif-
ference to the market. The number of big drug cases in Norway 
before 2000 was very few. Still today, 97–98% of the cases han-
dled by the police are concerning use, possession, and small-time 
dealing (Larsson 2011).
Mid 1980s to 2000 – Cracking Down on the Users,  
‘Stress Policing’
The 1990s saw an explosion in the number of reported drug cas-
es that is hard to explain (Stene 2003). There might be different 
factors contributing, such as changes in registration practices and 
drug use, but most of the increase seems to be connected to po-
lice activity. So, what happened? At a time when reported crimes 
started to drop, the drug cases sky-rocketed while the level of 
consumption increased moderately. 
The State Institute of alcohol and drug research have asked youth 
in the age 15–20 years if they ever have used cannabis. The pro-
portion giving a yes answer increased from 5 to 18 percent in the 
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period 1986–1998. In the same period the numbers of investigated 
drug crimes increased by seven times. 
(Haslund 1999)
Some of it might have to do with new routines for reporting 
crimes and the implementation of a new digital system in the po-
lice (Ellingsen 2001). But there must be other factors. One such 
factor is priority and resources allocated to the police. Another 
might be that the police were better organized, the Norsk nar-
kotikapolitiforening (NNPF), a mighty organization for the 
Norwegian drug police, was established in 1994. The police 
were impressed by the Danish ‘uropolitiet’ (stress police). Both 
the Danish and the Norwegian uropolitiet worked in the streets 
in plain clothes by infiltration, provocation and other ‘creative’ 
methods (Jensen 2015). Money was never a problem when it 
came to policing drugs in this period. No political party would 
cut the budget of the drug police. The work was seen as saving 
lives and of high importance.
Police got more professional and specialized in the drug field. 
There have since been courses and training programs in how to 
detect narcotics and substance use, with the number of drug sniff-
er dogs also having increased.
This coincided with the implementation of New Public 
Management ideals in the police force. With new management 
ideals there was a pressure to register more activity (Lomell 2018). 
Police officers are quick to point out that this created a pressure to 
register cases easily solved and with high clear-up rates. Therefore, 
there might be evidence that a substantial part of the increase 
seen was a result of the drive towards cooking the books for bet-
ter scores (Reiner 2010). Drug numbers are well known fixers of 
police statistics, with an extraordinarily high clear-up rate and a 
short processing time. In many countries, drug statistics are not 
included in the general crime statistics for this reason,27 but not in 
Norway. There are plenty of examples of the unintended conse-
quences of the stressing of certain management goals (Wathne 
2015). One well-documented example was the manipulation 
 27 Example is the Crime Statistics of England and Wales. https://www.ons 
.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins 
/crimeinenglandandwales/yearendingmarch2019#overview-of-crime.
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of drink driving tests by the Swedish police by blowing the 
tests themselves,28 or getting the correct numbers in other ways 
(Granér 2004). Doing the real test could be hazardous – if they 
actually caught a drunk driver there was lots of paperwork, so the 
best thing would be to do the test in low-risk areas and at times 
when there was less chance of drunk driving.
The Increased Focus on Organized Crime
A major shift occurred in the mid 1990s when organized crime 
was introduced as a major threat (Larsson 2018). Serious drug 
crimes were re-labelled. For many police officers, organized crime 
was more or less synonymous with drug crimes. This is still re-
flected in priorities and resources used and in what the police reg-
ister in their intelligence files (Eidet 2019). There was a move from 
policing the streets towards more analytical approaches based on 
intelligence work (intelligence-led policing) and the use of hid-
den and coercive methods, such as wiretapping, infiltration, and 
the use of informers (NOU 1997: 15; NOU 2009: 15). A new 
group of police specialists and experts evolved with more analyt-
ical skills. They worked in more pro-active ways to build cases 
(Fyfe, Gundhus, & Rønn 2018). In the words of Murji (1998), 
there was a move from low-level to high-level policing. Resources 
were diverted from street work to catch importers and traffick-
ers of drugs. Working on the streets with ‘stress policing’ used to 
be of high status in the police, however, now there has been a 
move towards experts in analysis and intelligence-led policing 
(Larsson 2015, 2018).
Policing drugs has been the spearhead of substantial changes 
in policing for the last 50 years (Sheptycki 2000; Larsson 2014). 
Some of the most important changes are a growth in interna-
tional policing, a wider use of coercive methods, more effective 
 co-operation with other agencies of policing, the development 
of intelligence-led policing and analysis, new investigative meth-
ods, and a growth in the numbers of civilian experts in the police 
 28 By blowing the tests themselves, they avoided catching any drunk drivers, 
and so also avoided all the extra paperwork and other nuisances that 
went with this.
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(Larsson 2018). Policing drugs has been one of the most central 
contributors to changing the role of the police and introducing 
new methods that have implications for society far beyond the 
police force itself.
The Sick Drug Addict and the Problematic Youth
Norway have been described as one of the hawks in the drug pol-
icy field. This has only been a partial truth (Bewley-Taylor 2012; 
Skretting 2013). There have always been groups of users treated 
in more health-oriented ways, but the health focus has become 
more visible since the turn of the century.
Norway have had treatment facilities established for drug users 
since the early 1960s, but they were for ‘traditional users’ – doc-
tors, health personnel, and patients with dependency problems 
(Lind 1974, NOU 2019: 26). A wider move towards a health ap-
proach came as a result of the HIV/AIDS epidemic of the 1980s. 
Harm reduction now became a central term (Bewley-Taylor 
2012). The spread of LAR29 to a substantial number of heroin 
users and the opening up of injection rooms in 2004 are examples 
of a turn towards health (Olsen 2020). For a short period in 2004, 
the Police Chief of Oslo and the minister of Justice at the time, 
Dørum, declared that it was not the task of the police to chase 
sick and tired drug users, resulting in falling numbers of report-
ed crimes. However, subsequently, things more or less returned 
to normal.30
The tired heroin user on the street has gone from being a prime 
example of ‘the usual suspect’, dangerous criminal, and police 
property, to being seen as sick and in need of help and rehabil-
itation. This process has taken years and one should not under-
 29 LAR is short for Legemiddelassistert rehabilitering. It is the use of opioid 
treatment for drug users, usually heroin users with a long history. Also 
known as substitution treatment.
 30 https://www.aftenposten.no/osloby/i/5E671/doerum-og-lae-lover-aa 
-ikke-jage-de-narkomane. The message was repeated by the General attor-
ney in 2014. Police shall not chase worn-down drug users, but prioritize 
serious crimes. https://www.dagsavisen.no/nyheter/innenriks/politiet-skal 
-ikke-lope-etter-slitne-narkomane-1.278016.
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estimate the roles of Nini and Thorvald Stoltenberg31 in giving a 
face to the user and the relatives. Thorvald was one of the first 
top politicians openly supporting the decriminalization of drug 
use, and the leader of the Stoltenberg Commission32 and mem-
ber of the Global Commission on drug policy. The high numbers 
of drug-related deaths have, for the last decades, been a fly in 
the ointment and embarrassment of the Norwegian welfare sys-
tem. The highly visible, tired, and sick opioid addicts in the main 
streets and parks of Oslo and Bergen have been bad publicity for 
the world’s best country,33 and a thorn in the side of local politi-
cians and businesses.34
Considering the population of 5.4 million, the numbers given 
in Table 14 are high. The numbers were low until the end of the 
1980s. There was then a sharp rise, peaking in 2001. Since 2003 
the numbers have fluctuated round 275 a year. It is interesting to 
 31 Thorvald Stoltenberg was former minister of foreign affairs and father 
of Jens Stoltenberg, prime minister and now General secretary of NATO. 
Nini was the daughter of Thorvald. She had a career in media before she 
became addicted to heroin. She was open with her problems and told the 
tale of the hard life of being a stigmatized addict. Thorvald got engaged 
in the drug case and was a strong believer in change. Nini died in 2014 
and Thorvald passed away in 2018.
 32 https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/hod/rappomnarkotika 
_nettversjon.pdf.
 33 I use this term with a slight potion of irony for 15 years Norway has 
been on the top of UNDPs list of the best nations to live in. Human 
Development Reports (undp.org). 
 34 Drug-related deaths are divided into three main categories: poisoning ac-
cidents (72%), suicides (20%), and mental disorders and behavioural dis-
order in connection to drug use. 83% of the deaths are related to opioids, 
with ‘other opioids’ (morphine, kodein, and oxycodon) at 31%, heroin 
at 20%, synthetic opioids at 18%, and methadone at 14%. There are 
dark figures and the numbers of suicides are generally considered to be 
higher than what is reflected in the statistics (Narkotikautløste dødsfall 
2019 – FHI).
Table 14. Drug-related deaths in Norway.34
Year 1985 1995 2001 2007 2013 2016 2020
Deaths 45 143 405 275 234 275 324
Source: Amundsen (2015); Narkotikautløste dødsfall 2020 – FHI.
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note that these numbers seem like a mirror of the rise in reported 
drug cases (Table 13).
Skretting (2013) describes the Norwegian policy as basically 
schizophrenic – there are elements of a strong belief in punish-
ment and severe penalties, but also in rehabilitation and health 
care.35 Norway has a maximum penalty for serious drug crimes of 
21 years of imprisonment. What is conceived as a serious case in a 
Norwegian context, however, might be viewed as small fry in The 
Netherlands, Spain, or the UK.36 This might not be as  schizophrenic 
as Skretting claims, but instead mirrors that some groups are la-
belled as ‘deserving’ drug addicts and patients, while others are 
seen as a threat and so are suitable candidates for  deterrence and 
punishment. The schism also reflects the different professions op-
erating in the field and their perspectives. Social workers, police, 
and health personnel will perceive the drug problem and its solu-
tions in different ways. The drug question is like the well-known 
story of the blind man and the elephant – dependent on what part 
you see or feel, it will appear as a different animal. The so-called 
symptom theory, that drug use was basically seen as a symptom of 
problems related to the social, health, and economic sphere, was 
officially established in 1976.37 This perspective underlines the so-
cial causes, while over the last decade we have gone a long way 
towards defining drug use in medical and health terms. We have 
moved from symptoms to illness. In this way, we have also gone 
from social to more individual causes as the main  explanations. 
This might also reflect that the ones ‘defining the solutions’ 
 35 ‘Abuse is increasingly interpreted in a disease perspective, harm reduction 
has become more important, while people with drug problems are refer-
red to as addicts. In this way, one could say that Norway is in a situation 
where we have developed a “schizophrenic” view of the drug problem, 
by on the one hand stressing the health aspects of abuse, while on the 
other hand seeming to be trapped in legislation, with severe penalties for 
drug offenses, which prevents a softening up if this is seen as appropriate’ 
(Skretting 2013, translation Paul Larsson).
 36 One example, 80kg of cannabis is the limit for what is seen as a serious 
crime concerning smuggling of cannabis. When it is defined as a serious 
drug crime the maximum sentence is 21 years. 80 kg of cannabis in the 
Netherlands, Spain or UK will not be treated as serious drug trafficking.
 37 St.meld. nr. 66 (1975–76).
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have moved from social workers to the medical and health 
care professions.
The cornerstone of policing drugs in Norway for the last de-
cade has been coined preventive work. The last action plan by 
the police concerning drugs underlined the need to reduce the 
availability of drugs on the street and the recruitment to drug use 
(Politidirektoratet 2010; Larsson 2015). This plan is character-
ized by low policing and street work, the remnants of stress polic-
ing. For some reason, the policing of import and trafficking is not 
mentioned in the action plan – it might be because this is seen as 
combating organized crime. Another plausible explanation of this 
omission might be that the plan is not written for experts but for 
the local patrolling officer.
The plan points to the importance of police combating 
 availability of drugs on the streets, hoping to reduce demand, and 
use. The means of ‘how to achieve this’ are well known, it is a 
combination of cracking down on known users (on the street), by 
information to the public, and the use of surveillance. The plan 
is rather vague when it comes to describe the practical aspects of 
these approaches. 
The last decade new preventive strategies aimed at young drug 
users have become fashionable. They are named the dialog of con-
cern38 (bekymringssamtale) and youth and drug contracts (NOU 
2019: 26). These are formally based on free will and consent39 of 
the youngsters, and are presented as help. These reactions can be 
supplemented with the use of mediation in a Conflict Resolution 
 38 The dialog of concern has been developed by Norwegian police. It is 
a formalized dialog that the police will conduct with youth that have 
committed a crime or those who are in a situation that the police believe 
makes it likely they will commit a crime. It is for youth under 18 years 
and is also primarily based on free will. Often the police will contact the 
parents to inform them about the situation. The effects of this alternative 
have not been documented by research (Lie 2020). Politiets bekymrings-
samtale – NUBU.
 39 There is a discussion about whether or not these measures are actually 
perceived as being of free will, as the pressure to join and the control in 
these ‘alternatives’ are such that it is openly questioned if they are for the 
good of the youth. There has so far not been any study of the effects of 
these alternatives.
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board. These ‘preventive measures’ are backed by the threat of 
punishment and a heavy use of urinal tests (Lien & Larsen nd 
_PUB_Flinkiser_og_dropouts__orig.pdf (rus-ost.no)). They have 
a duration of eight months and the youngsters are obliged to at-
tend talks with a nurse on a regular basis. Drug contracts are seen 
as suitable for youngsters and a low-threshold reaction. Even if 
the police label these measures as preventative, they view them 
as dependent on the threat of punishment. This, together with 
the normative argument (below), is among the main arguments 
against a decriminalization of drug use by the police and rep-
resentatives of the political parties KrF (Christian Democrats), 
FrP (The Progressive Party, a populist party), and, to a certain 
extent, the AP (Social Democrats).
We are now in the rather strange situation where there is lit-
tle resistance against a decriminalization and relabeling of heavy 
drug users from dope fiends to patients. At the same time, young 
experimental users will still be criminalized for the sake of the 
belief of punishment as prevention (Møller 2011). These preven-
tive measures have not been evaluated for their effectiveness by 
any researchers. This is an echo of the Penal Code Commissions 
(Straffelovrådets) report from 1967: ‘The fact that unjustified use 
is punishable must also be presumed to be deterrent to some of 
those who might otherwise be willing to experiment with drugs.’ 
(Skretting 2013).
There is still the traditional belief in the symbolic  normative 
value of punishment, which says it is wrong to  decriminalize 
drug use because it sends the ‘wrong signals’ (Hauge 2008). 
Decriminalization is described as synonymous with the state ap-
proving drug use, however, strangely, the same argumentation is 
rarely used concerning alcohol or tobacco.
From Punishment to Health
Christie and Bruun (1985) described drugs as a suitable enemy. 
Suitable enemies share some characteristics making them ideal 
targets for societal reactions. Drugs have, for the last five decades, 
been a focal point not only in criminal politics but also in politics 
in general. A minority have, until recently, been openly  questioning 
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the policy and the general rationality behind it, but the majority 
have supported the status quo.40 But things are changing.
Slowly, the climate of discussion and action seems to have 
changed. New voices can be heard, most notably, the voices of the 
users themselves. Debates are still heated and fronts can be hard, 
but there are now a wide variety of alternative views  expressed. 
The field flourishes with all types of organizations and pressure 
groups, drug users fighting for their rights to use drugs legally; 
self-help groups; movements trying to establish drug use as a hu-
man right; some working for the safer use of drugs and others for 
treatment. There are a wide plethora of associations supporting 
criminalization and the use of penal sanctions. The most import-
ant event was probably when, in December 2017, the Norwegian 
parliament declared that there was a political majority for a 
change41 in the drug policy – from viewing drug use as a penal 
matter to defining it from a health perspective. Minister of health 
Bent Høie was crystal clear when he declared:
Drug addicts shall receive healthcare and respect – not punishment 
and condemnation. We are now starting on the task of changing the 
Norwegian drug policy and the attitudes towards fellow humans 
that struggle with drug dependency. (https://www.regjeringen.no 
/no/aktuelt/utvalg-skal-forberede-ny-rusreform/id2594838/)
There was advice from the politicians to the committee working 
on the whitepaper of the drug policy was clear, look to Portugal. 
In criminological and penal law terms the advice was to move the 
reactions on drug use from penalization towards prohibition with 
civil penalties, or decriminalization (Bewley-Taylor 2012). What 
this meant in practical terms was rather open. Should all types of 
 40 There has been some voicing of other perspectives. One is the Penal law 
commission that proposed a decriminalization of the use and possession 
of drugs and a reduction in the levels of punishment (NOU 2002: 4). 
The reaction from the Minister of Justice was to put this proposal ‘in the 
drawer’, commenting that the time was not ripe for even discussing such 
changes in Norway.
 41 Three parties go against this: FrP (Populist party), SP (Centrum party) 
and KrF (Christian democrats). FrP is split – the youth organization have 
for years been pro-legalization.
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use be decriminalized? There is a big difference between worn-
down heroin addicts, casual users of ‘party dope’ and youngsters 
experimenting or casual smokers of cannabis. Should it cover use 
of all kinds of drugs or just ‘softer’ drugs? What would help users 
and how should it work? Should there be civil sanctions, or even 
penalties for users who would refuse help and treatment? What is 
the role and tasks of the police in such a system? How would such 
a reform affect the working conditions and methods of the police? 
Parts of the police in particular aired scepticism on the whole idea 
of such a reform. Three days before the report the Police Director 
published a media article with the suggestive title, ‘I am worried 
about the youth’, showing her position against the reform.42 She 
was anxious that a reform would result in a growth in the number 
of young users and moral decay, and believed punishment was 
needed, claiming the current policy of punishing users a success. 
These arguments, similar to the ones used in the 1960s, came to 
be central in the weeks to come.43 But the stunt mainly backfired 
and was criticized as being built on a lack of knowledge and re-
flecting a moralistic stance.44
On the 19th of December, 2019, the report, Drug-reform – from 
punishment to help, was released (NOU 2019: 26). For those ner-
vous about a toothless report, there was no need to worry.
The proposals were as follows: a decriminalization of the use of 
all types of drugs; using, buying, and possessing a certain amount 
of drugs for own use would be prohibited, but not a crime; and 
the sanction would be to meet for a board (rådgivningstjeneste) 
of municipal advisers. Users skipping such ‘advise’ should not be 
met with formal sanctions. The proposal when it came to the lim-
its of drug possession was split. The basic argument was that the 
limit should be such that the users did not have to buy drugs ev-
ery day, in this way reducing their contacts with the drug dealers 
 42 https://www.nrk.no/ytring/jeg-er-bekymret-for-ungdommen-1.14821890.
 43 And also in the final rounds of the making of the new law in the spring 
of 2021.
 44 https://www.minervanett.no/benedicte-bjornland-rusreform/plag-oss 
-ikke-med-kunnskap/350229. Spring and summer of 2021 the Police 
Director was criticized for airing the views of the private organisation 
NNPF (Norwegian Drug Police Organisation) and mixing roles of the 
police and a pressure group strongly against reform.
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on the street. At the same time, the police pointed out that the 
limit set would give a clear signal to the pushers of how much 
they will be able ‘to get away with’. There are big differences in 
use, which reflect the users drug history. The majority proposed a 
limit of 5 grams of heroin, cocaine, and amphetamine, and 15 grams 
of cannabis. The minority had limits of 1 grams of heroin, co-
caine, and amphetamine, and 5 grams of cannabis.45 The report 
also proposed limiting the use of intervening police practices to-
wards users.46
The main message of the report was the move from punishment 
to help (Pedersen 2020). In some ways this was a return to the 
policy in place before 1965. The report was 412 pages long, and 
the scope was wide. The reactions on the report were primarily 
positive, but there was, as seen above, also critical voices. The 
most debated issue was ‘the youth problem’. Fear of an increase 
in use and a moral decay among the youth is probably the aspect 
most hotly debated, even though the report analyzed these top-
ics in detail and showed there was little reason for alarm. The 
lack of sanctions for the ones not meeting for the advisory board 
was another debated aspect.47 At this point, the report takes a 
different stance than that practiced in Portugal, where they have 
a wide spectre of sanctions, even if they are rarely used. Youngsters 
will not go to a consultation if there is no threat of a sanction 
or punishment, critics pointed out. The report argues, from a 
principal point, that when they do not propose sanctions, ‘In the 
Committee’s view, this would be unfortunate (the use of sanc-
tions) in the light of the division of roles between the police and 
the health and welfare services and the trust between the individ-
ual and the public assistance services’ (NOU 2019: 26).
The future of the drug reform is, at this time (March 2021), 
still uncertain. There have been major shifts in Norwegian  politics 
 45 This was changed and reduced during the process of making the law 
(Prop 92.L 2020–2021) to 2 gram of heroin and 10 gram of cannabis.
 46 This is a field with exceptionally wide police powers in Norway (Larsson 
2014).
 47 This was changed in the process of making the law. It was proposed that 
a fine of 2400 nkr, that is approximately €230, could be given if the per-
son did not attend the meeting.
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since the release of the report that change the whole debate. The 
reform had a political majority because the ruling parties (Høyre, 
KrF, Venstre, and FrP) had decided at the Granavolden confer-
ence in 2019 to implement it. This decision was the result of 
tough political wrangling, as KrF and FrP were sceptical of the 
reform. The reform has been the baby of the liberal conservative 
party (Venstre) and Høyre (Conservatives). In January 2020, FrP 
(Liberal Populist Party) left the Government, the break official-
ly a result of an Islamic State supporter being brought back to 
Norway from Syria with her two children for medical treatment. 
To get a majority in Parliament, the Government had to rely on 
FrP, who has now been openly critical. Today, the reform is depen-
dent on the support of the Social Democrats, who are divided in 
their views. The Norwegian Labour Party (AP) are the ones that 
decide the destiny of the reform.48
Drug Reform as a Mixed Blessing
The slow progress towards drug use being perceived mainly as a 
health problem should come as no surprise – it has been in the 
making for quite a while. But this is far from stating that policies 
are on the way towards legalization. It was not in the mandate of 
the drug reform committee to think ‘outside the box’ about what 
to do with the sale and handling of drugs. Alternatives such as med-
ical marihuana and state-regulated sale of drugs in coffee shops 
are rarely openly debated in Norwegian politics. Punishment is 
seen as necessary to restrict the trafficking and use.49 Sentences in 
drug cases are still unproportionally severe. The idea that punish-
ment works in restricting the volume of drugs in society, without 
taking into account the costs of this, are firmly held. Punishment 
is seen as necessary to deter new users, as expressed in 1967, while 
addicts are seen to need help instead of punishment. The problems 
 48 The reform did not pass. In May 2021 AP decided not to support it. It 
was election year for Parliament and AP expressed the view that they 
would develop their own drug reform. 
 49 There have been some representatives of Venstre, and hard-core libera-
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with this neat picture are that the majority use drugs in recre-
ational ways and don’t get sick or addicted (Hauge 2009; Møller 
2011; Nutt 2012). Dependency, however, is a highly problematic 
concept in itself (Bramness 2018).
Maybe we have finally come to a point where other problems 
seem to attract more attention than drugs. The police have a wide 
array of ‘suitable enemies’ today, so drugs may seem to fall out of 
the picture – the immigration crisis, trafficking, cybercrimes, the 
war on terror, and environmental problems are examples from a 
long list50 (Franko 2020).
The number of countries and states that have now decriminal-
ized and even legalized the use of one or more drugs has increased. 
Many of these are states we often like to compare ourselves with. 
At the same time, there now exists research that shows that this 
does not end in chaos, an explosion in drug use, and a doomed 
youth (NOU 2019: 26). Norwegian politics have always been in-
fluenced by international trends – we have a tendency to follow, 
which is also seen in the area of drugs (Hauge 2015). As described 
in this chapter, the field has always been open to a wide array of 
approaches and perspectives. Maybe we are at a tipping point 
where it is time to shift from an approach that, to a large extent, 
relies on the belief in deterrence and punishment towards a more 
health-oriented approach.
But what does this mean? Such a development might be a mixed 
blessing. To depict the drug user as dependent and sick is not only 
to put him in a position where he might get help, it is also a way to 
disempower, to introduce new modes of control and discipline 
that might be more coercive and just as intrusive as what we 
have now. The wide array of so-called preventive measures, pre-
sented as soft alternatives, normally rely on the extensive use of 
 control measures, such as urine control in youth contracts (NOU 
2019: 26). Police and health personnel cooperate.51 Youths on 
such  contracts often experience these measures as degrading and 
 50 https://pst.no/alle-artikler/trusselvurderinger/nasjonal-trusselvur 
dering-2020/.
 51 Not always – in some places the health workers do not want to take part 
as controllers taking urine tests. In these instances, private firms have 
taken the role of the health workers.
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 demanding.52 These alternatives are presented as ‘free to choose’, 
but the stick is there if you do not cooperate. Encounters between 
youth and police when it comes to enforcement of the contracts 
can be highly unpleasant. The rights of users on such alternatives 
are in a totally different league than if they had been sentenced 
in court. These youth are not sick, what they have committed are 
more often minor acts, such as smoking cannabis. These dilemmas 
have been addressed in the drug reform report. The alternative 
presented in the report, the advisory board, might be a better solu-
tion. Anyway, its main function is to give advice and channel the 
problem users to the help system. There is political pressure to 
sneak in punishment in the reform by differentiating between the 
types of users and by using waiver of prosecution53 in cases with 
adult drug users. It is pointed out time and again that the reform 
is dependent on substantial economic support to build up a work-
ing system of help and support, as is the case in Portugal (Hughes 
& Stevens 2012). Anyway, we should be aware of the dangers of 
re-labelling drug use, this might be a mixed blessing.
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6. On the Possible Deconstruction 
of the Swedish Drug Policy
Henrik Tham
Since 2006 the Stockholm Prize in Criminology has been awarded 
‘for outstanding achievements in criminological research or for 
the application of research results by practitioners for the reduc-
tion of crime and the advancement of human rights’. The prize is 
presented each year at a ceremony in Stockholm City Hall, usu-
ally by the Queen but sometimes by other official representatives 
of the state or the city. At the same time, the Swedish National 
Council for Crime Prevention organizes a symposium that opens 
with a panel where the Minister of Justice participates with the 
winners of the prize and other experts in discussing their re-
search and views. In 2019, a renowned researcher on drug pol-
icy and a former President of Switzerland who has been active 
in harm reduction policy were awarded the prize. The year 2019 
the Swedish state withdrew from both the panel debate and the 
prize ceremony.
Sweden has long been known as a ‘hawk’ in the war on drugs 
in comparison with other democratic countries in Europe. This 
reputation has hardly been seen as detrimental by Swedish gov-
ernments, since the country has also claimed a successful drug 
policy. Fewer people than in other countries have tried drugs and 
the attitudes to drugs have been more negative. ‘Sweden drug-free 
society’ is the proud message that has been communicated both 
nationally and internationally.
Today, however, the situation is changing. Sweden’s allied in the 
war on drugs, Norway, seems to be deserting by in a  governmental 
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investigation proposing a policy that excludes the police practice 
of chasing drug users in the streets. Sweden has been criticized 
by the UN for not upholding human rights in its drug policy. No 
plans have been put forward regarding what to do about the rise 
in problematic drug use and drug-related deaths. Several coun-
tries have started on the road to decriminalization. Nils Christie’s 
question (see Introduction, this volume) can then be asked: Has 
Sweden started a retreat and if not, why? 
In an attempt to answer this question, we will start with a short 
description of Swedish drug policy since the 1960s and its theoret-
ical and political justifications. This will include the development 
of drug legislation, number of people sentenced for crimes related 
to drugs and drug consumption among school children – a central 
indicator in Swedish drug discourse. The results of the drug policy 
are then discussed in relation to indicators of the development of 
problematic drug use and drug-related deaths. This is then fol-
lowed by a description of the costs of Swedish drug policy in terms 
of legislation, police interventions and imprisonment. Drawing the 
conclusion that the costs cannot justify the gains, an attempt is 
made to understand why the drug policy in Sweden is not chang-
ing in a direction that would be more effective and less costly.
The Construction of Swedish Drug Policy
In order to analyze the possible deconstruction of Swedish 
drug policy, it is necessary first to understand its construction. 
Drugs were identified as a social and political problem in Sweden 
in the 1960s, thereby disengaging the issue from an earlier 
medical and individualized perspective (Edman & Olsson 2014). 
Changes in penal legislation at this time were aimed at the big 
producers, smugglers and dealers. The maximum penalty was, 
in a few years, raised to 10 years imprisonment, the then high-
est penalty in Sweden except the life sentence. Drug users were 
looked upon as victims and the debate about the users in the 
1970s concerned the issue of whether treatment should be volun-
tary or compulsory.
In the late 1970s the policy changed. The Swedish parlia-
ment, in 1978, stated that society would not accept any use of 
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narcotic drugs except for that which is medically motivated, and 
any other type of use would be strongly combated (Proposition 
1977/78:105: 30). This stand was later formulated as ‘Sweden 
drug free society’ (Proposition 1983/84:100), which became the 
motto for the drug policy. As a result of the zero-tolerance posi-
tion, the General Prosecutor abolished the earlier praxis of waiver 
of prosecution for possession of small amounts for personal use. In 
1980, the Police launched a national campaign for arresting drug 
users in the streets (Brottsförebyggande rådet 1983). The number 
of drug offences in the police statistics trebled in two years, main-
ly due to the police increasingly arresting already known drug 
users more often (Rättsstatistisk årsbok 1993: 147).
This development was followed by a political debate about 
criminalizing consumption as such. The center-right parties in 
Parliament pressed the Social Democratic government to criminal-
ize use, which was done in 1988 but only with a fine given as the 
penalty. The political opposition claimed that this was a useless 
law. Without imprisonment in the penalty scale the police had dif-
ficulties proving use. With the center-right parties in government a 
few years later, a law went into action in 1993 giving the police the 
right to take samples of body fluids by force in order to establish 
the use of drugs. The number of urine and blood tests carried out 
since then have increased sharply (Rättsmedicinalverket 2020). 
The number of drug offences reported to the Police in 2020 was 
124,000, an increase of more than four times since the law 
was passed in 1993.
The increasing focus on the drug user meant that Swedish 
drug policy moved from supply prevention to demand prevention 
(Johnson 2021, p. 119 ff.). This change was influenced by a per-
ception of the drug problem as an epidemic. The drug user was 
pictured as contaminating two or more others who, in their turn, 
would infect two or more, and so on. The drug user was also de-
scribed as the only irreplaceable link in a chain of dealers, smug-
glers, producers and corrupt regimes in other parts of the world. 
If only just the users could be locked away, the whole pyramid 
would fall and the drug epidemic would come to an end (Bejerot 
1975; Johnson 2021).
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It was therefore argued that a strict policy directed towards the 
user was necessary. The policy was backed by a picture of drugs 
being a severe threat to the Swedish welfare state. This was the 
message of a doctor of social medicine, Nils Bejerot (1975), who 
was also the father of the epidemic theory. He was the central 
figure in the creation of the new drug policy and had hundreds of 
thousands of followers, in terms of the number of his books sold, 
articles written in the press and total audiences at his lectures. In 
1979 he was bestowed the title of full professor by the center-right 
government.
The picture of drugs as a national threat to Sweden was supple-
mented by one of a successful policy. The Department of Justice 
seemed to have discovered that the proportion of school children 
using drugs was decreasing. After having stated in the central bud-
get bill that drugs had emerged as one of the very largest social 
problems in the country (Proposition 1983/84:100), two years 
later they stated that ‘Sweden leads a conscious and resolute drug 
policy’ (Proposition 1985/86:100). The indicator of this claimed 
successful policy became the proportion of young people using 
drugs (Figure 14). The change in evaluating the development of 
drug policy could also be interpreted as a solution to a possible 
political problem. When the Swedish policy increasingly focused 
on the drug user by using penal law and the police, some success 
of this policy had to be demonstrated.
The claimed success of Swedish drug policy was spread in a 
government leaflet, which was translated into four languages 
(Swedish National Institute of Public Health 1993). Even though 
the situation was serious, Sweden claimed a more successful drug 
policy than that of other countries (Swedish National Institute for 
Public Health 1998). The climax of the claims, internationally, 
could be said to have been reached at the 1998 UNGASS (United 
Nation General Assembly Special Session) in New York, where 
Sweden appeared with a large delegation, including the Queen, 
claiming a successful drug policy (Regeringskansliet 1998).
From the turn of the century, however, fewer voices were raised 
to praise the Swedish drug policy. A government committee 
 presented its report, At the Crossroads, in 2000 (SOU 2000:126). 
Problems were admitted, such as the fact that an increasing 
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 number of pupils had tried drugs, that the attitudes had become 
more permissive and that the mortality rate was high in relation 
to other countries. However, backing away from the restrictive 
Swedish model would mean ‘lowered ambitions and the accep-
tance of considerable drug abuse’ (op. cit.: 11).
The government bill that followed the report reiterated the suc-
cess of the Swedish policy, including in relation to other coun-
tries (Proposition 2001/02:91: 15, 23). The general repudiation 
of drugs in the Swedish population was stressed and the num-
ber of new recruitments and mortalities among young people 
were said to be lower than in other comparative countries (op. 
cit.: 10). The concrete outcome of the bill was the appointment of 
a national drug policy coordinator. The office of the coordinator, 
‘Mobilization against drugs’, existed for seven years before being 
closed down. The drug issue became less visible in politics and 
debate. It also disappeared from the election campaigns (Olsson 
2011; updated). It did, however, reappear in the 2018 parliament 
Figure 14. Proportion of pupils in 9th grade (15 years old) who have 
ever tried drugs and who have used drugs in the last month, 1973–2020, 
percent.
Source: CAN (2020).
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election when gang-related shootings in deprived areas became 
linked to the sale of drugs.
Some changes of the drug policy, in the direction of harm 
reduction, have been undertaken since the turn of the century. 
Substitution programs have expanded markedly. Syringe exchange 
was accepted on a general basis by the Parliament in 2006 and 
lately, other harm reduction measures have also been introduced, 
such as the use of nasal spray against the risks of overdoses and 
medical marijuana, albeit slowly and both on a restrictive base.
Table 15. Drug legislation, 1967–2020.
1967 Possibility for committal to psychiatric care for drug abusers
1968  Imprisonment for aggravated drug crime increased from a  
maximum of 2 years to 4 years
1969  Imprisonment for aggravated drug crime increased to a maximum 
of 6 years
Phone tapping for aggravated drug crime introduced
1972  Imprisonment for aggravated drug crime increased to a maximum 
of 10 years
1980 Limitations of waiver of prosecution for possession of drugs 
1981  Imprisonment for normal drug crime increased from a maximum 
of 2 years to 3 years
Imprisonment for aggravated drug crime increased from minimum 
of 1 year to 2 years
1982 Law on compulsory care for adult drug abusers
1985  Imprisonment for minor drug crime increased to maximum  
6 months
1988  Criminalization of consumption of drugs, maximum fine1989
Increased time from 2 to 6 months for psychiatric care for drug 
abusers
1993 Consumption of drugs, maximum imprisonment 6 months 
1999 Expansion of criminalization of synthetic drugs
 Zero tolerance for drugs in road traffic 
2016  Extremely aggravated drug crime as new category in the Penal 
Drug Law 
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The dominating picture of Swedish drug policy is, however, a 
development in an increasingly strict direction. Penal and other 
types of compulsory legislation have expanded markedly, and so 
have both the numbers of crimes reported to the Police and sen-
tences meted out in the criminal justice system. This is shown in 
Table 15 and Figure 15.
Has Swedish Drug Policy Been Successful?
The expansion of penal law, reported crimes, police resources and 
sentences could perhaps be justified if this had led to a decrease 
in the damage and suffering caused by drug use. This is the posi-
tion taken by various governments claiming the relative success 
of Swedish drug policy. This possible success is, however, limited 
to the comparatively low proportions in the population that have 
ever tried drugs, use them recreationally or who are favorable to 
the use of drugs. These indicators refer to use and attitudes, not 
to problematic use in terms of social malfunctioning, sickness or 
death. Here the picture becomes different.
In Sweden, three case-finding studies of ‘heavy’ or problem 
drug use were carried out in 1979, 1992 and 1998. Estimates 
based on different indicators were then conducted up to 2007 
(Olsson 2011: 36–38). Estimates since then have not been present-
ed, neither in Sweden nor by The European Monitoring Centre for 
Drugs and Drug Addictions, EMCDDA, for Sweden. The  picture 
that emerges is a doubling of the absolute number with problem-
atic drug use since the late 1970s. The Swedish estimates at the 
beginning of the century are slightly below the European average 
as measured by EMCDDA.
Another measure of detrimental drug use is drug-related mor-
tality. The Swedish figures can be compared both historically 
and with other countries. Figure 16 shows the development of 
 drug-related mortality since 1969. The increase is considerable. 
The causes of the particularly sharp increase in the 1990s fol-
lowed by a decrease in the early 2000s and then by a continued 
expansion is a matter of debate. First, a decline in resources for 
treatment after the economic crisis in the early 1990s and then an 
expansion of substitution programs has been mentioned.
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Figure 15. Number of people sentenced for drug crimes as major crime, 
1975–2019, per 100,000 inhabitants. 
Source: Kriminalstatistik.
Figure 16. Drug-related mortality in Sweden, 1969–2019, and Switzerland, 
1995–2018, per 100,000 inhabitants. 
Source: CAN (2019) (updated); Swiss Health Observatory.
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These explanations are of less importance to the overall devel-
opment of drug-related mortality. Even the secular trend, how-
ever, has been a matter of debate. Inclusions and exclusions of 
various drugs in the definition of drugs have affected the speed 
of increase. A study of the development of drug-related deaths 
concluded that the rise is considerable even though the sharp in-
crease at the years before 2015 is exaggerated (Leifman 2016). 
That there is a marked rise is also compatible with the fact that 
there has been a rise in the number of people who are considered 
as having a ‘heavy’ or problematic pattern of drug use.
Drug-related mortality in Sweden is also one of the highest in 
Europe (EMCCDA 2019). Figures from Switzerland are includ-
ed in Figure 16, showing that an increase is not an unavoidable 
development taking place everywhere in Europe – a fact that the 
Swedish Minister of Justice was not prepared to discuss in connec-
tion with The Stockholm Prize in Criminology 2019. Switzerland 
showed a marked increase in drug-related deaths up to the early 
1990s, but the trend then took a downturn with a change in drug 
policy (De Preux, Dubois-Arber, & Zobel 2004). In relation to 
other European countries there are, of course, difficulties involved 
in doing comparisons. The Swedish government is quick to point 
this out when criticized for the high number of deaths (Swedish 
drug policy nd.: 9). Sweden might also be making a rod for its 
own back by looking particularly carefully for indications of 
drugs in classifications of causes of death. Despite reservations 
of the possibility of making comparisons, a report to the Swedish 
government has admitted the high rate of drug-related deaths in 
relation to other countries in Europe (SOU 2000:126), which has 
been reiterated as late as 2021 (Proposition 2020/21:121).
The Costs of the Control of Drugs in Sweden 
In politics, possible gains must be balanced against possible costs. In 
making an evaluation of different measures of reducing drug 
abuse, the costs of these measures have to be included. Typical 
costs refer to the penal legislation and to the criminal justice sys-
tem, like resources spent by the Police, the prosecutors and the 
courts, and the number of people in prison for drug crimes, both 
in terms of economic costs and suffering for those in prison. As 
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costs related to the criminal justice system can also be counted, 
different types of discriminatory praxis and violations of integrity 
by the police should also be considered.
Penalization of an act is, in law, traditionally seen as a last re-
sort, as a cost in itself, that should always be seriously considered 
before undertaking (Jareborg 1995). In the preparatory works 
from the Department of Justice that gave the Police the right to 
take blood and urine tests by force, it was pointed out that it was 
‘principally wrong to criminalize an act that was directed against 
the person him- or herself’ (Ds 1992:19: 28).
The fact that using drugs, in itself, is a criminal offence in 
Sweden is a violation of this principle. It also produces a large 
number of crimes and criminals. The National Council for Crime 
Prevention made a rough estimate of the number of crimes that 
occurred as a result of the consumption of drugs in 2015 and came 
up with a figure close to seven million crimes (Brottsförebyggande 
rådet 2016: 10). The fact that the consumption of narcotic drugs 
is criminalized, an act without clear harm to others, has produced 
more than four times as many illegal acts as the total number of 
crimes reported to the Police. This can then possibly be regarded 
as a cost in terms of dark numbers or undetected crimes, the pro-
portion of criminals in the population and recidivist rates.
Figure 17 shows the development of the number of years spent 
by the Police on drug cases in proportion to the total work force 
of police officers. The rise is particularly sharp from 1993, when 
the Police received the right to take samples of body fluids by 
force in order to establish the consumption of drugs. At most, 
the Police has spent almost one tenth of the total work force on 
drugs. The drop in the last few years can be attributed to a large 
police reform in 2015, however, whether it reflects a real drop in 
the use of police resources on combating drugs or just a change 
in registering activities is not clear. The drop in tests conducted 
by the National Board of Forensic Medicine is only seven per-
cent and is back on the level it was at before the police reform in 
2018. The figure for 2020 is 42,000 tests, which is an all-time high 
(Rättsmedicinalverket 2020). Disregarding the dip, which might 
not picture a real decrease in police resources, the development of 
police hours and sentences is fairly similar (Figure 15). Sentences 
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seem then to be produced by the amount of police resources put 
in, as drug consumption is an almost inexhaustible source in terms 
of increasing the overall clearance rate.
The violation of integrity caused by this police practice might 
be experienced as particularly offensive if the suspected person 
has not consumed any drugs. The National Council for Crime 
Prevention (Brottsförebyggande rådet 2016) has studied the urine 
and blood samples collected by the Police from 1998–2015 that 
have been analyzed by The National Board of Forensic Medicine. 
It is shown that the number of false positives increased during 
the period from 10 to around 20 percent. The false positives were 
also, throughout the period, by far the highest in the youngest age 
group (17 years), where they were close to half (op. cit.: 18). The 
National Council for Crime Prevention stresses the problem that 
such a negative test might be the first contact with the criminal 
justice system for a number of young persons (op. cit.: 22).
Out of all prisoners who are serving time, more than one quar-
ter has a drug crime, including smuggling, as the principal of-
fence. The proportion was higher before a number of decisions in 
drug cases were made by the Supreme Court. Whether a sharpen-
ing of the law by the government in 2016 in order to reverse the 
Figure 17. Number of years spent by the Police on drug cases in proportion 
to the total work force of police officers, 1970–2020, percent.
Source: CAN (2019), updated.
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 decisions of the Supreme Court, and an announced sharpening by 
the government in 2019, will change this again remains to be seen. 
In addition, more than half of those in prison have been judged by 
the prison authorities to have a drug problem (Kriminalvården).
In a general expansion of the means of coercion available to the 
criminal justice system, the drug issue has played a central role. 
Secret wiretaps have been justified, particularly with reference to 
the suspicion of drug crimes. The wiretaps used quadrupled in 
Sweden from the 1970s to the 1980s – a development primarily 
explained by an increase in the police investigation of drug crimes 
(Svedberg & Svensson 1995). The majority of all wiretaps used 
concern drug crimes (Ds 2007:2). Since 2007, bugging has been 
legal in Sweden if there are suspicions of certain types of serious 
crimes. Central among these crimes are narcotic crimes.
The criminalization of drugs in itself produces criminality. The 
number of infractions caused by making the consumption of 
drugs illegal was mentioned above. The high economic costs 
of the consumption of narcotic drugs as compared to, for instance, 
the consumption of alcohol, can be expected to contribute to theft 
and other crimes against property. The high costs of drugs also 
lead to an illegal market where profits can be made. Such a mar-
ket tends to be associated with high levels of violence. The case of 
Mexico is probably the most striking (Hari 2015).
A possible example from Sweden is the marked increase in 
shootings and homicides in socially deprived areas since 2013. The 
causes of the shootings were the object of a study carried out by 
The National Council for Crime Prevention (Brottsförebyggande 
rådet 2019), who interviewed young men who had been involved. 
The report discussing the causes of the conflicts states: ‘The abso-
lutely most common (cause) is that conflicts are tied to the drug 
market and particularly to the sale of cannabis …’ (op. cit.: 55). 
Several interviewees pointed out that they entered the criminal 
setting through the cannabis market – cannabis being so com-
mon in the socially deprived areas that no active introduction 
was  necessary (op. cit.: 116). The question could be raised as to 
 whether the total ban on cannabis was a contributing cause of the 
fatal shootings.
Finally, there is the issue of discriminatory stop and search when 
it comes to drugs. The National Council for Crime Prevention 
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conducted a study of young people in the Stockholm area compar-
ing the distribution of suspects of drug use and drug use reported 
in anonymous surveys. The two indicators did not correlate as 
expected. Those from less wealthy areas, whose parents did not 
have higher education, who lived in rented flats and who were 
foreign born were more often suspected by the police for drug 
use. Drug use according to self-reported data, however, was more 
prevalent among those who lived in private houses in the richer 
areas, where at the same time fewer were suspected of drug use by 
the police (Brottsförebyggande rådet 2018; see also Holgersson 
2007). In another study it was shown that the police discrimi-
nated against non-Europeans in stop and search on suspicion of 
drugs in Stockholm (Pettersson 2005).
Even though there can be other explanations to this outcome 
than direct discrimination from the side of the police, it could 
be interpreted as an example of procedural justice not being up-
held. As such, an obvious cost of applied drug policy could be 
diminished respect for the criminal justice system and the negative 
consequences that have been reported to follow from this (Doobs 
& Gartner 2017: A14). Regardless of discrimination, stop and 
search has, in several studies, been shown to create frustration 
and tensions between the police and citizens (op. cit.). Stop and 
search for whatever reason is also often justified by reference to 
the suspicion of drugs (Murray 2014).
Some Harm Reduction But Mostly a Fast Stand
Given the questionable success of Swedish drug policy, and the high 
costs of this same policy, a change in the direction of policy might 
be expected. As mentioned, there have been some examples of a 
harm reduction policy. These policy changes have, however, origi-
nally met with resistance. A substitution program where heroin us-
ers were given Methadone was already set up in 1966. In the early 
1980s, however, no new admittances were accepted as a result of an 
unholy alliance between different interests. There were those who 
feared a medicalization of a social problem, those who opposed 
harm reduction as giving the wrong signals, and groups from the 
political left who regarded substitution programs as a pseudo solu-
tion in a capitalist society exploiting people (Johnson 2003: 117–
128). The program, however, was later allowed to expand again.
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Syringe exchange programs were also met with much resistance. 
Accepting syringe exchange was seen as a threat to the basic val-
ues of Swedish drug policy, and a program limited to two towns 
was the only one allowed as an experiment. The national drug co-
ordinator worked hard to get the program accepted on a national 
level. The opposition was phrased in terms of risks of medical-
ization and that the goal of total rehabilitation would be aban-
doned. Syringe exchange was ultimately accepted by Parliament 
after guarantees of attaching social rehabilitation measures to the 
programs (Tham 2005: 67 ff.). The programs were, however, still 
met by local resistance and further legislation was needed to get 
programs established (Proposition 2016/17:15).
In spite of the introduction of some harm reduction measures, 
the main impression given is that of strong resistance to liberalizing 
the drug policy in Sweden. In a survey before the general election 
2018, the question was put to the political parties of whether they 
were willing to decriminalize the use of narcotic drugs. Only the 
Left party was in favor of changes in that direction. None of 
the parties wanted to legalize drugs. When it came to penalty scales, 
most parties wanted to stay with the present  legislation, with 
the Moderates (liberal-conservative) and the Social Democrats 
wanting to increase the severity of prison  sentences, and the Left 
party wanting to consider lower prison sentences (Andersson & 
Ekeroth 2018).
In the party programs there is strikingly little about drugs. 
Neither has there been much on drugs in earlier party programs, 
although a number of special reports and information folders 
were published earlier. The relative lack of action today could be 
interpreted as the parties being on the defensive with regards to 
the drug issue. They do not want to leave the motto ‘Sweden drug 
free society’ behind, but at the same time, do not really know 
how to develop an effective drug policy. When the word ‘drugs’ 
appears in the party programs it is mainly used as a way of un-
derlining the general seriousness of the crime problem. The Social 
Democrats in particular use drugs as an intensifier in statements 
about the threat of crime against the country. In the criminal pol-
icy program of the party, drugs are mentioned nine times and in 
general alarmist contexts: ‘Shootings and open drug trafficking 
have been a problem for a long time’, ‘Problems with gangs of 
143On the Possible Deconstruction of the Swedish Drug Policy 
thieves, an increase in reported sex crimes, and drug crimes are 
examples of problems that are found in all our country’, ‘Drug 
dealing, shootings, threats and violence have to get away from our 
streets’ (Socialdemokraterna 2018).
The political parties watch each other for signs of liberalization 
of the drug policy, which are then used politically. Critique from 
non-political bodies could possibly, then, be used as an  opportunity 
to look for new roads to take. In a number of rulings starting in 
2011, the Supreme Court lowered the sentences for aggravated 
drug crimes. This was, however, not silently  accepted by the gov-
ernment. First the center-right government and then the Social 
Democratic–Green government reacted against the new praxis of 
the courts and increased the penalty scale with a new category, 
‘extremely aggravated drug crime’ (Proposition 2015/16:111).
The government, in a report to UNGASS 2016, explicit-
ly defended why Sweden has criminalized drug consumption 
(Swedish drug policy nd.: 7). In a government communication on 
the strategy for alcohol and drug policy 2016–2020 the goal of 
a drug free society was repeated (Regeringskansliet 2016). The 
Social Democratic–Green government has declared that it will 
raise the penalty for drug crimes. In 2019, the government com-
missioned the Police to intensify its work against drug dealing 
(Justitiedepartementet 2019). The Minister of Social Affairs has, 
in 2020, refused evaluations of the law criminalizing consumption 
after recommendation both from the Parliament and the Public 
Health Authority. Finally, in an introduction to a conference on 
drug treatment held by Swedish regions in 2020, the Minster of 
Justice declared that he would not accept a decriminalization of 
consumption, that drugs are the roots of organized crime, that a 
decriminalization would be an enormous gift to the criminals and 
that the critics should speak up about their real motives for liber-
alization (Johansson 2020).
Obstacles to Change
The question to be raised then is why Sweden sticks to its 
old policy, a policy that also seems foreign to the general prag-
matic politics of the country. A number of conditions and process-
es partly linked to each other can be distinguished.
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A drug free society
The motto ‘Sweden drug-free society’ formulates possible posi-
tions in the drug policy debate as binary. It is either/or. You are 
against drugs or you are for drugs if you do not embrace the official 
motto. It makes it more difficult to try pragmatic,  harm-reducing 
reforms. Such reforms, and particularly reforms in the direction 
of decriminalization, have been labelled ‘a catastrophe’ by the 
Ministeer of Social Affairs (Wallström 1998). Resistance against 
substitution programs and syringe exchange has been expressed 
in terms of not being compatible with the basic values on which 
the Swedish drug policy is founded. The ‘Sweden drug-free soci-
ety’ perspective will not permit any distinctions between different 
types of narcotic drugs. The distinction between soft and hard 
drugs has officially been rejected by the government (Swedish 
National Institute of Public Health 1998: 9). Those in the debate 
who have tried to articulate the difference have been accused of 
being ‘soft on drugs’. The zero-tolerance foundation of Swedish 
drug policy has, in itself, become an obstacle to possible rational 
solutions to a social problem. 
The tradition from the Temperance movement 
That the prohibitionist Swedish drug policy has its parallel 
in the Temperance movement has been pointed out in an analysis 
by Leif Lenke (1991). This movement had been quite strong in 
Sweden, however, after losing ground since the 1960s it gradually 
incorporated the drug issue. The zero-tolerance tradition of the 
Temperance movement, with total abstinence from alcohol, also 
became the approach to narcotic drugs. The Temperance move-
ment was in conflict with the official Swedish alcohol policy of 
regulated drinking through price policy and a rationing system. 
The theoretical foundation of this stand was the stepping-stone 
or gateway theory. The use of alcohol in any form, even of low 
strength, meant a risk – a risk of continued consumption. Beer 
led to hard liquor and therefore was condemned. The equivalence 
when it came to narcotic drugs, then, was that cannabis smoking 
led to hard drugs and social exclusion, and therefore had to be 
fought particularly hard.
The gateway theory has not been empirically supported when it 
comes to the development of drug use in Sweden. Low prevalence 
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or incidence of drug use has not been followed by a low num-
ber of people with problematic use or a low level of  drug-related 
deaths. In comparison with other European countries, several 
have higher levels of recreational drug use without having as high 
levels of drug-related deaths as seen in Sweden (EMCDDA 2019). 
Still, the theory is used to justify a zero-tolerance drug policy. The 
indicators ‘ever tried drugs’ or ‘have used drugs in the last month’ 
continue to be referred to as proof of a successful drug policy. 
The interventionist tradition
Identifying social problems and acting upon them with reforms is 
central to social engineering and the welfare state. Non-intervention 
is alien to this type of thinking. When the political parties before 
the election in 2018 were asked if they would consider decrimi-
nalization of the consumption of drugs, two of them, The Liberals 
and The Christian Democrats, said no to decriminalization but 
would consider changing the penalty to rehabilitation (Andersson 
& Ekeroth 2018). That people who use cannabis on a limited scale 
might not need drug treatment was not seen as an option.
The interventionist tradition could partly be understood against 
the background of the economic commitment of the welfare state 
to its citizens. The welfare state promises to take care of those who 
cannot take care of themselves. When unable to work because of 
sickness, disability, parental care or old age, for example, compre-
hensive social insurances will grant a reasonable standard of liv-
ing. Such a system is costly and demands that as many people as 
possible work and contribute with taxes. The prospect that some-
one will never even enter the labor market because of heavy use 
of drugs and will need social allowances for his or her whole life 
might contribute to interventions, and sometimes even coercion.
This interventionist tradition is also related to a tendency to 
consider human rights in positive terms, stressing quality of life, 
rather than in negative terms, stressing the protection against the 
state. In the political debate in the 1980s about criminalizing con-
sumption, the leader of The Liberals (then The People’s Party) 
was pictured full size on advertising signs declaring that in the 
country of The Peoples Party using dope would be illegal. For 
the  defenders of the forced tests by the Police, the question of 
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whether the state has any business examining the urine of its citi-
zens has not occurred.
Before UNGASS 2016 Sweden was, as mentioned, criticized by 
the UN for not upholding the human rights of drug users (The 
Local 2015). The answer from the Swedish government gives a 
picture of how it perceives human rights and the duty of political 
interventions.
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child recognizes a child’s 
right to grow up in a drug-free environment as a human right. The 
UN International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights 
talks about the right to health. All societies attempt to  protect their 
citizens from risks that they cannot foresee; these may be anything 
from additives in food to seat belts in cars. This is part of the duty 
of society and of governments to protect citizens from risks.
(Swedish drug policy nd.: 9)
The Swedish government sets up two types of human rights 
against each other: the rights of the drug user as being protect-
ed against state force and the rights of children to grow up in a 
drug-free environment. Exactly how these two rights collide is 
not expounded. The document produced for the UNGASS also 
refers to the general duty of governments to protect its citizens 
from risks in connection with buying food and driving a car. In so 
far that such interventions justify penal law, it seems open to the 
possibility of fairly far-reaching restrictions on human rights as 
traditionally understood.
A general law and order climate
Sweden has moved in the direction of a criminal policy relying 
more heavily on punishment. Changes in the general criminal 
policy have been described in terms of an expansion of penal 
legislation, a shift towards an expressive approach to policy and 
symbolic legislation, an increasing stress on security, a pro-active 
Police and early interventions (Tham 2018).
These characteristics of the development are clearly shown 
in the drug policy. The expansion of penal law was shown in 
Table 15. The expressive character of penal legislation regard-
ing drugs is quite visible in the preparatory works. Legislation 
should give the right signals and show that society does not accept 
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drugs. The issue of drugs also lends itself to symbolic criminal 
policy. Drugs are said to be a threat to Sweden, to democracy 
and the whole of society (Tham 2005). Such statements also fit 
well with the increasing stress on security in Swedish politics 
(Hermansson 2019). The rule of law has had to yield for securi-
ty concerns, and ‘unconventional police methods’ have expanded 
with reference to drugs. Early interventions and pro-active po-
licing are consequences of the overall strategy for criminal pol-
icy: crime prevention. In the case of drugs, for example, a law 
now gives the possibility for mandatory drug tests of legal minors 
(Proposition 2009/10:105).
The parallel development of criminal policy, in general, and 
drug policy is clear. The general development in the direction of a 
policy relying increasingly on punishment could therefore be seen 
as an obstacle to a liberalization of the drug policy.
A punitive public?
In the document presented by Sweden to UNGASS 2016 it was 
pointed out that the drug policy has been formed from below: 
‘Sweden’s drug policy has been firmly established for a long time, 
both across political boundaries and with support of the Riksdag 
(the Parliament), but also through strong support from the gener-
al public’ (Swedish drug policy nd.: 2).
In the process of criminalizing the pure consumption of drugs, 
popular support was claimed by referring to a survey sponsored 
by Lion’s Club where 95 percent of the interviewed population 
agreed that all dealings with drugs ought to be prohibited (SIFO 
1984). In the 1980s, the theme of the people vs the liberal elite 
was also clearly present in the drug discourse, and it was claimed 
that there was popular support for a tougher drug policy (Tham 
1995: 117 f.).
If this is the case, Swedish drug policy could be said to be an 
example of democracy at work (Beckett 1997). This view can, 
however, also be questioned and systematic empirical support of 
a pressure from below is lacking. Most people would have rath-
er limited knowledge of drugs – as compared to alcohol – and 
would therefore have to rely on the analyses put forward in the 
public debate. The picture provided of the drug situation is, to a 
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high  extent, put forward from above: from politicians, the Police, 
experts, NGO’s and the media. In the government bill launching 
a national drug coordinator in 2002, one of the tasks of the co-
ordinator was to carry on public opinion work, engage authori-
ties and youth organizations, and ‘offensively’ propagate the of-
ficial policy of the government (Proposition 2001/02: 91, 90 f.). 
Alcohol, narcotics, doping and tobacco programs (ANDT) have 
also worked for several decades in schools.
A study of the Swedish drug policy carries the subtitle, The 
opinion machine at work (van Fessem 1996). The author writes: 
Public opinion doesn’t appear out of the blue. Opinions are 
shaped by history and previous experiences. And in the Swedish 
case, opinions are shaped through ‘opinion formation’ by the 
government institutions. The National Institute for Public Health 
(Folkhälsoinistitutet) has a central role to play in the process of 
opinion formation.
(op. cit.: 71) 
The report also lists a number of other authorities, private compa-
nies and NGOs that have been involved in forming the zero-toler-
ance stand against drugs in Sweden.
Even if the framing of the drug problem comes from above 
rather than from below, it could be effective and constitute an 
obstacle to a liberalization of Swedish drug policy. Such concerns 
have been voiced. After more than 40 years of ‘Sweden drug-free 
society’, an intense zero-tolerance policy and massive information 
from the government and pressure groups, the public might not 
be swayed that easily.
Drug control as a national project 
In criminological analyses of criminal policy there is a long tra-
dition of interpreting development of policy in terms of possible 
latent functions. Theses explanations usually take the form of a 
national discourse (Cohen 1972; Gusfield 1963; Hall et al. 1978). 
A sharp and uncompromising reaction to a form of deviant be-
havior, and out of proportion to the seriousness of the problem, 
is seen as a means of strengthening a threatened national identity.
Magnus Linton makes such an interpretation of the tremen-
dous popularity and influence of the leading figure of drug policy 
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in Sweden, Dr. Nils Bejerot. Drug use was, according to Bejerot, 
the most important sign of decadence following the lack of 
norms that was the result of 1968. The conscientiousness of the 
people of the working class who had built the Swedish welfare 
state was said to be challenged by dopes, sex liberalists, pop radi-
cals and lovers of thievs – all alien to traditional Swedish culture. 
Bejerot then managed to focus the anxiety of large groups on the 
drug issue after the radical, and even revolutionary, 1968 and 
the stagnating economy after the oil shocks in the 1970s. The 
whole welfare state was said to be threatened but could still be 
saved if a strict policy of punishment and isolation was applied to 
people on drugs (Linton 2015: chap. 1).
The Swedish drug policy and discourse in the 1970s and early 
1980s developed further but with a slightly different focus. The 
concept of ‘The Swedish model’, which earlier referred to an ac-
tive labor market policy and generous social insurances, some-
what lost its ring in the 1980s when, along with the welfare state 
idea, it started to be questioned. The concept was then given a 
new meaning, referring to the Swedish drug policy. Swedes unit-
ed behind a new model and explicitly tried to export it to oth-
er countries. The importance of making a stand against drugs 
 became  formulated in relation to ‘the foreign’: drugs are un-Swed-
ish, drugs are not compatible with traditional Swedish morals, 
both drugs and ideas of liberalization come from abroad, and the 
solution to drug abuse would be farm work and mounting hiking 
in the north of Sweden. The control of drugs in Sweden could be 
seen as a national project when the welfare state project became 
less self-evident. A strict drug policy became a way of reinforcing 
Swedish-ness (Tham 1995).
Retreat?
The official line of the government is still ‘Sweden drug-free so-
ciety’, repeated by the government in the action plan for 2021–
2025 for alcohol, narcotic drugs, doping and tobacco (Proposition 
2020/21:132). A governmental investigation in August 2021 
presented a report proposing increased penalties for drug deal-
ing after directives from the government (SOU 2021:68). Both 
the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Social Affairs have, as 
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mentioned above, come out quite explicitly against any type of 
decriminalization. A number of obstacles to a more liberal drug 
policy were also pointed out above: the claimed success of the 
drug policy and its nationalistic undertones, the long-term and 
massive anti-drug information from the government and NGO’s 
and its influence on the public, the tradition from the Temperance 
movement and the gateway theory, and the aversion in a welfare 
state to not intervene actively in anything that is regarded as a so-
cial problem. So, returning to the question asked by Nils Christie: 
‘How will the retreat be organized’, it presently looks like Sweden 
will not retreat but will continue the war on drugs and will fight 
decriminalization and legalization.
However, there are also signs and circumstances pointing to-
wards a liberalization of the drug policy in Sweden. Organizations 
have been formed combating the official zero-tolerance policy 
(Föreningen Tryggare Ruspolitik). Debates are taking place in the 
national press and on the internet (Månsson 2017). Programs are 
appearing in the national television on the issue of decriminaliza-
tion. The youth organizations of the political parties are nearly 
all in favor of decriminalization, with two even in favor of the 
legalization of cannabis.
The claim that the people want a strict drug policy could be 
questioned. A study of the general sense of justice in relation to 
different crimes in all the Nordic countries (Balvig et al. 2015) did 
not indicate a punitive population in relation to drug crimes. In 
Sweden, the result of a national vignette survey was that the popu-
lation, on average, propose sentences far below that of the courts. 
In a focus group study including a video of a mock trial, where the 
accused had smuggled 250 grams of heroin and the judges wanted 
to give a five-year prison sentence, half of the participants opted 
for an alternative punishment to imprisonment (Jerre & Tham 
2010). The people, if properly informed, would perhaps not be an 
obstacle to decriminalization.
Even public organizations and authorities have begun to ques-
tion the present drug policy. Sweden’s municipalities and county 
councils (SKL, Sveriges kommuner och landsting 2018) has de-
manded an evaluation of the law criminalizing drug consump-
tion and an international comparison. In 2020 the Public Health 
Authority, the governments expert authority on drug policies, 
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published its report on the drug strategy for the next four years. 
It underlines the importance of syringe exchange as a probable 
means for reducing drug-related deaths and also suggests an in-
vestigation of the possibility of monitored drug consumption 
rooms as a further means for this purpose. The Authority also 
proposed an evaluation of the law criminalizing the consumption 
of drugs (Folkhälsomyndigheten 2020).
The Standing Committee on Social Affairs in the Swedish 
Parliament in February 2020 unanimously decided to demand 
an inquiry into the drug policy by the government. That such an 
announcement could be put forward at all is a result of the gov-
ernment parties not being in the majority in the Parliament, and 
the demand therefore became a decision by the Parliament. The 
committee, in its report, emphasized evaluation, treatment, harm 
reduction and a zero-tolerance vision for drug-related deaths 
(Socialutskottet 2019/20). The Minister of Social Affairs from the 
Social Democrats and the Social Democrats in Parliament, how-
ever, opposed an evaluation of the criminalization of consump-
tion. An evaluation plan has still, more than one year after the 
announcement from the Parliament, not been presented. All in 
all, however, there has been a clear change in the debate on drug 
policy in the political parties during just a few years.
Finally, and hypothetically, a liberalization of the drug policy 
might have unintended consequences. Not only has the drug 
policy followed the general trend towards law and order, as 
was pointed out above, but it has also taken the lead in this 
 development. Means of coercion and a pro-active Police have 
been justified with reference to the drug menace. The use of the 
whole penalty scale in sentencing for drug crimes has become a 
point of reference for politicians criticizing the courts for staying 
in the lower end of that scale. The general move towards expres-
sive justifications of penal legislation has become a forerunner 
in drug legislation. The claimed organized crime behind drugs is 
now said to characterize almost every type of crime (Tham 2012). 
Could reversing the punitive trend in drug policy then be ex-
pected to influence criminal policy in general? A return to the rule 
of law, proportionality and ultima ratio as principles of criminal 
legislation in drug cases could have effects in general. A reduction 
in the length of prison sentences for drug crimes would markedly 
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lower the prison population. The recognition that more than half 
of those in prison are judged to be drug-abusers with a particu-
larly difficult background could perhaps restore the insight of the 
typical prisoner as being socially disadvantaged, and not just a 
villain who refuses to take responsibility for himself and his acts.
This line of argument could then again be an obstacle to chang-
es. Taking drug policy seriously means facing questions regarding 
classic principles of law, the right to privacy and self-determina-
tion, the roots of marginalization and social exclusion, and the 
costs of penal control. The years to come will show if Sweden is 
prepared for such a turn in criminal policy.
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7. Gang Talk and Strategic Moralisations 
in Danish Drug Policy Discourses on Young 
and Recreational Drug Users
Thomas Friis Søgaard & Frank Søgaard Nielsen
Introduction
While Canada, Uruguay and several US states have legalised canna-
bis in recent years, and many European countries have implement-
ed or are considering decriminalisation as an option, Denmark is 
one of the few Western countries that seems to be going in the 
opposite direction, away from a lenient decriminalisation policy 
and towards a more restrictive approach (Moeller 2020). In 2004, 
Denmark introduced a new drug policy that marked the end of 
a 35-year period during which possession of illicit drugs had 
been depenalised, meaning that although it was illegal to possess 
drugs, in most cases the police refrained from bringing charges for 
possession for personal use (Frank 2008). In government white 
papers and in political discourse, the novel and more restrictive 
approach was called a zero-tolerance policy on drugs, and it was 
accompanied by a legislative change, which meant that posses-
sion of illicit drugs should now always be punished with at least 
a fine, except in certain specific cases (Houborg 2010). Research 
has documented how this shift in drug policy was underpinned 
by a change in governmental rationalities from a ‘welfarist’ to a 
more ‘neo-liberal/conservative’ rationality (Houborg & Bjerge 
2011), and by discursive changes in the way young people, youth 
culture and drugs were problematised in government reports, pol-
icy documents and in the public media (Houborg 2008, 2010; 
Houborg, Søgaard & Mogensen 2020). Until the early 1990s, 
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youth drug use was largely framed as a social problem and seen as 
a symptom of structural social problems, but from the early 2000s 
it became increasingly associated with nightlife revelling and was 
depicted as a result of deviant consumer choices (Houborg 2010). 
Houborg, Søgaard and Mogensen (2020) thus argue that the re-
penalisation of drug use in Denmark was intimately coupled with 
a discursive reconstitution of the young drug user in neo-liber-
al (autonomous, rational, self-responsible) and neo-conservative 
(morally compromised) terms.
In this chapter, we wish to build on and add to this previous 
research on drug policy changes and associated discursive ‘fram-
ings’ (Rein & Schön 1993) of the youth drug use ‘problem’ in 
Denmark. It has been well documented how the discursive fram-
ing of youth drug use as a deviant consumer choice set within the 
context of a particular risk environment – i.e. nightlife – became 
the catalyst for more restrictive policies in Denmark during the 
early 2000s. In this chapter, however, we analyse the emergence of 
a new discursive and politically potent framing of youth and rec-
reational drug use. More specifically, we describe how recent years 
have seen a shift in Danish drug control policy debates, whereby 
young and recreational drug users are no longer merely framed 
as consumers of drugs and as wilful lawbreakers but increasingly 
also as customers in a criminal market, and hence as the market 
basis for organised crime.
We argue that this policy discourse, depicting young drug users 
as customers feeding a criminal market, involves a novel ‘stra-
tegic moralisation’ (O’Malley 1999) in which young drug users 
are now framed as morally deviant customers, who, through their 
purchasing of illegal commodities (drugs), are complicit in, and 
hence partially responsible for, organised drug-related crime. The 
shift in policy discourses about young drug users – from wilful 
lawbreakers to accomplices in organised drug crime – has not led 
to legal changes. However, we describe how this novel framing 
of the issue of youth drug use has been used as a lever for the 
development of intensified police campaigns specifically targeting 
drug users and led to the emergence of disciplinary discourses urg-
ing drug users to become responsible citizens who, by saying no 
to drugs, also say no to organised crime. Though reformers have 
163Gang Talk and Strategic Moralisations 
also drawn on the framing of drug users as complicit in organised 
crime to argue for the necessity of ‘peace-time’ resolutions to the 
fight against drugs, it remains the case that the discursive coupling 
of drug use/rs and organised crime has mainly functioned to push 
Denmark in a more restrictive direction.
In the analysis, we draw on existing research, key government 
reports, policy papers and content analysis of media accounts 
of policy and policing developments. The government reports 
and policy papers were retrieved from open public and ministe-
rial homepages. Media searches have been made in the database 
Infomedia, which contains all national and local newspapers. 
Searches have been made especially for drug policy, drugs, youth 
culture, law enforcement, organised crime, gangs and Christiania 
from 2000 to 2020. Media accounts and policy documents have 
been subjected to content analyses (Braun & Clarke 2006).
Analytical Framework
Theoretically, we draw inspiration from critical policy analysis, 
holding that policies are not straightforward responses to objec-
tive problems but rather are active in the creation and shaping of 
those problems as particular types. More specifically, we draw on 
Rein and Schön (1993), who argue that policy actors construct 
and make sense of problematic policy issues through a process 
of discursive framing defined as ‘a way of selecting, organising, 
interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality to provide 
guideposts for knowing, analysing, persuading, and acting’ (Rein 
& Schön 1993: 146). Within this framework, the complementary 
processes of naming and framing not only define what is prob-
lematic about an issue, but also suggest what course of action and 
policies would be appropriate to address the ‘problem’ (Duke & 
Kolind 2020). As Houborg, Søgaard and Mogensen (2020) ar-
gue, ‘problematisations’ of young people, youth culture and drugs 
have been, and remain, central to much drug policy and practice, 
but the way they are framed has differed over the years, in turn 
giving rise to different policies and interventions. Based on exist-
ing research, the following two sections outline how the youth 
drug ‘problem’ was framed prior to and during the early 2000s.
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Youth Drug Use as a Social Problem
Modern Danish drug policy was born in 1955 with the Law 
on Euphoria-Inducing Substances. The law made possession of 
illegal drugs for personal consumption an offence (Winsløw 
1984). In connection with the promulgation of the law, 
policy-makers stated that penalisation of possession was not 
meant to criminalise users. Rather, the law was only meant to be a 
shortcut to  criminalise possession with the intent to deal 
(Houborg, Bjerge & Frank 2008). During the 1960s, new drugs 
and new groups of  users started to appear as part of the youth 
counter-culture and, as a result, drug use among young people 
became a very important public issue and policy problem 
(Houborg & Vammen 2012). In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s drug 
use among young people was largely framed as a social problem. 
During this period, youth drug use was associated with an alter-
native youth culture that rebelled against established institutions, 
and with socially disadvantaged living conditions for certain seg-
ments of the population (Houborg 2008). The discursive framing 
of youth drug use as  primarily a symptom of various underlying 
social causes became the  foundation of a drug policy that took 
drug use to be a normal social problem, and one therefore best 
addressed through social policies and social expertise, including 
drug prevention and treatment. The aim of this drug policy was to 
tackle the causes of the problem and to integrate users into society 
(Houborg 2010).
The framing of drug use as a social problem also came to influ-
ence Danish criminal justice policy on drugs. In 1968, the Danish 
government proposed an increase in the legal sentencing for pro-
fessional drug trafficking and drug dealing. Representatives from 
the police and the public prosecutor were among the strongest 
supporters of increased criminalisation of professional drug tra-
ders. They argued that since Denmark had lower sentences for 
drug offences than neighbouring Norway and Sweden, interna-
tional professional drug traders were likely to be attracted to 
the Danish drug market (Houborg & Vammen 2012). To pre-
vent this, supporters argued, a legal correspondence between 
the Nordic countries was needed (Storgaard 2000). Critics, on 
the other hand, were concerned that increased criminalisation 
of professional drug traders would have a spillover effect on the 
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 sentencing of  minor drug offences, which would lead to increased 
 criminalisation and alienation of drug users (Storgaard 2000). 
Critics also argued that increased sentences for professional drug 
trading were likely to be counterproductive, in that they would 
result in rising retail-level prices on cannabis, which would in turn 
make the Danish cannabis market even more attractive to pro-
fessional criminals. According to critics, the best way to prevent 
organised crime was to legalise access to cannabis, as this would 
make the cannabis market less economically attractive to profes-
sional criminals (Houborg & Vammen 2012). In June 1969, the 
parliament reached a compromise. While deciding to amend the 
Penal Code (§191), increasing the penalty for professional drug 
dealing and trafficking, a majority of the parliament wanted to 
avoid further criminalisation of the large number of young people 
experimenting with drugs, particularly cannabis (Houborg 2010). 
The parliamentary majority therefore made it a condition of the 
passing of the Bill that the Attorney General would instruct the 
police and prosecutors not to charge drug users for possession of 
illegal drugs for personal use. Such cases should instead be settled 
with an administrative or court caution (Frank 2008; Houborg, 
Bjerge & Frank 2008; Houborg 2010). For drugs other than can-
nabis, this applied only to first time offences, while for cannabis it 
also applied to repeat offences. The instruction thus created a de 
facto decriminalisation of possession of illicit drugs for personal 
use. In this way, a dual track policy was enacted which not only 
distinguished between cannabis and other drugs, but which also 
distinguished between drug suppliers and drug users (Storgaard 
2000). While the former were framed as criminals, and therefore 
to be dealt with via law enforcement, the latter were framed as so-
cial clients, whose use of illicit drugs was better addressed through 
welfare means such as treatment, education, social services and 
prevention (Houborg, Bjerge & Frank 2008).
The Young Drug User as a Rational Consumer  
and Wilful Lawbreaker
Due to the depenalisation of possession of drugs for personal 
use, Danish drug policy was for many years considered relatively 
liberal by international and Nordic standards (Storgaard 2000). 
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During the early 2000s, however, this began to change. As with 
the drug policy reform during the 1960s that led to depenalisa-
tion, it was drug use among young people, and the discursive 
framing of this as a particular kind of ‘problem’, that in 2004 led 
to a repenalisation of drug possession for personal use (Houborg, 
Søgaard & Mogensen 2020).
Debates on drug policy in Denmark in the late 1990s and early 
2000s were characterised by intensive discussions about the role 
of alcohol and drugs in youth culture (Houborg 2010). The back-
ground for this was the publication of comparative survey studies 
showing that young Danes consumed more alcohol than young 
people in other European countries, and were among the group 
of young Europeans with the highest prevalence of cannabis use 
(Houborg, Søgaard & Mogensen 2020). This new concern about 
youth drug use was heightened by intensive media reports 
about young people’s excessive use of ecstasy in nightlife. 
According to Houborg (2010), two very influential reports – one 
by the National Board of Health and one by the Chiefs of Police 
– came to play a key role in a re-framing of the youth drug ‘prob-
lem’ during the early 2000s. Rather than depicting youth drug 
use as a symptom of social problems and societal changes, and us-
ers as subjects in need of help, the two reports instead represented 
youth drug use as a problem rooted in flawed consumer choices 
and a lack of moral respect for the law.
The report by the National Board of Health (2000) concluded 
that a more liberal attitude towards illegal drugs had developed 
among young people generally, which meant that drug use was 
becoming an integral part of a new youth culture, especially the 
urban nightlife party scene. The discursive framing of youth drug 
use as indicative of a new ‘culture of intoxication’ (Measham & 
Brain 2005) was also evident in the report by the Chiefs of Police 
(2002). This report described the emergence of new youth culture 
characterised by individualisation, event culture, party culture, in-
toxication, experimentation and anomie. As outlined by Houborg 
(2010), the report by the Chiefs of Police not only depicted young 
drug users as economically resourceful (deviant) consumers in a 
nightlife leisure scene, but also attributed this new drug problem 
to the policy of depenalisation that had been in force since 1969, 
167Gang Talk and Strategic Moralisations 
which had allegedly led many young people to believe that use of 
illegal drugs was not prohibited.
On the basis of this discursive framing, the centre-right gov-
ernment, which had come to power in 2001, formulated a new 
policy programme in 2003 under the headline ‘The Fight against 
Drugs’ (Government 2003a). The policy programme was indica-
tive of a broader shift away from welfarism and explanations that 
emphasised social determination and towards neoliberalism and 
neo-conservatism. It articulated the idea that young people’s use 
of drugs was rooted in a new culture of intoxication and essential-
ly a matter of individual consumer choices (Houborg, Søgaard & 
Mogensen 2020). Within this policy discourse, young drug users 
were thus framed as rational and autonomous consumers who 
deliberately chose to break the law. Against this background, the 
white paper emphasised that it was important to send a ‘clear sig-
nal’ to young drug users that this kind of behaviour was unaccept-
able and would have legal consequences. Couched in the rhetoric 
of ‘zero tolerance’, ‘deterrence’ and ‘respect for the law’ (Frank 
2008; Houborg, Søgaard & Mogensen 2020), the new drug pol-
icy led to a legislative amendment in 2004 that reintroduced 
penalties for all personal possession of illicit drugs. The govern-
ment hoped that the repenalisation of possession for personal use 
would deter young consumers from exercising their freedom in 
an irresponsible and deviant way, and instead foster a new moral 
order characterised by respect for the law (Houborg 2010). The 
shift towards an understanding of young drug users as individ-
ualised and rational consumers was also evident in subsequent 
parliamentary debates, which in 2007 led to an increase of the 
fines for possession of illicit drugs. On this issue, Karsten Nonbo 
from the liberal government party Venstre said: ‘We are tightening 
the penalty for possession of euphoric drugs. We are doing this 
because we have too many so-called “rich kids”, that is, we have 
too many people who go to discos, those who have their pockets 
full of money’ (Folketingstidende 2006/07).
The neo-conservative framing of youth drug use as a consum-
er- and choice-based moral failure has played a key role in the 
production of young recreational drug users as objects of a ze-
ro-tolerance governance approach in Denmark.
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The Drug User as an Indirect Accomplice  
in Organised Crime
While the early 2000s saw a move towards a neoliberal and more 
moralistic point of view, where the use of illicit drugs was ex-
plained in terms of consumer-based wilful transgressions in a new 
kind of risk environment (i.e. nightlife), during the mid and late 
2000s a new discursive framing of youth drug use started to gain 
prominence. In the following, we outline how recent Danish drug 
control policy debates have become increasingly dominated by a 
discursive framing that depicts young and recreational drug users 
as complicit in organised crime. Linked to this shift is a new moral 
configuration of young drug users, as well as the deployment of 
police campaigns specifically aimed at targeting young and recre-
ational drug users.
The present day discursive framing of young and recreational 
drug users as complicit in organised crime is part of a longer pro-
cess. In 1982, the Copenhagen Police Department released a re-
port describing how outlaw bikers were involved in the cannabis 
market in the Free Town of Christiania, Copenhagen (Copenhagen 
Police 1982). Based on their observations at Christiania, the po-
lice gave voice to the perspective that the selling of cannabis was 
becoming more professionally organised, and that drug trading 
was the key economic basis of outlaw biker groups. These ideas 
gained prominence in public debates during the 1990s, especial-
ly during and after the ‘Big Nordic Biker War’ (Strand 2011). In 
2003, when the centre-right government launched its new drug 
policy, The Fight against Drugs, it highlighted criminalisation and 
intensified policing as the best ways to combat cannabis-related 
organised crime. As part of its new tough-on-drugs policy, the gov-
ernment made the dissolution of the cannabis trade in Christiania 
– the biggest open drug market in Scandinavia – a key priority 
(Government 2003a). In the policy paper, the government repeat-
ed the argument that close links existed between the cannabis 
trade at Christiania and organised crime. The Government also 
emphasised that intensified policing was important as a means of 
combatting the organised crime groups believed to be responsible 
for the cannabis trade at Christiania. The policy paper, and a lat-
er action plan (Government 2003b), specified that the intensified 
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police approach would involve 1) an increased police presence, 
with more raids, drug seizures and arrests of sellers and backers, 
and 2) a physical removal of sales stalls in Pusher street, the main 
cannabis sales area at Christiania. Furthermore, the action plan 
stated 3) that the police should increase their targeting of ‘the re-
cipients’ of cannabis (i.e., the users) at Christiania, as this would 
make it more difficult for drug traders to sell their commodities 
(Government 2003b: 8999). The action plan outlined that the lat-
ter process should involve increased use of stop and search meth-
ods, sniffer dogs and traffic stops to check if potential customers 
going to or coming from Christiania were in possession of canna-
bis or driving under the influence of cannabis.
In the media, the Minister of Justice, Lene Espersen, explained 
that the police had been instructed to actively target the ‘buyers’ 
frequenting Pusher street in Christiania because this would ‘result 
in a situation where the buyers will no longer find it attractive 
to go to Christiania to source hash’ (Berlingske Tidende 2003a). 
Similar to the debates about young peoples’ use of ecstasy and 
cocaine in nightlife, the Minister of Justice thus invoked a notion 
of the cannabis user as a rational actor who could be deterred into 
conformity. However, rather than describing the rational cannabis 
user as a consumer, as had been the case in debates regarding the 
much talked about new youth nightlife culture, in policy docu-
ments and in the debates addressing the situation at Christiania, 
cannabis users were now described as ‘recipients of cannabis’, 
‘buyers’ and ‘customers’, and as the ‘customer-base’ for crimi-
nals (Berlingske Tidende 2003a; DR.DK 2003; Jyllands-Posten 
2003a). This change of vocabulary was indicative of the gradual 
emergence of a new dominant discourse in which drug users were 
increasingly framed as market actors, whose ‘demand’ for drugs 
constituted the economic basis for the criminal drug trade: ‘Hash 
customers – all the more or less ordinary and decent people, in-
cluding tourists, who are the basis for Pusher street’s existence 
– can look forward to a more tough police approach’ (Berlingske 
Tidende 2003b).
While Danish drug policy had traditionally rested on a dual 
track policy that distinguished between drug suppliers and 
drug users (Storgaard 2000), the new policy discourse not only 
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 dissolved this distinction, but also framed drug users, in their 
capacity as economic customers, as (indirectly) complicit in 
drug-related organised crime. The emerging framing of youth 
and recreational drug use as the economic driver underpinning 
criminal drug trading was not only evident in discursive recon-
figurations of ‘drug users’ into ‘drug buyers’ and ‘drug use’ into 
‘drug demand’. It was also evident in the fact that the tough-on-
crime rhetoric, such as the terms ‘to stress’ and ‘stress strategies’, 
which had hitherto been used to describe the ‘pulling lever tactics’ 
(Kennedy 1997) used by Danish police to make life difficult for 
outlaw bikers, gangs and drug sellers (Volquartzen 2009; Strand 
2011; Rowe & Søgaard 2020), was now also being used by po-
lice to describe their approach to cannabis users at Christiania: 
‘Now we have been stressing the sellers and the buyers for some 
time. We will continue doing so, but at some point, we will take it 
to the next level. We will come in hard and demolish Pusher street 
when it suits us’ (Copenhagen Police Chief Inspector in Jyllands-
Posten, 2003a).
In the months following the launch of the government’s new 
Christiania strategy, the police intensified their targeting of drug 
users frequenting the cannabis market at Christiania. As part 
of the new buyer-directed ‘stress strategy’ (Berlingske Tidende 
2003c), in the first month, the police searched 459 persons and 
2448  cars. Two hundred and forty-eight persons were fined for 
being in  possession of illegal substances, and 557 were fined 
for traffic violations in and around the Christiania area (Jyllands-
Posten 2003b). In 2004, the police launched a major crackdown, 
during which bulldozers and armed police entered Christiania and 
removed the stalls where cannabis was being sold. Fifty cannabis 
dealers and ‘security guards’ were arrested (Frank 2008; Moeller 
2018). While the police had hoped that this crackdown would 
effectively put an end to the Christiania cannabis market, history 
has shown that this was not the case.
Over the following years, however, the discursive framing of 
young and recreational drug users as the economic basis for crim-
inal and organised drug trading grew in prominence. Not only did 
this discursive framing spread beyond the Copenhagen context, it 
also came to include other drug users, such as recreational users 
of cocaine, ecstasy and amphetamine. This development was part 
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of a broader process where policies and police approaches that 
were originally developed to target the specific cannabis market 
at Christiania spread to other areas and domains. As an example 
of this, Moeller (2020) has documented how, since 2003 – the 
year the government launched its first Fight against Drugs-policy 
(Government 2003a) – there has been a remarkable quantitative 
increase in the enforcement intensity of the Law on Euphoria-
Inducing Substances. While the period between 2004 and 2010 
was characterised by a quantitative increase in enforcement in-
tensity, stemming mostly from crackdowns on cannabis retail 
sales in Copenhagen, from 2011 to 2017 police districts outside 
of Copenhagen came to drive the overall increase. This develop-
ment coincided with the launch of the government’s second drug 
action plan in 2010 – The Fight against Drugs II (Government 
2010). While this action plan emphasised the importance of 
maintaining and increasing the intensity of drug law enforcement 
against possession offences and against organised drug trading, it 
no longer contained references to the specific cannabis market in 
Copenhagen (Moeller 2020). Across the different police districts 
in Denmark, the average increase in reported Law on Euphoria-
Inducing Substances offences rose by 42% from 2007 to 2017, 
with some provincial police districts, such as Mid- and West 
Sealand Police, and North Jutland Police, registering increases of 
127% and 122% respectively (Moeller 2020).
Both in Copenhagen and elsewhere, police have often drawn 
on discourses that frame young and recreational drug users as the 
economic basis for organised drug trading to publicly justify their 
intensified targeting of drug users:
We target those who want to buy hash, because we want to combat
the criminal backers, by making it unsafe for their buyers, which 
means that they lose their customer base.
(Head of Task Force Pusher Street in DR.DK 2012)
[We target people who buy cannabis and other drugs from mobile 
dealers] because we want to get to the root of the problem. When 
there are buyers, there will also be sellers, and while the police 
make a great effort to combat the organised drug trade, it is a fun-
damental problem that there is still a demand.
(Police Commissioner in Mid- and West Jutland Police 2019)
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A New Moral Configuration of the Drug User
The intensified policing of drug users as a means of combatting 
organised crime has been coupled with a new moral configuration 
of young and recreational drug users. During the 2000s, many 
Danish cities experienced a growth in gang conflicts and shoot-
ings, resulting in an intensified media focus on the linkages be-
tween drugs and organised crime (Houborg & Enghoff 2018). 
In this climate of heightened public concern about gang-related 
crime and violence, Danish police became strong public promot-
ers of a moralistic discourse, in which young and recreational 
users of cannabis and other drugs were blamed for the ongoing 
gang conflicts. As illustrated in the above, drug users are some-
times identified as the ‘root of the [gang] problem’. In 2011, for 
instance, the Chief of Danish Police, Jens Henrik Højbjerg, made 
a public appeal in which he emphasised that the authorities could 
not by themselves combat the crime and violence committed by 
outlaw bikers and gangs. Ordinary Danes also needed to take 
responsibility.
If we all showed responsibility and didn’t allow ourselves [to] 
be tempted, things would be very different (…). Citizens should 
stop buying stolen goods, and they should not buy amphetamine 
or cocaine on a night out at the weekend (…). Think about what 
kind of people you are supporting when buying stolen goods 
or drugs.
(TV2 Lorry 2011)
In recent years, the morally condemnatory tone and the argument 
that ‘if you choose to buy illegal drugs you support criminal gangs’ 
have recurred consistently in public statements by the police, as 
the following quotes illustrate:
Those who buy hash at Pusher street support organised crime and 
thereby the criminals, who repeatedly defend their crime with vio-
lence against the police.
(Chief Police Inspector, Copenhagen Police, in DR.DK 2018)
People just need to realise that when you buy hard drugs,  ultimately 
you are underpinning organised crime in one way or the other.
(Police Inspector, Mid- and West Jutland Police, 
in TV Midtvest.dk 2019)
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By buying hash from these people you are underpinning the gangs 
in Esbjerg, and thereby also the continuation of the gang conflict.
(Vice Police Inspector, South Jutland Police, 
JydskeVestkysten 2020)
While leading politicians and the police have been the key moral 
entrepreneurs promoting condemnatory discourses that attribute 
responsibility for gang criminality and violence onto drug users, 
such discourses are today also replicated in the broader media, 
sometimes under headlines such as ‘Hash-smokers support gangs’ 
(B.T. 2009) or ‘The coke-sniffing upper class has a responsibili-
ty for gang crime’ (Information 2019). In such accounts, young 
and middle- and upper-class drug users are sometimes depicted 
as hypocrites who care much about how their actions impact on 
the climate but little about how their drug habits supposedly feed 
gang violence (see Information 2019).
The above illustrates how recent drug control policy debates 
in Denmark have involved a strategic mobilisation of morality 
(O’Malley 1999) encapsulated in a discourse where the young 
and recreational drug user is reconfigured from a consumer and 
wilful law-breaker to a customer and indirect accomplice in or-
ganised drug crime and related violence. Hence, drug use is no 
longer framed merely as an individualised moral failure to com-
ply with the law, but increasingly also as a moral failure to be a 
responsible citizen. From this perspective, drug use is not seen 
as a victimless crime. Rather, it is represented as a key driver of 
gang-related violence. By implication, drug users are depicted as 
hedonistic and selfish people who ‘support’ criminals and who do 
not care about how their practices are indirectly exposing oth-
ers to risks – i.e., the potential victims of drug-related violence. 
Moralisation against drug users is thus deliberately mobilised not 
only to justify police use of user-directed punitive approaches, 
but also as a governmental strategy to ‘responsibilise’ (Garland 
1996) young and middle-class people. This is carried out by com-
municating the message that apparently harmless drug use has 
dire consequences for others in the drug supply chain, and that, 
as moral citizens, would-be users therefore ought to demonstrate 
a societal responsibility and care for the wellbeing of others by 
choosing to abstain from buying illicit drugs.
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Gang Talk and Cannabis Legalisation
In Denmark, the discursive framing of young and recreational 
drug users as the economic basis for criminal drug trading has 
predominantly been used to promote user-centred punitive ap-
proaches. In the following, however, we briefly outline how this 
framing has also been used in recent years by reformers to argue 
for the necessity of a legalised cannabis market.
While the early 2000s was characterised by relative political 
consensus, both at municipal and national levels, about the use-
fulness of a punitive zero-tolerance approach, 2009 marked a 
turning point in cannabis policy debates (Houborg & Enghoff 
2018). During 2008 and 2009, the gang-related violence in 
Copenhagen reached a peak, and its effects on the lives of ordi-
nary citizens were widely reported by the media. As part of his 
campaign for the 2009 municipal election, the incumbent may-
or of Copenhagen, Frank Jensen, from the Social Democrats, 
therefore proposed introducing a three-year trial period where all 
cannabis users above 18 years of age should be legally able to 
purchase cannabis from shops in Copenhagen run by the state 
(Politiken 2009). The Liberal-Conservative government, however, 
immediately rejected the proposal. Nevertheless, from 2009 on-
wards, references to the gang conflicts have been central in politi-
cal discussions about cannabis and the possibilities for legalisation 
(Houborg & Enghoff 2018). Representatives of the Copenhagen 
municipality have played a key role in these debates. As outlined 
by Nygaard-Christensen and Frank (2019), in January 2017, the 
Social Democrats in Copenhagen argued for a legalisation trial by 
suggesting that legalisation would ‘remove some of the economy 
of the criminal gangs who today profit from cannabis being ille-
gal’. This line of argument has also been adopted by national pol-
iticians. In 2016, the parliamentary party Radikale Venstre noted 
the following in their proposal for a trial legalisation of cannabis:
The illegal cannabis sale at Christiania and elsewhere is controlled 
by organized criminals and gangs (…). Therefore, it is necessary 
to rethink and explore the possibilities for a responsible and con-
trolled way of legalizing cannabis, so that cannabis sale does not 
continue to remain a lucrative business for organized criminals.
(Quoted in Nygaard-Christensen & Frank 2019: 6)
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As outlined earlier, in the policy debates that in 1969 led to an in-
crease in the legal sentencing for professional drug trading, critics 
had warned that increased criminalisation was likely to result in 
rising retail-level prices on cannabis, thereby fertilising the ground 
for a growth in organised drug trading (Houborg & Vammen 
2012). In the 2010s, reformers argued that the turn towards more 
punitive policies, both in 1969 and especially after 2004, had in-
deed come to act as a criminogenic driver resulting in increased 
gang activities. Coming full circle, reformers today argue that le-
galisation of cannabis is the only way to prevent the continuous 
popular demand for cannabis, and its economic revenue, ending 
up in the hands of organised criminals. Importantly, advocates ar-
guing for the need for cannabis policy reform have not challenged 
the discursive framing of drug users as market customers whose 
purchasing practices feed organised crime. On the contrary, their 
argument for cannabis legalisation seems to reinforce this dis-
course. The solution reformers point to, however, is very different 
from the punitive one that dominates today. While the cannabis 
reform movement has gained momentum, in the Danish parlia-
ment there is still an overwhelming majority opposed to legalisa-
tion or decriminalisation (Nygaard-Christensen & Frank 2019).
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have outlined how changes in Danish drug 
control policy have been underpinned by discursive changes in 
the way youth and recreational drug use is framed in government 
reports, policy documents and the media. While previous studies 
have described how the discursive framing of youth drug use as 
a deviant consumer choice set within a nightlife context became a 
catalyst for more restrictive policies in Denmark during the ear-
ly 2000s (Houborg 2008; Houborg 2010; Houborg, Søgaard & 
Mogensen 2020), in this chapter we have analysed how recent 
decades have seen the emergence of a new discursive and politi-
cally potent framing of youth and recreational drug use as feeding 
organised crime. While this discursive shift has not led to legal 
changes, it has functioned as the foundation for an increase in the 
intensity of drug law enforcement, often used specifically to target 
and ‘stress’ drug users. Within this new discourse, intensified po-
lice targeting of drug users is justified as a means of combatting 
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organised crime, and young and recreational drug users are mor-
ally configured as selfish persons who allegedly do not care about 
how their drug habits feed gang conflicts and thus expose others 
to risk and harm. In this way, recent years have seen an intensifica-
tion of the moral condemnation of young drug users in Denmark.
Similar tendencies today characterise drug policy debates in 
countries such as England and Sweden. In England, the National 
Crime Agency launched a campaign in 2015 entitled ‘#every-
linecounts’, which aimed to raise awareness among middle-class 
individuals about how their seemingly harmless drug use had 
dire consequences for others in the drug supply chain, for local 
communities and for the environment (National Crime Agency 
2015). The campaign not only attributed blame for the harm done 
by the drug trade onto users, it also sought to responsibilise young 
and recreational users through slogans such as ‘Your choices can 
change everything’. In the UK, this discourse has been promoted by 
government representatives and leading politicians. In 2018, the 
Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan (The Guardian 2018a), the most 
senior UK police chief, Cressida Dick (The Guardian 2018b), and 
the British Justice Secretary, David Gauke (Independent 2018), all 
publicly argued that individuals who consume cocaine at dinner 
parties are to blame for street violence in cities across the UK. 
More recently, UK politicians and the media have also singled 
out middle-class cocaine users, often depicted as selfish individ-
uals who lead privileged lives, as the key people responsible for 
the emergence of highly exploitative criminal county-line supply 
models (Spicer 2021). In a similar vein, Swedish Prime Minister 
Stefan Löfven recently argued that middle-class drug users in 
the more affluent parts of Swedish cities are partly to blame for the 
gang-related violence in the more marginalised neighbourhoods 
(Expressen 2019).
The above illustrates how recent drug control policy debates in 
Denmark mirror developments in some other European countries, 
where ‘gang-talk’ has taken centre stage in arguments for more 
punitive approaches (see Spicer 2021). However, a notable differ-
ence exists. While the framing of drug users as complicit in gang 
crime in the UK has mainly focused on cocaine users, in Denmark 
(and in Sweden) today, this framing also dominates discourses 
about cannabis users. So, while Canada, Uruguay and several US 
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states have legalised cannabis, and many European countries have 
implemented or are considering decriminalisation of cannabis as 
an option, Denmark is one of the few Western countries that is 
going in the opposite direction, away from a lenient decriminali-
sation policy and towards a more restrictive approach (Houborg, 
Søgaard & Mogensen 2020; Moeller 2020). As demonstrated in 
this chapter, discursive linkages between cannabis use/rs and con-
cerns about organised crime have played a key role in this process.
As our analysis has shown, Danish police have, at times, 
 described the intensified policing of drug buyers as a way to ad-
dress the ‘root’ of the drug market problem. Contrary to this, 
Spicer (2021) has argued that contemporary discourses allocating 
blame and responsibility for the harms of the drug trade onto drug 
users represents a form of surface scapegoating that functions to 
divert attention away from the underlying structural and social 
conditions that drive drug markets. In Denmark, it remains the 
case that most street gangs are composed of  socio-economically 
 marginalised men (Pedersen 2014), and that men of lower socio-
economic status are also the primary users of cannabis (Bloomfield, 
Elmeland & Villumsen 2013) and the demographic most likely to 
be targeted by police for possession of illegal drugs (Houborg, 
Kammersgaard & Pedersen 2016). Yet, in Danish drug control 
policy debates on young peoples’ use of drugs,  socio-economic 
factors and issues related to social marginalisation are increas-
ingly silenced, and instead replaced by a focus on morality and 
individualised choices.
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8. Drug Control as an Exception 
in a Humane and Rational Criminal 
Policy in Finland
Heini Kainulainen & Pekka Hakkarainen
Three Stages of the Modern Finnish Criminal Policy
Following the criminological analysis of David Garland (2001), 
three different stages in the development of Finnish criminal pol-
icy can be identified: mitigation of repression, the punitive turn 
and conflicting policies. In this chapter, we will scrutinize how 
these general trends of criminal policy are reflected in the devel-
opment of drug control policy.
We will begin our examination from the 1960s, when the con-
ditions for humane and rational criminal policy were laid out in 
Finland. The motivation behind such a policy was to temper the 
role of the criminal justice system in the resolving of societal is-
sues. From this perspective, the issue of drugs is seen as an anom-
aly; it has been termed a paradox, since anti-drug measures have 
been primarily repressive.
In the 1990s, the criminal policy took a punitive turn, which 
could be partly attributed to increased concerns about organized 
and international drug-related crime. Governments clamped 
down and stringent measures were implemented not only in drug 
control but also within the criminal justice system in general.
Thirdly, it can be concluded from Garland’s analysis that the 
concept of conflicting policies describes the current system rather 
well: the punitive turn has not become predominant since mea-
sures intended to reduce or mitigate the role of the criminal justice 
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system have also been implemented.54 However, we will show in 
this chapter that such reductions or mitigation have barely had 
any effect for drug offenders. We will explore how the special role 
approach reserved for drugs has been evident in a strong reliance 
on the criminal justice system and, in particular, the directing of 
strict control over those who use drugs.
Towards a Humane and Rational Criminal Policy  
during the 1960s and 1970s
During the 1960s, a lively debate began in Finland over control 
policy. The debate drew attention to how the exercise of pow-
er in society resulted in the isolation of marginalized groups of 
people for extended periods of time without guarantees of due 
process (Eriksson 1967). This debate questioned the use of a pu-
nitive penal system. In the Nordic context, one of the most vocal 
critics was Nils Christie (1968), who pointed out that the rate of 
imprisonment in Finland was many times higher than in the other 
Nordic countries.
The debate over criminal policy was ideologically linked to the 
emergence of a welfare state that sought an equitable allocation of 
costs and benefits. This approach formed the basis for a humane 
and rational criminal policy that sought to minimize the suffer-
ing and other costs of crime, and of the control of crime, and to 
allocate these costs fairly among the various stakeholders (Lahti 
1972; Lappi-Seppälä 2001; Törnudd 1996: 33–36).
The aim of humane and rational criminal policy was to reduce 
repression and to use criminal law as sparingly as possible in the 
management of social problems (Anttila 1967; Lång 1966). In the 
spirit of a welfare state ideology, particular attention was paid 
to vulnerable members of society and services provided by social 
policy were to be enhanced (Lappi-Seppälä 2007). This was also 
considered a priority within the framework of the tools of criminal 
 54 Similar developments have been found in various Western and Nordic 
countries, but their manifestation, intensity and timing tend to vary, see 
e.g. Lappi-Seppälä 1998; Lappi-Seppälä 2016; Snacken & Dumortier 
2012; Tham 2019; Tonry 1998; Ugelvik & Dullum 2012; Victor 1995. 
For critique on Garland’s analysis, see e.g. Matthews 2002.
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policy. The slogan, ‘Good social policy is the best criminal policy’ 
expresses the essence of this approach (Kinnunen 2008: 69). The 
criminal justice system is not the only or even the most important 
system for controlling crime. Better results can be achieved by 
reducing social marginalization and welfare inequalities (Lappi-
Seppälä 2001: 107–109; Joutsen, Lahti & Pölönen 2001.)
One of the concrete objectives of a humane and rational crim-
inal policy was to reduce the number in the prison population, 
which had proven to be high in comparison to the other Nordic 
countries. In this spirit, a fundamental reform of legislation began 
in the 1970s. The scaling back of the use of imprisonment was 
widely accepted in legal praxis, and the prison population began 
to decline. Compared to the 1950s, the number of Finnish prison-
ers decreased almost by one half during the 1970s, and by the end 
of the 1980s the prison population had fallen to the same level as 
in the other Nordic countries (Lappi-Seppälä 2016: 18, 26).
From an international perspective, achieving such a change is 
exceptional. Tapio Lappi-Seppälä (2001) has found several dif-
ferent explanations behind the change. One explanatory factor 
he has suggested is that, at the time, criminal policy was not of 
general political interest in Finland, and instead the debate was 
expert-driven. Many of those who criticized the repressiveness of 
control policy played important roles in society during the 1970s 
and were actively involved in the liberalization of the legislation 
on criminal justice and the system of sanctions (Lappi-Seppälä 
2007). It was also at this time that a reform was undertaken of 
the outdated criminal law, which had originally been drafted 
in the 1800s. It is very clear from the report of the Committee 
on Criminal Law (1976) that the ultima ratio principle on which 
criminal law was built was taken seriously, and the intent was 
that the use of criminal law was to be the last resort. The purpose 
of the overall reform of the Criminal Code was to provide a crit-
ical assessment of the content of all penal provisions, seek to re-
duce the number of criminalizations and reduce the penalties for 
them (Anttila & Törnudd 1992; Lahti 2017.) From this point of 
view, the drug issue can be seen as an exception. This has been 
called the paradox of Finnish criminal policy (Kinnunen 2008), 
which still remains unsolved.
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Total Ban on Drugs
The special way in which drugs were dealt with had a long his-
tory. When the first wave of drugs washed over Finland (among 
other Western countries) in the 1960s, new legislation was passed 
to combat the situation. When the 1972 Narcotics Act was en-
acted, the need to criminalize the production, trafficking and dis-
tribution of drugs was widely recognized, while the question of 
whether or not drug use should be criminalized became a matter 
of controversy. The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 
did not require parties to make drug use a punishable offence; 
rather it encouraged treatment and care.
At various stages in the drafting process, views were expressed 
both for and against the criminalization of use. Following a series 
of very close votes, in 1972 it was finally decided to criminalize 
the use of drugs (Hakkarainen 1992; Hakkarainen 1997: 131–
150; Kainulainen 2009: 42–59; see also chapter Hakkarainen & 
Kainulainen in this book). It was recognized that the criminal-
ization of use would cause harms, and in order to avoid these, 
the police, prosecutors and judges were encouraged to apply the 
provisions on the waiving of measures so that users would not be 
punished for their personal consumption. In spite of the recom-
mendations to interpret the legislation thus – with a heavy focus 
on depenalization55 – waiving the measures was rare throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s (Kainulainen 2009: 62–65, 73–82).
The Narcotics Act showcased a repressive stance towards the 
issue of drugs, which was further enhanced by the strictness of 
its implementation. The end of 1960s saw the police force im-
proving its skills to the effect that it could detect drug-related 
crimes that would have been otherwise left uncovered. Drug 
crime  investigation became a special branch, new investigation 
methods were adopted through foreign influence, undercover 
operations were attempted, interrogation skills were developed 
and good  relationships were established with the actors working 
in the illegal markets. The increased number of drug offences in 
the statistics was the reason why the police was allocated more 
 55 Depenalization means that the use of drugs remains a criminal offence 
but punishment is, in practice, no longer imposed.
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 human resources and equipment to drug units (Kainulainen 2009; 
Kainulainen, Savonen & Rönkä 2017; Kontula 1986). However, 
the number of drug offences was pretty small when looking at 
recorded crime as a whole.
When the 1972 Narcotics Act was enacted, some experts in 
criminal law had opposed the criminalization of drug use. Since 
drug use was criminalized despite this opposition, a few experts 
continued to raise the issue. Recommendations were presented on 
how the provisions on the waiving of measures should be applied, 
but they had little effect on enforcement praxis. For example, 
within the practices of the police and prosecutors, it was de facto 
a dead letter (Kainulainen 2009: 73–82).
From the 1980s there was increasing criticism in the legal lit-
erature. The criticism was directed in particular against the way 
in which the Narcotics Act was applied. What faced criticism in 
the literature alongside strict user control was the way criminal 
responsibility was established in cases of more aggravated crimes 
pertaining to drug distribution. Some criminal law experts were 
also concerned with the possibility that criminal liability was be-
ing extended too far with respect to drug offences. The case-law 
seemed to be consistently producing cases in which exceptions 
were made to the general doctrine of criminal law, and the prin-
ciples limiting criminal liability in general were compromised on 
the grounds of the ‘special nature’ of drug crime (Lahti 1985; 
Träskman 1995; Utriainen & Hakonen 1985). The question was 
also raised whether quite heavy sentences were being imposed on 
defendants for drug offences with a very low threshold of evi-
dence. When a person was convicted of a drug offence, the quan-
tity of drugs involved was generally not determined by what had 
been found in his or her possession but on what his or her ac-
complices had said about the quantity of drugs that he or she had 
handled (Kainulainen 2007: 49; Kainulainen, Savonen & Rönkä 
2017: 137–139; Kontula 1986: 235).56
 56 From this point of view, it can be noted that during the 1990s, after the 
police were gradually permitted to use a variety of undercover policing 
methods (like phone tapping), the evidence pertaining to the quantity of 
drugs has diversified and the legal protection of defendants has, to some 
extent, improved.
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The way in which drugs were being controlled was also criti-
cized in criminological studies that dealt with police, prosecuto-
rial or court practice. The police played quite an active part on 
the drug front. Drug users were observed, arrested and brought 
before courts for punishment (Kainulainen, Savonen & Rönkä 
2017). Attention was paid to the intensity of the use of coercive 
measures in criminal proceedings, for example in the form of 
the very long periods that individuals could be held under arrest 
(Kontula 1986: 57; Träskman 1986: 22–23). Indeed, it was only 
after Finland acceded to the European Convention on Human 
Rights in 1989 that the maximum period of arrest was shortened. 
During the 1970s and 1980s drug users could be held under ar-
rest for up to 17 days, but in practice it could be even longer be-
fore a court ruled on whether or not the suspect could be held in 
 pre-trial detention (Heinonen 1989: 76–79; Kainulainen, Savonen 
& Rönkä 2017: 126–129).
Furthermore, in addition to the fine imposed on the drug of-
fender, he or she was ordered to pay the state for the value of 
the drugs that the offender had used. This practice was not abol-
ished until the criminal law was amended in 1992. The purpose 
of the Narcotics Act was to concentrate crime control around the 
distributors, who were seen to represent professional and orga-
nized crime. However, the research of police practices shows that 
for decades the police control has focused on catching drug users 
(Kainulainen 2009; Kinnunen 2008; Kontula 1986). Interviews of 
those who had been apprehended for using drugs showed that they 
objected to the prohibition on drug use and stated that being the 
subject of control had had many negative consequences. Indeed, 
there was an accumulation of official and unofficial sanctions, 
which easily initiated a process of exclusion that was difficult to 
reverse (Heinonen 1989; Kainulainen, Savonen & Rönkä 2017).
A Punitive Turn: The Tightening of Control in the 1990s
Like in many other Western countries, the Finnish criminal pol-
icy remained fairly moderate during the 1980s, but the 1990s 
brought a shift in the debate on criminal policy.57 The ideological 
 57 The punitive turn seems to be similar in Western societies, but when ana-
lyzing more closely, differences between countries can also be found (see 
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basis of the welfare state began to crumble due to the  economic 
depression in the 1990s. The criticism stated that welfare states 
increase problems rather than solve them, and that such 
states are too expensive, inefficient and passivating. Also as part 
of the discussion, the starting points for humane and rational 
criminal policy began to be undermined (Lappi-Seppälä 1998).
One way in which this policy was undermined was criticism 
of the fact that the participants in the debate on criminal policy 
had been limited to a small and influential group of experts who 
shared one another’s views. For example, some right-wing poli-
ticians were vocal in airing their views in the media on the need 
to tighten control. Their demands received some political weight 
and support, which was reflected in more punitive amendments 
to the Criminal Code. One example of this was that the statutory 
definitions of violent offences were made more punitive and the 
accompanying penal latitudes were raised, which was soon re-
flected in an increase in the number of prisoners (Lappi-Seppälä 
2007; Lappi-Seppälä 2012; Lappi-Seppälä 2016).
When the repression was being mitigated in the 1970s and 
1980s, drug-related crimes received wide coverage in the press 
and generally sparked public interest, but they were not at the 
centre of criminal policy decision-making. The number of cases 
and ‘drug convicts’ was relatively low compared to other types of 
crime, such as property crimes or drink driving. For example, the 
report of the Committee on Criminal Law (1976) contains only 
a few scattered references to drugs. Achieving the main goal of 
criminal policy, which was the reduction of the prison population, 
was to be done by focusing, above all else, on those offenders who 
were filling the prisons, such as those who had been convicted of 
property offences.
However, in the debate on criminal policy, the focus was now 
turned to the drug issue from another angle, since the control of 
drugs appeared to have an impact on the choice of tools used in 
other areas of criminal policy. One of the drivers of this debate 
was ‘Den gode fiende’, the book written by Christie and Bruun 
(1985) that was published in Finnish in 1986. In their critical 
analysis, the authors highlighted how drug-related crime had been 
Garland 2001; Hermansson 2019; Pratt 2007; Tham 2019; Victor 1995; 
von Hofer & Tham 2013).
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at the forefront as the grip of the mechanisms of control had been 
strengthened and the range of measures used by the control au-
thorities had been expanded (see also Träskman 2004).
In an article published by Per Ole Träskman in the joint Nordic 
book, ‘Varning för straff’ (‘Beware of Punishment’), he uses the 
term ‘dragon’s egg’ to illustrate the phenomenon identified by 
Christie and Bruun. According to Träskman (1995), organized 
drug crime was used as the rationale for injecting elements into 
the criminal justice system that were foreign to the Finnish le-
gal system and that seriously jeopardized the legal protection 
of suspects. Pressure was soon exerted to expand the scope of 
these elements to other types of offences. In the end, according to 
Träskman, the control of drugs has had a significant impact on 
the entire criminal justice system and on the punitive turn in this 
system (Träskman 1995; Träskman 2003; Träskman 2004).
The police took an active role in defining the nature of 
illegal drug markets, which further consolidated the linkage be-
tween drugs and criminal activity. The review of law enforcement 
authorities painted the picture of professional, organized and in-
ternational drug crime, which in turn called for an increase in the 
coercive measures available for use. Consequently, the police were 
given a set of new undercover policing methods, like cellphone 
surveillance, bugging, undercover operations, pretended drug pur-
chases, use of data sources and controlled delivery.
After the mid 1990s, the prisoner rate in Finland, which had 
remained low, began to grow again. This was the result of strict-
er policies, starting with drug offences and later including vio-
lent offences. The change could be seen not only in the growth of 
the number of prisoners convicted of drug offences and violent 
 offences, but also in the longer length of sentences given (Lappi-
Seppälä 2012). According to Lappi-Seppälä, this was a clear con-
sequence of the punitive turn, which had led to a tightening of 
control (Lappi-Seppälä 2001; Lappi-Seppälä 2007). However, the 
increase in the number of prisoners convicted of drug offences is 
also explained by changes in the drug market.
The significance of drugs in the criminal justice system also 
increased due to the considerable changes that took place in 
191Drug Control as an Exception in a Humane 
the amount and nature of drug crime. This was influenced by 
a  second wave of drug use (Partanen & Metso, 1999; Partanen 
2002), which resulted in an expanded drug market. This, in turn, 
could be seen in an increase in the supply of drugs, the emer-
gence of new drugs on the market, and a strong increase in the 
demand for drugs. According to the police, drug-related criminal-
ity in the 1990s began also to have more common features with 
organized crime, and its connections to international criminality 
deepened. The changed drug situation was soon reflected in the 
criminal justice system. The number of drug offences recorded in 
the statistics increased. The number of seizures multiplied, as did 
the quantity of drugs seized. The movement of large quantities of 
new substances classified as dangerous, such as ecstasy and bu-
prenorphine products (generally, Subutex), which was later used 
in drug substitution treatment, was reflected in the penal system. 
The number of prisoners serving sentences for drug offences in-
creased, and they were being sentenced to very long terms of im-
prisonment (Kainulainen 2007).
Drug Control Remains Strict
The penal provisions on drug offences were reformed at the be-
ginning of the 1990s as part of a comprehensive reform of the 
penal code. The 1988 Vienna Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances also played a part 
in improving international cooperation to combat illegal drug 
sales. It required the extension of criminal responsibility to facili-
tate the access to the factors that uphold the drug industry. One of 
the key aims was the prevention of money laundering.
In terms of drug use, there was no strong attempt to carry out 
a critical assessment of the justifications for the criminalization 
of the use of drugs. The main debate at the time was over what 
would be the appropriate penal latitude for the use of drugs. 
The Working Group on Drug Offences, chaired by Träskman, 
 proposed a petty form of the basic offence – a drug infraction 
punishable only with a fine. The Minister of Justice was concerned 
that such an approach would convey the wrong message – that the 
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control of drugs was being eased – which would, in turn, tempt 
young people to become new users of drugs and would bring in 
more people as drug dealers. Also, members of Parliament joined 
in the debate. In the total reform of criminal law, offences were 
generally set out on three levels of seriousness, with a petty form, 
a basic form and an aggravated form, however a different ap-
proach was adopted with respect to drugs. The use of drugs re-
mained part of the basic drug offence, for which the penal latitude 
continued to range from a fine to imprisonment for two years. 
However, the rationale for the possibility of the waiving of mea-
sures was regarded as so strong that a special provision on this 
was taken into the criminal law. The intention was that measures 
would be waived more often, particularly in cases where a drug 
user sought treatment, but also in other petty cases of drug use. 
Thus, depenalization now received strong support by penal code 
(Kainulainen 2009: 95–122; Kainulainen 2017).
This time there was a change in the application of law, and 
prosecutors began to decide much more frequently to waive mea-
sures in the case of drug offences. The increasing use of the waiv-
ing of measures prompted lively debate. Some deemed it a good 
way to prevent the exclusion of drug users, in particular of young 
people, while others were concerned about the blurring of the 
line between what is allowed and what is prohibited. The Finnish 
Prosecutor’s Association proposed to the Ministry of Justice that a 
petty form of the offence be incorporated into the Criminal Code. 
Since this would have a narrower penal latitude, offences involv-
ing the use of drugs could be dealt with through summary pe-
nal proceedings (Kainulainen 2001; Kainulainen 2009: 134–137; 
Kainulainen 2017).
Indeed, the provisions criminalizing the use of drugs were 
amended at the beginning of the 2000s, but this reform did not 
call into question the need for criminalization. Nonetheless, an 
approach based on fundamental and human rights had increas-
ingly gained ground in the debate on criminal law, even though 
this was not reflected in the formal opinions given by criminal 
law scholars on the use of drugs as an offence. It is possible that a 
form of Realpolitik thinking may have been behind this approach. 
Although some experts might well have opposed the criminaliza-
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tion of the use of drugs, they did not raise the issue because they 
did not believe that this view would have prevailed in political 
decision-making.
Setting the use of drugs apart from the basic drug offence, as 
a petty form of the offence, is in itself a positive development. 
Under pressure from the police, the penal latitude was set as a fine 
or imprisonment of up to six months, so that the police retained 
the right to carry out searches of the premises of people suspect-
ed of drug use. From a criminal law perspective, the severity of 
the penal latitude should be based on the reproachful nature of the 
conduct in question, and not on the needs of the police. However, 
the amendment of the law to provide for a separate, petty offence 
of drug use led to a tightening of the penal system, with the good 
start that had been made towards a shift to the wider use of the 
waiving of sanctions quickly ending (Kainulainen 2009: 359–360; 
Kainulainen 2017.)
Hence, following the amendment of the law to provide for 
a separate offence of drug use, the penal system was tightened. 
The simplification of the procedure for imposing fines has led 
to the police imposing a fine for drug use in a rather schemat-
ic manner. Following the amendment, it has been very rare that 
measures have been waived. When the amendment was enacted, 
the authorities were encouraged to waive measures, particularly 
for two groups of people. The Office of the Prosecutor General 
and the National Police Board jointly drafted guidelines for the 
implementation of this position, and the guidelines have recent-
ly been revised (VKS 2018: 2). Young people who were appre-
hended experimenting with or using drugs should be cautioned 
rather than fined. Problem drug users should be encouraged to 
seek treatment, in which case they would not be fined. Studies 
of enforcement practices have shown that various arrangements 
for cautioning minors have been organized in different municipal-
ities and in general they have not been fined. On the other hand, 
the diversion of adult problem drug users to treatment has not suc-
ceeded and, consequently, the number of such decisions to waive 
measures has remained very small (Kainulainen 2009: 346–380).
For decades, the police have considered it important to tackle 
drug use. This is also stated in recent instructions to the  police: ‘In 
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order to maintain both general and special deterrence, it is im-
portant that the police intervene in all cases of drug use and that 
these also be recorded as criminal offences known to the  police’ 
(PO-2018-49612). These same instructions refer to the possibility 
for the police to decide to waive measures. A caution by the police 
is considered sufficient for very petty incidents of drug use involv-
ing the possession of a small quantity of drugs or where the drugs 
have been used only at home. The police do not publish statistics 
on the number of cautions it has issued. According to police, such 
decisions are rarely made, even if suitable cases for the waiving 
of measures can be found among drug offences. Indeed, since the 
1960s, the police have been reluctant to waive measures for drug 
use (Kainulainen 2001; Kainulainen 2009; Kainulainen 2017).
Indicators of the Control of Drugs
Drug offences are graded according to three different degrees of 
severity, according to the seriousness of the offence. Drug offences 
involve the illegal production of drugs, import, export, transport, 
distribution and possession of drugs. The sanctions are a fine or 
a maximum of two years imprisonment. The drug offence is ag-
gravated if it involves very dangerous drugs or a big quantity of 
them, if substantial financial profit is sought, the offender acts as 
part of organized group, the offence causes severe danger to the 
health or life of several people, or the drugs are distributed to mi-
nors or otherwise in un unscrupulous manner. The penalty is im-
prisonment from one to ten years. In the reform of 2001, the new 
prerequisites were introduced for petty drug offences. It includes 
the use of drugs and the possession of drugs or attempt to acquire 
minor quantities for own use. The least severe drug offence, the 
use of drugs, may be punished with a fine or a maximum of six 
months imprisonment. In addition to this, the Penal Code con-
tains penal sanctions for the preparation and promotion of drug 
offences (see Penal Code 50:1–4).
Recorded drug offences increased steeply during the 1990s, 
and the increase has continued. Figure 18 shows that the major-
ity of drug offences recorded by the police continue to  involve 
drug use. In recent years, the police have recorded around 
195Drug Control as an Exception in a Humane 
30,000 drug offences, of which about 20,000 have been drug use. 
This means that more than half of the drug offences recorded 
by the police have involved drug use. The punishment has usually 
been a fine imposed by the police. Very few decisions have been 
taken to waive measures.
Since the 1960s, police have kept statistics on the number 
of drug seizures they have made and on the quantities of various 
drugs seized. Data on drug seizures (see Table 16) can be used to 
form a picture of changes in the drug market, such as the avail-
ability of different drugs or fluctuations in the amounts. However, 
the reliability of a timeline analysis is undermined by the lack of 
statistics on the potency of the drugs that have been seized. For 
example, if one year the amphetamine found on the market was 
typically low-grade, but in the following year very strong amphet-
amine was seized, this information is not revealed by the statistics, 
and the data on amphetamine seizures from one year to the next 
cannot be compared.
In the Finnish drug market cannabis has been the most com-
monly seized by the law enforcement agencies. Also, amphetamine 
and methamphetamine, ecstasy and buprenorphine-based opioid 
substitution medications (especially Subutex®) are  common, 
whereas heroin and cocaine are rarer, although this seems to 
be changing.
Very little statistical information is available on coercive mea-
sures used by the police. In addition, the police do not keep statis-
Figure 18. Recorded drug offences (unlawful use of drugs; drug offence; 
aggravated drug offence; other) in Finland, 2001–2019.
Source: Statistics Finland (1).
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tics on whether they only stop drug users on the street and seek to 
determine whether or not they have drugs in their possession. It is 
only if a person is brought to a police station and he or she, or his 
or her clothes, are searched in order to detect drugs that there is 
usually a record of the apprehension. The number of persons ap-
prehended, arrested and remanded for trial each year can be seen 
in Table 17. In 2020, a total of 3200 apprehensions were made. 
The number of arrests was 1,900 and remands 500. In traffic, the 
examinations to detect drug use have increased markedly. From 
2013 to 2020 the number of examinations increased from 4,500 
to 12,000.
The police publish selected data on their use of undercover 
policing methods, such as interception of telecommunications or 
Table 16. Quantities of seized drugs in Finland, 2015–2019.
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Cannabis (inc. hashish 
kg)
271 332 1.015 399 612
Cannabis-plant (N) 23,000 18,900 15,200 13,100 15,900
Amphetamines (kg) 300 192 259 202 177
Ecstasy (tablets N) 23,660 127,680 66,420 219,350 265,510
Heroin (kg) 0.42 0.3 0.36 0.08 7.8
Cocaine (kg) 9.2 18.5 7.3 10 223
Subutex® (tablets N) 42,950 73,670 24,510 63,130 56,470
Source: Police.
Table 17. Drug offenders* apprehended, arrested and remanded in 
Finland, 2016–2020.
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Apprehended 1959 2418 2574 2866 3192
Arrested 1614 1747 1749 1857 1906
Remanded 565 555 520 558 496
(*) unlawful use of drugs, drug offence, aggravated drug offence and other 
drug offences.
Source: Statistics Finland (2).
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technical surveillance. An annual report on the use of covert co-
ercive measures is prepared for the Parliamentary Ombudsman. 
According to these reports, very many of these cases have  involved 
the investigation of drug offences. According to the assessment 
of the police themselves, the use of covert coercive measures has 
been very useful in the detection of drug offences. The police are 
not at all forthcoming on their covert activity and the use of pseu-
do-purchases. They also do not report on their covert collection 
of intelligence.
During the 1990s, the number of prisoners serving a sentence 
for a drug offence as their main offence began to increase (see 
Figure 19). In 2019, 20 per cent of prisoners had been convicted 
of a drug offence as their main offence (N = 464). The number of 
all sentenced prisoners was 2260. Of the prisoners with a foreign 
background, almost one half had been convicted of a drug offence. 
The conversion of unpaid fines into imprisonment was reduced by 
a reform implemented in Finland in 2008. However, the law is 
once again being tightened and the trend is reverting to what it 
was before. No statistics are available on what offences had led to 
the original unpaid fine, which was subsequently converted into 
imprisonment. Nonetheless, it can be presumed that some of the 
offenders serving a sentence of imprisonment for unpaid fines had 
been guilty only of drug use.
Surveys of the health of prisoners show that a significant 
 proportion of them suffer from alcohol and drug problems 
Figure 19. Prisoners in Finland, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2019 (100 %) 
(principal offence of sentenced prisoners). 
Source: Criminal Sanctions Agency.
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(Obstbaum-Federley 2017). From the mid 1990s there was a rel-
atively rapid change in Finnish prison services and rehabilitation 
programs were introduced. As the number of drug-using inmates 
continued to rise, as did the number of inmates sentenced for drug 
offences, there was a strong need to establish drug treatment pro-
grams in prisons (Kainulainen, Kinnunen & Kouvonen 2001). The 
programs reflect a dual-track policy in which drug-using inmates 
are seen either as criminals who are to be punished and controlled 
more harshly, or as rehabilitating drug users who are entitled to 
welfare services (Kolind et al. 2013). The substance control of 
prisons has been intensified significantly in recent years. In addi-
tion, measures related to training, information, rehabilitation and 
health care have been implemented.
Statistics do not necessarily provide information on the intensi-
ty of the control of drugs. From this point of view, studies that ex-
amine those involved in control are of interest. There have been a 
few studies on the drug police. There have also been a few studies 
that have contacted those who have been the subject of control. 
For decades, the police have attached great importance to inter-
vening in the behavior of drug users. In addition, the police have 
rather intensively monitored those people that they have identi-
fied as being of interest (Kainulainen 2009; Kainulainen, Savonen 
& Rönkä 2017; Kinnunen 2003). This explains, in part, how the 
police are able to apprehend drug users, as does the fact that some 
of those involved in the illegal drug market are quite active in 
the commission of many different types of offences. However, the 
criminal justice system has succeeded rather poorly in responding 
to the needs of those who are caught in a cycle of drugs and crime.
The Failure to Lower the Level of Repression in Respect 
of Drugs
With respect to drugs, it has proven to be difficult to launch a 
debate that would provide a critical assessment of drug control 
and its consequences, as well as alternatives to the use of the penal 
system and criminal law. Träskman (2004) has pointed out that 
while the prevailing severe control of drugs and its harmful effects 
have indeed been criticized, it has not had a positive influence in 
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the development of criminal policy, since politicians have not been 
convinced of the need for mitigation. On the contrary, for a long 
time, the trend has been towards a tightening of control rather 
than a relaxation of it. In addition, international models and the 
need for amendment of the law in line with EU requirements have 
typically been referred to precisely when a tightening of controls 
has been desired.
During the 1990s, when a general debate arose that empha-
sized fundamental and human rights, it would have been a good 
opportunity for criticism of the control of drugs and, in particu-
lar, for easing the prohibition on the use of drugs. Fundamental 
and human rights were no longer just an internal constitutional 
issue. Instead, human rights thinking pervaded all areas of law, in-
cluding criminal law (Melander 2008; Pirjatanniemi 2011). When 
 examined from the point of view of fundamental and human 
rights, it would have been very difficult to justify, for example, a 
prohibition on the personal use of drugs.
Amnesty International has examined drug control and 
 prohibition from the human rights perspective, and came to the 
conclusion that the current repressive control has been inefficient, 
leading to numerous violations of human rights. On a global 
scale, the violations include capital punishment; the coercive use 
of arms; and corruption and repeated questionable actions by the 
law enforcement that have been either unlawful or ‘in the grey 
area’, leading to the neglect of legal protection. The vulnerable 
people in society are typically those who resort to drug use and 
suffer from it. However, the current repressive control does not 
focus on seeing to their social rights or right to health, but rather 
exacerbates the issues through stigmatization, alienation and mar-
ginalization of users (Amnesty 2019).
The criminal justice system can be developed not only by 
amending legislation, but also by changing the way in which the 
law is interpreted or applied. For example, the Supreme Court 
has sought to reduce the sentences imposed on persons who had 
been apprehended in the smuggling of drugs on the grounds that 
they had not been responsible for the planning of the drug traf-
ficking (Supreme Court precedents 2017:9; 2018:45; 2020:45). 
However, the Supreme Court has upheld a strict attitude towards 
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the  penalization of drug use – the scope for waiving of measures 
has been narrowed to a great extent (Supreme Court precedents 
2002:111; 2003:62).
Conflicting Policies in the 21st Century
Garland (2001) states that one of the characteristics of the current 
state of affairs is that, after the punitive turn, there has been no 
unified vision of criminal policy. Societies have conformed to high 
levels of criminal activity and the public sector no longer strives to 
solely prevent crime. Today, we simultaneously resort to  numerous 
different criminal policy measures that are based on very different 
ideological starting points – even at odds with one another.
Nordic criminal policy has been characterized as extraordi-
nary, since it has remained humane and rational in spite of the 
punitive requirements (Pratt 2008a; 2008b). The Nordic penal 
exceptionalism has gained admiration in international discus-
sion, but it has also engendered criticism, according to which such 
exceptionalism does not exist. The tone of the discussion varies 
based on which countries are used as points of comparison, what 
kinds of questions are being asked and to whom the message 
of the current state of criminal policy is directed. Moreover, when 
the focus is placed on the target of the repression, more aspects 
are revealed that are open to criticism. For example, the UN 
Committee against Torture has drawn the Nordic countries’, and 
especially Finland’s, attention to the large amount of time individ-
uals spend on remand and the harsh circumstances at the police 
station cells (Barker 2013; Ugelvik & Dullum 2012). Minors are 
rarely found in Finnish prisons, but the number of out-of-home 
placements has been on the increase.
Lappi-Seppälä argues that various structural and cultural 
 factors can be found behind the moderate criminal policy. The 
question is about a constant commitment to the Nordic welfare 
state, which aims for solid safety nets and an even distribution of 
income. Citizens and the government trust each other, and politics 
strives for consensus rather than conflict (Lappi-Seppälä 2007). 
Although there have been signs of a chilling of the criminal policy 
climate in Finland, it should be noted that the debate in Finland 
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does not seem to be as emotional or politicized as it is in many 
Anglo-Saxon countries, or even in Sweden (Hermansson 2019). 
This has been reflected in the program of many political parties 
and in the criminal policy initiatives of politicians, which have 
not sought to appeal to the general public through populist crack-
downs (Boucht 2020; Häkkinen 2020; Kainulainen, Honkatukia 
& Niemi 2021; Lappi-Seppälä 2012; Lappi-Seppälä 2016).
The general public, in turn, does not seem to be getting very 
heated about crime. This can be seen, for example, in a recent 
study of public attitudes towards punishment, according to which 
the respondents would, in general, have imposed sentences that 
were even lighter than the prevailing sentencing practice (Balvik et 
al. 2015; Kääriäinen 2017). Many respondents also welcomed the 
idea of  developing treatment-oriented alternatives to prison for 
offenders with substance abuse problems. The general debate on 
criminal policy in recent years seems to have focused on certain 
limited crime themes, such as offences committed by immigrants, 
in particular, sexual offences. On these issues, the tone of the de-
bate has become sharper.
Using Garland’s idea on conflicting policies we can point out 
that the punitive turn has manifested itself as strict continuous 
amendments to the Criminal Code: the scope of penal provisions 
has been broadened and the sentence scale heightened. This trend 
is especially visible for violent crimes and sex offences, which 
have been made stricter several times during the last few years. 
The number in the Finnish prison population began to rise at the 
turn of the millennium, but it levelled off shortly after and has 
since reduced. Lappi-Seppälä sees that this is partly due to the 
development of the sanctions system, which has been on par with 
the approach of humane and rational criminal policy. When the 
Criminal Code has been made more severe, the common reaction 
has been to mitigate the sanctions system. According to Lappi-
Seppälä, in many cases, changes and innovations in the system of 
sanctions functioned as a safety valve, easing the pressure created 
by politically motivated reforms in the realm of criminalization 
(Lappi-Seppälä 2007: 219, 2016: 31).
Indeed, in the penal system, legal experts have actively begun 
to seek alternatives to imprisonment. Community service was the 
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first such alternative to be introduced, followed by the juvenile 
penalty for young offenders, and the most recent reform that in-
troduced a form of supervision as punishment, which offenders 
serve in their own home. Intensive abuse of substances or drugs, 
or homelessness, can be a bar to community service or supervi-
sion. Thus, the relaxation of the penal system in recent decades 
has not been to the benefit of vulnerable persons who have been 
apprehended for drug offences.
The more lenient approach in the system of sanctions is also 
represented by the use of mediation in the case of less serious of-
fences; successful mediation usually results in a decision to waive 
prosecution. Mediation is not possible at all in the case of drug 
offences because there is no victim in the offence who would be 
the other party to the mediation. Some years ago, plea bargaining 
was introduced in an attempt to reduce the expenses incurred by 
the criminal process, whereby the perpetrator could participate in 
defining the proceedings he or she is prosecuted in, which would 
mitigate the punishment. Plea bargaining is applied only in more 
serious charges; however, the bargaining is not applicable to ag-
gravated narcotics offences.
The number of imprisoned drug addicts is considerable. The 
Imprisonment Act, which was introduced in 2006, placed an em-
phasis on drawing up an individual sentence plan. The number 
of rehabilitation programs in prison has been increased, but their 
implementation has been met with many problems, for example, 
not all drug addicts are recognized or are deemed to profit from 
such programs (Obstbaum-Federley 2017). The programs also 
rarely accept those on remand, convicts serving short sentences 
and those who are serving a conversion sentence due to unpaid 
fines in prison.
Discussion
New participants have entered the debate of criminal policy, 
and the debate has become more diverse. This is also reflected in 
drug policy. The ‘role’ of drugs is being redefined  internationally, 
which can be seen particularly with regard to cannabis. The need 
to control the distribution of drugs is generally agreed on in the 
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EU, which in turn has strengthened international cooperation. 
However, the member states are not in full agreement as to the 
view towards the use and users of drugs. Some states emphasize 
the role of penal control, others the need to weaken adverse ef-
fects. However, several member states have depenalized the use of 
drugs, which ensures that punishments are not necessarily includ-
ed in the political agenda: it is understood that there are ways to 
apply the criminal legislation and simultaneously employ mitiga-
tion and leniency in the proceedings (Chatwin 2011; Hughes & 
Stevens 2010).
The drug control policy in Finland has been built on the crim-
inal justice system ever since the 1960s. Compromises have been 
made to the principles of humane and rationale criminal policy. 
The penal provisions regarding drug-related crimes have been 
broadened, more efficient drug control has been enforced and 
the application of Criminal Code has been extremely stringent. 
When the sentence scale was narrowed down in an amendment 
pertaining to drug abuse, the penal practices were, in turn, made 
stricter. Even though mitigation has been employed within the 
criminal justice system (e.g. with mediation and plea bargain-
ing) and alternatives have been devised for imprisonment, those 
convicted of drug-related crimes have hardly been able to benefit 
from these changes. The number of such convicts has been on the 
increase in prisons, and generally the number of addicted people 
has been shooting up. It has been noted that these people usually 
come from poorer circumstances than those who end up apply-
ing for non-prison rehabilitation services. Bringing rehabilitative 
elements into the practical life of prisons is not simple, however, 
and hitherto there has not been enough political will in Finland to 
adopt, for example, the contract treatment (kontraktsvård) model 
used in Sweden.
From the perspective of humane criminal policy, the use of the 
penal system should not be discriminatory. Regardless, penal con-
trol has been concentrated on drug users who are in vulnerable 
positions. Some of these people are constantly involved in criminal 
proceedings, both because of their drug use and because of other 
crimes. The dominant repressive system of control has an adverse 
effect on drug users. A ban on drug use can make it more difficult 
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to get help, support or treatment, as well as remain in treatment 
when the relapses during a normal treatment process are defined 
as criminal. Mistrust, control and sanctions can easily make their 
way into the common practices of drug user rehabilitation. The 
current ban on drug use has numerous adverse consequences, and 
it makes it more difficult for drug users to act as full members of 
society. Now would be a good time to assess the necessity and 
fairness of the ban, and to set the wheels in motion to achieve a 
decriminalization reform. Concurrently, there is a need to fully 
assess the content, expenses and effects of the current repressive 
drug control system.
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9. Street Users in Drug Policy: On 




A wind of liberalization has been manifest in drug policy for de-
cades, while the political establishment has stubbornly refused 
to give in with regards to the penal regime. But how would 
 liberalization change the situation for drug users in Norway? In 
this chapter, I argue that a reform decriminalizing drug use would 
not alter the major structure of the controlling environment for 
street users.
In 2018 the Conservative government announced that they 
had prepared a ‘drug-reform’, and in late 2019 a committee gave 
their white paper on how to decriminalize minor drug violations. 
In 2021, the process again stops short of any significant reform 
on the political level. Penalization of any association with illegal 
drugs has been a cornerstone in Norwegian drug policies and one 
of the most important legal resources for policing for decades, 
as is broadly the case in the other Nordic countries. In Nordic 
criminological circles there has been a widespread consensus that 
a move away from the penal regime is long overdue (Christie & 
Bruun 1996; Houborg, Asmussen & Bjerge 2008; Ólafsdóttir 
2001). This chapter argues that criminology has been too focussed 
on the penal aspects of current drug policy. Expectations for po-
litical improvements of a decriminalization reform overlook the 
fact that it is the welfare state, in all of its institutional forms, 
that define the conditions of drug users. I make the claim that 
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the proposition to decriminalize possession of minor amounts of 
illegal drugs will not alter the situation for street-level drug users. 
I will not discuss consequences of such a reform on prophylactic 
activities regarding younger people.
In the next section I present a review of recent changes in drug 
policy. I open up with a broader view of what drug policy is, and 
then provide a more precise conception of the welfare state: the 
state ‘takes care’ of its citizens. The development of drug-relat-
ed deaths indicates that the obligation to take care is not taken 
as literally as in other political areas. A fundamental example is 
found in the area of knowledge production, which forms the ba-
sis of political activities. Whereas the state takes a keen interest 
in the health of the population at large, the equivalent interest in 
the health of drug users is conspicuously absent. To make sense 
of the divide between drug policy and other areas of the welfare 
state, I highlight an understanding of the welfare state as an ‘in-
stitution of curtailment’. A brief overview of drug treatment is of-
fered in the last section to exemplify how the welfare state is both 
a provider and an executioner in contemporary drug policy. This 
example is based on the experience of a user and also serves as a 
substitute for the gap left by the research community. The absence 
of more knowledge about these aspects of drug treatment reveals 
that the research community is more or less completely absorbed 
in the prevailing knowledge regime (Campbell & Pedersen 2014) 
defined by the perspectives of the treatment sector. To prepare this 
argument, however, it is necessary to explain why the term ‘drug 
policies’ is sometimes used in plural tense and attend to the short-
comings for understanding this political field.
Theorizing Drug Policies
The argument presented here does not rely on a specific method, 
other than putting pieces together in a somewhat unfamiliar way. 
The target of the argument is understanding – my contribution 
is not to add data to a hypothesis. Thus, this chapter concerns 
the sphere of discovery, and not the sphere of justification in 
Swedbergs terms (Swedberg 2014; see also Johansen 2018b). I 
argue that drug policy needs to be theorized, again with Swedberg, 
with a more profound understanding of the welfare state. Thus, 
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the story to which I refer towards the end of the argument is an 
example, illuminating the questions and experiences omitted in 
the research community. It should not be considered as data.
Theorizing implies a focus on concepts and uses of words. In 
this chapter, I switch between the terms drug policy and drug 
policies. ‘Drug policies’ covers a wide range of administrative ar-
eas. In the most recent white paper discussing drug policies in its 
broadest definition, a number of areas are listed (Meld. 30 2011): 
employment, housing, rehabilitation, health care, social benefits 
and programmes, the treatment sector and legal status (any as-
sociation with illegal drugs is defined as a criminal offence, and 
thus suggests drugs are a police matter). All of these areas are part 
of the field understood as drug policies in administrative circles. 
What matters here is that drug policies consist of contributions 
from a wide array of politico-administrative areas.
In Norway, the term for drug policies is ‘ruspolitikk’. Ruspolitikk 
translates directly as ‘intoxication policy’ (see Edman, Chapter 10, 
this volume). Intoxication policy is broader than the concept of 
‘drug policy’. The term ‘intoxicating substances’ includes alco-
hol, whereas ‘drugs’ in this context are understood as illegal sub-
stances. Alcohol policies are, however, left out as a separate field 
of politics, distinct from ‘drug policy’. Policies regarding illegal 
drugs are separated not merely by a distinct status defined by its 
illegality, but also by the fact that users of illicit substances are 
regarded, and treated, differently from other people asking for as-
sistance. Welfare institutions distinguish between people worthy 
and unworthy of assistance. Drug use is generally a disqualifying 
attribute (apart from being punishable). Drug users report that 
they encounter rejections all across the welfare and health sec-
tors (Skyggeutvalget 2020). Accordingly, any regulation does, in 
principle, relate to users of illicit drugs. Thus, the relevant rules 
are those that relate to people using drugs and having social and 
health problems. This is also why it is sometimes referred to as 
laws and regulations in plural, as drug policies.
Uses of words and concepts reveal underlying ideas. The argu-
ment forwarded here challenges some ideas apparently underlying 
some Nordic criminological circles. Perhaps it is described in too 
simple terms, but I call it ‘the carrot-and-stick paradigm’.
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The Carrot-and-Stick Paradigm
Christie and Bruun (1996) labelled Norway and Sweden the 
Nordic ‘hawks’ of drug policy. Hawks promotes heavier use of 
punishment, but what is the alternative? Is it treatment? This 
question is left unresolved by Christie and Bruun. This chapter 
takes issue with the unclear and contradictory images of the area 
of politics sometimes referred to as drug policy. I argue that it is 
necessary to avoid an implicit understanding of drug policy as 
a binary field defined by punishment and treatment. This is ‘the 
carrot-and-stick paradigm’.
Within the carrot-and-stick paradigm, punishment is seen as 
the hard measures (sticks) typically advocated by cynics. On the 
other side, treatment is seen as a soft measure. Both punishment 
and treatment come in different guises. Punishment is, to some 
extent, meshed with rehabilitative activities. Through the 20th 
century, penal ideologies have shifted back and forth between 
classical liberal ideals of pure responsibility deterrence on the one 
hand, and welfarist social engineering in the name of treatment 
and rehabilitation on the other. ‘Treatment’ is also a fluid term. It 
is sometimes referred to as day care in institutional settings with 
some sort of psychological rehabilitation techniques, sometimes 
as harm reducing activities such as opioid substitution treatment 
(OST), and sometimes as welfare in general.
In criminology, the tension between punishment and treatment 
has been a recurring theme. The founding father of Norwegian 
sociology of law, Vilhelm Aubert, famously argued that the med-
ical and the penal spheres are inherently incompatible systems of 
thought and action (Aubert 1958). Aubert analyzed the difference 
between psychiatry and punishment and commented on the con-
temporary debate over ‘treatment ideology’ that prevailed in pe-
nal administrative circles at the time. Forty years later this work 
was still seen as a relevant starting point for a meeting of Nordic 
drug researchers. This meeting gave occasion for a host of differ-
ent analyses of contemporary drug policy, and fortunately these 
contributions were published (Ólafsdóttir 2001). This publication 
harbours different views, but on the whole, it is clear that the 
participants do not agree on a common understanding of what 
the field of drug policy is or how it should be interpreted. The 
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 contributors mostly refer to some sort of bipolarity of punish-
ment and treatment, but the terms are not fixed or agreed upon. 
Svensson (2001) states that punishment and treatment are two 
sides of the same coin because the recipient may confuse experi-
ences from the two sides: it was ‘difficult to say which is which’. 
Part of this confusion comes from the fact that the ‘treatment 
ideology’ is still in operation within penal institutions (Storgaard 
2001). Whereas these and other reflections are well founded, they 
are still unclear in how drug policy is conceptualized. Träskman 
(e.g. 2001) said that the burden of punishment had become ‘too 
heavy’ and unbalanced, with the weight put on treatment. The 
implicit expectation of this is that the sides are opposites.
This ambiguity has prevailed. Jepsen (2008: 151) commented 
that the Danes had a long tradition of solving ‘social problems via 
social welfare measures’. In an older review article, Jepsen and 
Laursen (2002) had discussed the ‘ambivalent balance between re-
pression and welfare’. This ambivalence was intensified by the rise 
of harm reduction (Jepsen 2008: 173). Some years later, Ødegård 
(2011) would claim that there are inherent contradictions be-
tween harm reduction and punishment, and that it ruined the dy-
namics of drug policy. Houborg and Frank (2014) and Giertsen 
(2012) later observed that the treatment sector is unable to solve 
or redeem the drug problem, but they leave it at that. In their op-
tics, the problem is that politics is defined by penal law. And by 
leaving the alternative to punishment open, they implicitly accept 
the possibility that treatment or welfare may be a benign activity.
The criticism presented here does not rely on the premise 
that the mentioned authors are at fault. What is argued is that 
these conceptualizations of drug policy are too narrow, and 
that what is needed is a more comprehensive view of what drug 
policy is. In the mentioned works, studies of drug policy are trou-
bled by a tacitly conveyed image of a political field defined by two 
opposites, defined basically by a positive and a negative pole.
Within the carrot-and-stick framework, the drug-free treat-
ment industry is associated with the benign forces. Treatment in 
terms of therapeutic efforts to redeem addiction is regarded as a 
countervailing force opposing the evils of punishment. What is 
missed in this paradigm is that the treatment sector, the health 
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providers, harm reduction activities and welfare organizations in 
general are interwoven parts of the same political rationality. It is 
not the police or the penal law (or its agents) that define politics 
nor coordinate it. The problem is not necessarily found in the 
realm of penalty, the problem is how the welfare state defines its 
role in relation to (marginal) citizens. And this, I argue, is part of 
the reason why decriminalization of minor drug offences will not 
fundamentally alter the landscape of drug policy.
A closer look at the political developments within the area of 
drug policy reveals that from an administrative point of view, the 
broader perspective is taken for granted. This will be shown in 
the next section, which in turn also portrays the width of welfare 
activities relevant for drug policy.
Recent Reforms and Political Action Related to Drug Use
In 2011 the government issued a white paper on drug policies 
called ‘See me! A comprehensive drug policy’ (Meld. 30 2011). 
The title supports the basic premise of this chapter, that drug 
 politics should be seen as the result of activities in many adminis-
trative areas. The paper promises to contribute to a ‘comprehen-
sive’ intoxication policy. For our purposes, it is more relevant that 
the white paper summarizes former reforms that define develop-
ments in the area of drug policy. Their summary highlights the 
following reforms.
• In 2004 two ‘milestones’ took place in relation to drug pol-
icies. Firstly, a permanent law for fixing rooms was passed 
in parliament. Secondly, a so-called ‘drug reform’ (not to be 
confused with the current reform) altered the structure of 
drug treatment. The reform was, primarily, a shift of organ-
ization, from a municipal model to the state level of govern-
ment. It also gave drug users in need of care and treatment 
‘patient rights’ on par with ordinary citizens in the general 
health system.
• In the following years, a programme for dental health was 
established, targeting people with severe drug-related prob-
lems. Dental aid is offered to people enrolled in treatment.
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• In 2007 a white paper on poverty and inequality was pub-
lished. This paper included attention to people suffering 
from drug-related problems. In the same year, the first of 
several ‘step-up plans’ for the drug area was set in operation. 
The step-up plans are a monitored fuelling of resources to 
drug and alcohol relevant activities, mainly on the munic-
ipal level. It is important to notice that the ‘drug field’, on 
this level, is interwoven in civil society, and as such, is highly 
dispersed (Hansen et al. 2019).
• Two major reforms concerning the entire construction of 
the welfare state were also implemented in this decade. A 
reform of social services (‘NAV-reformen’) fused the sector, 
from one formerly operated with three separated organ-
izations. The aim of this reform was to coordinate social 
services more effectively. This reform also emphasized the 
procedural demands for clients, and thus attached drug us-
ers to the general goals (not to say ‘visions’) of social servic-
es: to create a pathway from financial dependency of ben-
efits to autonomy (employment). Clients of social services 
have a right to an ‘individual plan’ – a coordinated group of 
servants from the relevant sectors for the individual (health 
workers for drug users).
• At the turn of the ‘00’s’ (2010) more resources were chan-
nelled to street-level activities for drug users with serious 
health problems. New legislation in the area of public health 
also clarified municipal duties regarding health care and fol-
low-up regarding the specific organization of channelling 
people into labour.
• At the same time, a ‘coordination reform’ (‘samhandlings-
reformen’) was introduced in the health sector. This reform 
was made to improve the coordination of activities delivered 
in the dispersed reality of welfare and health organizations. 
It is hard to specify the concrete relevance for drug users, 
but it is stated that drug users are supposed to be met with 
‘respect, care and influence concerning the content of servic-
es’ (both on a general level and with regard to their individ-
ual situation). The relevance of this reform is  perhaps most 
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clearly seen in the current ambition to establish a standard-
ized scheme for treatment (‘pakkeforløp’).
• Looking forward, the white paper (Meld 30 2011) emphasiz-
es room for improvement in the ‘coordination of assistance’ 
to make the local services ‘more accessible’, ‘improving 
housing conditions’, ‘improving possibilities for people with 
drug related problems to find work’, ‘assisting people having 
amassed problematic debt’, ‘possibilities to develop mean-
ingful leisure activities’ and ‘non-drug related networks’, 
‘close attention to child care’, ‘improving dental care’ and 
‘mental assistance’, and finally, ‘continual follow-up on the 
system of opioid substitution programs’.
The short review offered above does not reflect all the nuanc-
es and width in the political activities mentioned, but it reflects 
the areas that are considered as relevant for drug policies by the 
 government. However, Meld 30 is written in general and un-com-
mittal terms, based on ‘law in books’ and rarely on ‘law in ac-
tion’. So, it does not reflect the changes in real life chances of 
drug users. To discuss these reforms as law in action is far beyond 
realistic in a tiny chapter like this. To illustrate the point though, 
we could look to the reform that has altered the life chances most 
profoundly, perhaps ever, in drug policy (but still not mentioned 
in the list above): the establishment of opiate maintenance treat-
ment in 1998 (known as LAR in Norway).
The story of LAR is a tale of small steps in a landscape of peo-
ple in dire need of assistance. LAR started out as a reticent offer 
with strict rules and a heavy control regime. Slowly, the strict rules 
have been lifted. Step by step, LAR has become more flexible, but 
the regime is still harsh to the patients that do not fit in perfect-
ly (Skyggeutvalget 2020). Despite all this, almost 8000 patients 
are enrolled in OST in Norway today, and it is hard to think of 
any social welfare programme that has improved and saved more 
lives. The design of LAR, however, is a familiar one. The rules of 
admission (and exclusion) are designed to promote a lifestyle as 
conformist as possible, and not to save lives (Johansen 2018a). 
Thus, LAR is organized in a way that leaves out a large part of the 
drug using population.
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Since the publication of Meld 30, three more activities have 
been established. Firstly, a ‘step-up plan’ was vetoed for the entire 
field of drug policies, and this was repeated twice. The step-up 
plans involve the coordinated and detailed distribution of added 
resources to targeted areas of treatment and municipal organiza-
tions. These step-up plans are monitored by evaluation teams.
Secondly, increased attention has been given to reduce the 
number of deaths from overdoses; several nationwide so-called 
‘overdose strategies’ have been implemented. The most recent of 
these strategies (Helsedirektoratet 2019) opened for activities that 
have hitherto been considered in conflict with the overall politi-
cal strategies to counter drug use (to ‘minimize demand and mar-
ket offers’). Prohibition has been seen as the backbone of drug 
policies, and reference to these ideals prevented drug testing and 
other harm reduction activities from being accepted. These refer-
ences were lifted in 2019, and drug testing, among other things, 
was included in the overdose strategy. This change in operational 
doctrines may be interpreted as a sign of changes in the overall 
political climate.
Thirdly, and most recently, the drug-reform committee 
gave their report (NOU 2019: 26). They propose to decriminalize 
the use and possession of illicit substances. Use and possession 
are still seen as criminal acts but are freed from penal sanctions. 
The reaction suggested was to meet with a coordination unit to 
find a way to assist the user. The committee did not propose any 
changes in legislation regarding selling and distribution, so the 
main structure of the legal framework is not challenged. No le-
gal channels for obtaining so-called narcotics are suggested (it is 
not ‘legalized’). Due to the criminal definition of use and posses-
sion, the police also maintain their right to frisk people suspected 
of possessing drugs. As a corollary, they also have the right to 
confiscate (and destroy) illicit drugs they find. One may imagine 
that the police will have fewer incentives to pursue such actions, 
but the legal side of frisking will remain the same. Frisked persons 
will not be punished for possession and use of illegal substances. 
In place of a penal sanction, the police will order them to meet a 
commission, inspired by the famous Portuguese model, to seek 
advice or help for their assumed problems. The radical part of this 
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model is that the reaction will, under no circumstances, be open 
to sanctions of any kind (no fines, fees or any form of monetary 
burden) if the drug user fails to turn up at the health commission.
The reform ended in a failure. It did not pass in the parlia-
ment. I will not dwell on the reasons for this ending, the aim of 
the chapter is to consider the possible results from a de facto de-
criminalization of carrying and use of illegal drugs. The model 
proposed by the committee was made drastically less radical by 
the bureaucrats preparing a law for parliament. The ensuing po-
litical debate also revealed that conservative arguments still have 
a strong appeal in public exchanges.
The lesson from this overview is that the welfare state con-
volutes the lives of street users and that the role of penal law is 
unclear. The theme of this book is ‘changes in Nordic drug policy’, 
and although the penal status remains the same, there have been 
many changes. Optimism on behalf of lifting the penal domina-
tion in this area of politics is emerging, but will the decriminaliza-
tion announced by the government alter the political landscape?
To answer this, we need to consider penalties in the context of 
the broader scope of welfare institutions and the welfare state as 
a rationality for state organization. In the next section I will juxta-
pose welfare rationality and the handling of drug-related deaths.
Death Rates in the Welfare State: The Case Against  
the Police
Public debates on drug users have centred on the high death 
rates in Norway compared to other European countries. This fo-
cus shadows the general misery and ‘unhealth’ (different forms 
of sickness) endured by many street users (Johansen & Myhre 
2005). Elsewhere, I have argued that closer attention to the health 
conditions of street users, in particular, would draw a more nu-
anced picture of suffering from the current political regime, and 
that it could also serve as a source of information on the human 
effects of drug policies (Johansen 2018a). Still, death rates serve as 
a crude measurement that will suffice for this brief account.
Norway started to count drug-related deaths in 1977. Since 
then, more than 7000 people have officially died from overdoses 
or other related causes. During the 1980s, the number of deaths 
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increased steadily, but it never exceeded 50 people annually. 
During the 1990s, the numbers doubled more or less every third 
year: 100 was reached in 1992, 200 in 1995, 300 in 1997 and 
then numbers peaked at 400 in 2001. They then dropped again to 
250 in 2003, and since then have oscillated between 250 and 300 
(Amundsen 2015a).
In 2018, 286 people were reported dead from drug-related 
causes in Norway (NIPH 2019b). ‘Poisoning’ caused 210 of these, 
and 51 were registered as suicides. In 24 deaths, a combination of 
mental illness and behavioural anomalies was officially the cause 
of death, and involved illegal drugs.
Drug-related deaths mirror the pattern of the population inject-
ing illegal substances: 30% involve women, and the average age 
of the victim is increasing (it was 44 years old in 2018). But apart 
from this, little is known about the context of these deaths. From 
the annual evaluations of the opioid maintenance programme 
(LAR), it appears that patients in that sort of treatment are effec-
tively insulated from overdoses (Waal et al. 2019). This leaves us 
with a situation in which drug users who fail to qualify or choose 
not to partake in that kind of assistance are dramatically more 
likely to die from drug-related causes. A research project was in-
stigated in 2015 to study overdoses more carefully, but this has 
yet to produce any results.
How high are these numbers? Drug-related deaths have 
almost reached the number of deaths related to alcohol (350 in 
2018) and are 2.5 times that of traffic accidents (an area in which 
Norway have comparatively low figures). Drug-related death tolls 
in Norway are also high in a European context. EMCDDA pro-
duces a list of drug-related deaths annually. Per capita, Norway is 
among the top nations and has held a steady position for decades.
The high numbers have been a public concern for a long time. 
Some have challenged the validity of comparisons with refer-
ence to the quality of Norwegian reporting systems (Amundsen 
2015b), but the numbers nevertheless call for an explanation that 
is not provided. The numbers have been a challenge for the cur-
rent political regime.
What makes these numbers challenging is that Norway is a 
welfare state. The welfare state is expected to protect its citizens. 
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High death rates among parts of the population are expected to 
trigger a protective response, whichever group is most vulnerable, 
i.e. designated organizations keep track of causes of death among 
the population. A micromesh system monitors the prevalence of 
diseases. Elaborate systems register weather phenomena such as 
flooding. When rivers rise above their limits, rescue services move 
swiftly and people are evacuated. High death tolls in traffic inci-
dents incurred great efforts to prevent future accidents. The wel-
fare state takes care of the population and takes an active interest 
in its well-being by monitoring its health in detail. This monitor-
ing uses data from the health sector and research.
This contrasts with state interference in drug-related deaths. It 
is true that drug research has received much funding, but still, re-
search to study the circumstances of drug-related deaths in more 
detail has not been prioritized, and the activities promoted to re-
duce the number of deaths have been remarkably absent and un-
successful, i.e. the ‘overdose strategies’ mentioned above.
The Role of State Action
The emergence of overdose strategies may very well reflect a 
gradual change in politics. Harm reduction has become more 
and more important. As mentioned above, in 2019 the time 
came where the benefits of harm reduction measures were be-
lieved to outweigh the importance of ‘sending the wrong signal’ 
(Helsedirektoratet 2019).
Implicit in the overdose strategies lies an understanding of the 
causes of drug-related deaths. Such an understanding is rarely pro-
claimed explicitly, but implicitly these deaths are attributed to in-
herent qualities in the drugs themselves and destructive lifestyles. 
While talk about causes of death is, by necessity, reductionist in 
nature, it is also worthwhile looking at in terms of the role of state 
agencies. I want to address the impact on living conditions creat-
ed by rejections from health and welfare institutions. From the 
vantage point of the carrot-and-stick paradigm, the first inclina-
tion is to look at the police and administration of punishment for 
an explanation of drug-related deaths. As will be evident  below, 
 policing contributes to the total amount of pressure on drug users, 
but their efforts cannot fully account for the developments.
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Indeed, the numbers of reported cases for drug crimes shows 
a remarkable co-variation with drug-related deaths. The number 
of reported drug-related violations increased threefold during the 
1990s, reaching 45,000 cases in 2001. This number then fell by 
a third in the subsequent years before increasing steadily again 
until it reached 50,000 in 2013 and 2014. Since then, the numbers 
have again dropped by a third (the population has also increased 
by 15% in this time period). I will offer three brief comments on 
these figures before I return to the focus on welfare institutions 
more broadly.
Firstly, reported crimes are peaking in exactly the same year as 
the peak of drug-related deaths. The bulk of drug-related crimes 
consist of possession and use of illicit substances. It is common 
knowledge that these violations are driven by police initiatives. 
Thus, these figures reflect police activity.
Secondly, the steep increase in police activity was stopped after 
the Minister of Justice publicly proclaimed that the police should 
stop running after ‘worn out drug users’ in 2003.
Thirdly, a break in the trajectory in 2014 also came after a 
public scolding of the police, this time by the Attorney General.
The increase in police activity during the 1990s and subsequent 
years deserves closer scrutiny than I can offer here. Larsson gives 
a more detailed presentation of policing strategies in his chapter 
(Chapter 5, this volume). The fact that the two main breaks in 
the trajectory of drug-related crimes occur after public reactions 
from high standing officials is, in itself, something to reflect on. 
(Does it mean that the police organization did not respond to 
internal communications, or does it reflect that political signals 
were mixed and that the police organization was confused about 
how they were expected to respond?) Nonetheless, it would be 
harsh to blame active policing for the high numbers of drug-re-
lated deaths. Firstly, the police appear, at least partly, to take a 
more relaxed attitude towards the open drug scenes (Lundeberg 
& Mjåland 2017). Secondly, it is not necessarily so that short pris-
on sentences are on top of the list of problems for high-mainte-
nance drug users (they frequently seem to benefit physically and 
mentally from time out from the drug scene). Third, and most 
importantly, it is hard to see how the causal link would be if the 
police were to be held directly responsible. Drug users hide from 
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the police, but they also hide from private guards and the general 
public. And, most importantly, the numbers of deaths have not 
responded to the drop in charges by two fifths after 2014. Thus, 
the case for blaming the police is not so straightforward.
At the time of the peak of drug-related deaths, harm reduction 
in what has proven to be the most effective form (OST/LAR, men-
tioned above) was upgraded and opened up to a broader number 
of the most worn-down drug users. This fact leads the search for 
causes of death rates in a new direction. I have argued that politics 
relevant to the control of drug use should be seen broadly, with 
the long list of administrative entities borrowed from Meld 30 in 
mind. Harsh policing does not produce deaths among drug users, 
but it is possible to identify some indirect relations.
First, harsh policing may reflect a harsher political climate. In 
this way, policing is merely one expression of politics in other 
parts of the welfare state. A ‘tougher stance’ is taken also in the 
health sector, in social services and in other sources of support. 
The result is that drug users are rejected more often than before 
when they ask for assistance.
Secondly, and also a result of the first, the general health of drug 
users deteriorates as a result of the rejections. When the health is 
poor, death is a more likely outcome. One general observation 
is that deaths occur when people hide. They hide from the police, 
from security guards and from being seen at all. They hide for 
different but related reasons. Drug users injecting the most le-
thal substance, opioids, hide because they are ashamed, fearful of 
unpleasant consequences like being arrested, or to protect them-
selves against robbery.
It is futile to look for scapegoats. The death tolls of drug users 
are certainly dramatic, and slowly it seems that the alarm bells 
also ring in government circles. In the remainder of this chapter, 
I will address how the welfare state produces marginality on a 
broader scale than can be attributed to police activities.
Curtailing Welfare for the Unworthy
The minimal definition of a welfare state is that it provides a net 
of security for citizens who ‘fall’ from the security associated with 
a steady income and stable sources of sustenance (Garland 2016). 
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This provision takes different forms, i.e. financial insurance 
for the individual. It may also be viewed as proactivity to prevent 
citizens from falling. The number of traffic accidents and deaths 
has been reduced by 94% since 1970, (Skadeforebyggende forum 
2021, Statistikkbanken 2021), due to better security in cars, laws 
making the use of safety belts mandatory and, not least, through 
massive investments in roads. Inquests are routinely established 
in the wake of fatal accidents. Similarly, the numbers of deaths 
caused by cordial diseases has been reduced by 50% since 2008 
(NIPH 2019a). Hospitals conduct autopsies to learn from as many 
deaths as the finances allow (Johansen 2020). State organizations 
monitor the prevalence of illnesses and causes of death closely, 
and are prepared to react quickly if there are changes in threats 
to the lives of citizens. Some welfare states also operate with a 
distinct sort of rationality, Garland (2016) says, and take an ac-
tive interest in rescuing people’s lives and securing their health. 
The Scandinavian states are clearly within this segment of welfare 
states, but despite the overdose strategies, a comparative keenness 
has not been seen in relation to the prevention of deaths among 
injecting drug users.
The welfare state has received increasing attention in recent 
years (Barker 2017; Smith & Ugelvik 2017). However, this liter-
ature misses important aspects of how the Scandinavian welfare 
states operate. Much of the criminological presentations operate 
with underdeveloped conceptualizations, similar to the prob-
lems associated with drug policy mentioned in the introduction. 
Welfare is perceived as provisions of goods and security, and the 
criticism of the welfare state is that it does not live up to the ide-
als it purports. The typical form of criticism is to point to certain 
groups that (evidently) suffer from too little support compared 
to their needs (Barker 2017). Whereas this form of criticism is a 
most needed correction to state activities, it misses a crucial ele-
ment that the Norwegian sociologist Midré pinpointed in 1991. 
On the basis of an historical account, he claimed that every form 
of welfare model is centred on criteria for inclusion and exclusion. 
The crucial element is that benefits are provided with a thresh-
old set to delineate between the ‘worthy and unworthy’ recipients 
of assistance. Simply put, those who did not ‘fall’ as a result of 
their own responsibility are worthy. A welfare institution does not 
merely offer benefit, it also rejects applications. An intrinsic aspect 
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of welfare institutions is that they say ‘no’ to people they consid-
er unworthy of assistance and aid. Based on this analysis, Midré 
characterized welfare as ‘institutions of curtailment’ (Loedemel & 
Trickey 2001; Midré 1991).
For a good part, the benchmarks defining the worthy and the 
unworthy are found in laws and other forms of regulations, trace-
able as sources of law in the legal system. It is common knowledge 
that judgement about worthiness also relies on informal discre-
tion. Informal discretion is informed by stereotypes circulating 
in political culture and among professionals. For instance, the 
importance of police culture for organization output has been a 
main theme in police research for decades (Granér 2004; Lofthus 
2009). Similar analyses of the importance of informal discretion 
in welfare organizations have not been conducted.
The curtailing function of welfare institutions makes the em-
ployees operating on the frontline – the street-level bureau-
crats – important. Street-level bureaucrats are gatekeepers for 
the  welfare state, and this is a core activity in the Scandinavian 
 model. Gatekeepers operate all over the welfare sector: emergency 
 hospitals and other specialized health institutions, social welfare 
organizations, housing agents, treatment organizations, housing 
institutions etc. The argument here is that these gatekeepers, and 
not merely the police, are crucial in defining the conditions for 
drug users. The suggested argument here is that the rate of arrests 
made by the police is an indicator of gatekeeping all over the wel-
fare spectrum, and not a cause itself.
However, I can only partially substantiate this argument. The 
most obvious example to illuminate curtailment in the welfare 
state would be in social services. However, a comprehensive 
presentation of the research on the role of welfare agencies re-
garding drug users has not yet been made, although Lundeberg 
and Mjåland produced a very interesting analysis of the political 
nexus activated when the open drug scene in Bergen was taken 
down in 2015 (Lundeberg & Mjåland 2017). Mik-Meyer (2018) 
also made a promising cross-sectoral approach focussing on the 
views of social workers. Similar studies would be needed from 
the health sector. For now, we must rely on anecdotal evidence 
from the users (Hart 2000). I have made an attempt at an analysis 
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with regard to curtailment in LAR as a harm reduction activity 
(Johansen 2018a). However, in want of existing research, I will 
use anectotal evidence on treatment.
Treatment, I argued in the introduction, is as much a part of 
drug policies as any other sector within the welfare state. What is 
interesting in this perspective is how they design their  demarcation 
against the unworthy clients. The example provided here is cho-
sen because it sheds at least some light on the role of frontline 
workers in an assisting sector for drug users within the setting 
of a welfare state. I will present the views of an experienced drug 
user reflecting on his journey through the treatment sector. His 
views are his alone, but they have been collaborated by at least 
some other people with similar biographies (in conversations with 
the author).
Power and Knowledge in the Treatment Sector
Drug treatment has three distinct branches: OST (‘LAR’ in 
Norway), policlinic assistance and institutionalized, sometimes 
drug-free, treatment (which may also be combined with LAR). 
This section is about the latter, and the term ‘treatment’ will refer 
to institutions offering in-house complete care and some sort of 
therapeutic regime.
It should be made clear from the start that a substantial num-
ber of drug users benefit from treatment programmes (Ravndal 
& Vaglum 2001). However, troublingly, there is also little suc-
cess to report (Giertsen 2012; Ravndal in Skretting 1997). And as 
Ravndal and her collaborators pointed out on various occasions, 
the most striking fact has been how many individuals drop out of 
treatment (Ravndal & Vaglum 2001). This fact is underplayed by 
most research (however, Nygård 2021 points out a new pattern). 
This is but one indication of the underlying presuppositions of 
both the research community and administration of drug policy 
(which is funding the research). If one wanted to find out whether 
treatment was useful systematically it would require a basis for 
comparison (something functioning as a control group). A control 
group would involve people having similar troubles  associated 
with drug use but who are not in treatment programmes. Designs 
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of this kind does to my knowledge not exist in Norway, and it re-
veals that the research community shares outlook with the treat-
ment sector (see also Skyggeutvalget 2020). 
It is well known (but significantly not recorded) that some 
therapeutical schools have been particularly lethal (‘therapeutic 
societies’). There are no estimates on the balance of harms and 
well-being resulting from the treatment sector. Research mostly 
tells us how many (few) individuals lead a drug-free lifestyle three 
and five years later (focussing on the tiny fraction that complete 
the programmes).
In Norwegian research, there is barely any reference to the pos-
sibility that people leave their habit independently of treatment 
institutions. This blindness is remarkable given that episodes of 
‘natural recovery’ are sometimes reported in the press, it is por-
trayed in popular culture (e.g. Trainspotting) and, not least, it is 
commonplace in international research. It is a striking feature of 
Norwegian drug research that there is no research to be found 
on how drug addicts actually leave their habits (Bretteville-Jensen 
2005 briefly mentions this possibility). Toneatto (2013) claims 
that ‘natural recovery’ is a taboo in current medical discourse be-
cause it is an anomaly in the paradigmatic understanding that un-
derpins all treatment. It is the treatment industry that defines drug 
use as addiction, what addiction is and, accordingly, the research 
agenda. Research has been focussing on the problem ‘what works 
with treatment’. It has been blind to the possibility that factors 
other than treatment might be helpful.
Furthermore, success stories from the treatment industry are 
rarely weighted against the drop-out rate (Brorson et al. 2013) or 
harms associated with it (Chatfield 2014). Dropping out becomes 
a personal failure, and not a failure on behalf of the treatment 
programmes. What if the treatment programmes do not primarily 
satisfy the needs of its users? It could be argued that this is what 
the drop-out rate actually reveals (Ravndal & Vaglum 2001). 
Many drug users do not find treatment relevant for their needs. 
And given that for them, getting out of the drug habit might be a 
matter of life and death, this is a profound statement.
To summarize, research has not (systematically) addressed the 
content of drug treatment programmes and what is going on 
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 inside the institutions delegated the task of curing drug users. One 
can only speculate why the research community has not shown 
attention to this aspect of the drug industry, but no matter why, in 
this void we may instead listen to a former patient looking back at 
his experiences. In the next sections I will highlight the reflections 
made by Jan-Erik Tørres, in a lengthy article in a Norwegian jour-
nal, based on his personal experiences in both drug-free treatment 
and OST-based treatment (Tørres 2019). He claims that these ex-
periences are neither unique nor rare. Whether this is true would 
be a task for the research sector to find out.
What We Don’t Know: Curtailment in Treatment
Tørres’ comment was written before the committee gave their 
report, but his main argument goes beyond the mandate of the 
committee to say that, just as important as aspects of punishment, 
is the ‘punishment’ found in the treatment sector.
Patients have an inferior position in treatment institutions, 
Tørres says. The inner life of treatment institutions is defined by 
the therapeutic ideology it embraces. But the actual therapy is, to 
a large extent, meaningless, humiliating or of little use for the in-
mate. Nevertheless, indulgence in the therapeutic activities is cen-
tral to the quality of the relationship to staff and the stay at the 
institution. The responsibility for this relation, however, is placed 
on the patient, not the institution. Motivation is the keyword, and 
the patient is expected to show motivation by his/her involvement 
in the therapeutic activities. No questions are asked about the at-
titude among personnel and how that influences this ‘motivation’. 
This creates a dynamic circling on the patient’s mental involve-
ment. This, in turn, leads to a preoccupation with the patient’s 
state of mind. Absentmindedness is interpreted as part of the ‘ill-
ness’ or as a way to manipulate staff. Institutions are obsessed 
with ‘manipulating’ as an expression of non-involvement. Thus, 
in cases of a suspected infringement of rules, the patient cannot 
win. He or she is deemed either guilty or manipulative. Revealed 
dishonesty is not interpreted as an attempt to avoid sanctions (a 
normal reaction in most contexts) but as evidence of the person’s 
manipulative character.
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Most institutions use some sort of ‘social sanctions’, Tørres 
says. By this term he refers broadly to different forms of peer 
pressure. The group of patients is activated in correcting the be-
haviour of individuals, putting them in the ‘hot chair’ or ‘love 
chair’. However, Tørres dryly remarks, it is not love that is con-
veyed in these situations. Rather, it is a sort of mass psychosis: ‘it 
is shame inflicted in the hope that it will have a positive behavior-
al effect’ (Tørres 2019). Chatfield (2014) has traced the historical 
roots of this activity to the brainwashing programmes developed 
after the Korean War in the 1950s. Some patients decide to leave 
the institutions in the wake of such events.
Tørres goes on to emphasize the punishment found in the treat-
ment sector, often in the guise of treatment. He says that under 
the label ‘environmental therapy’ used in day care, restrictions 
are given on freedom through curfew hours, room searches and 
 possessions, visitations, the control of or prohibition of use of the 
telephone/the Internet, denial of leisure time (sometimes with 
the restriction that one must always have company), strict sched-
ules for meals and the daily rhythm, and when to clean the room 
to name a few.
Despite that, drug use is the defining problem for patients; a 
zero-tolerance policy is (to a large extent) adopted for possession 
of such substances. A recent example of this can also be found 
in Ramms tale of her daughter’s journey through the treatment 
sector (Ramm 2019). The patient is treated as guilty because of 
his/her past. Stereotyping comments like ‘people like you’ are fre-
quent, Tørres implies, in combination with urine tests and room 
checks. Humiliating practices are commonplace when infractions 
of ‘house rules’ are suspected.
Failure to comply with these rules leads to sanctions in the 
form of withdrawal of privileges and may ultimately also lead to 
expulsion from the institution. The decisions to sanction breaches 
of rules frequently leave the patient bewildered about the grounds 
for the sanction and the process leading up to it. The employees 
operate with unfettered discretion, both in terms of how to define 
the foregoing incident and when to apply which rules.
Needless to say, Tørres and other patients observe and remem-
ber the discretion, to their disadvantage more often than their 
favour. By referring to Tørres’ reflections, the intention is not to 
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indicate that people working in the treatment sector are systemat-
ically working against the interests of patients. This is not Tørres’ 
intention either – people working in this sector often see their 
line of work as meaningful and perform their part with the inten-
tion of being of assistance. It is, nevertheless, worthwhile listening 
to the experiences brought forward by Tørres as they represent a 
part of the picture – to him, a defining part of the picture. The con-
sequences of the decisions made under the treatment and environ-
mental therapy label may be just as damning and damaging as any 
legal punishment administered by the police and courts, Tørres 
says. And the process leading up to them are usually opaque.
This section provided a critical view of the institution-based 
treatment sector. Many people associated with drug use who have 
problematic lives seem to benefit from staying at these institu-
tions. But many patients leave, never to return, and some leave 
with lower self-esteem than they had when they entered. Some 
leave with scars, and yet others leave with open mental wounds, 
desperately vulnerable. And some die from an overdose in this 
phase. Still others learn something they can use in their further 
attempts to create a better life.
Concluding Remarks
The image of drug treatment conveyed above indicates that it is 
woven into the web of small punishments nudging the individual 
in the direction of a straight lifestyle, which permeates the entire 
welfare state. Treatment in this perspective is not merely designed 
to safeguard the interests of the drug users. On the contrary, it 
appears as if the treatment industry is designed to conform to the 
control policies more generally – to force drug users to subordi-
nate themselves to a norm of non-use. Thus, drug treatment is not 
the opposite of repression, it complements it.
Recke, having witnessed the drug scenes in Norway and 
Denmark at close hand, concludes in similar ways. She com-
ments that treatment and punishment are ‘two sides of the same 
coin’ (Recke 2014). In the same vein, Jøhncke might be correct 
in  assessing that ‘the existence and funding of treatment is legit-
imate less on grounds of what it produces in terms of improve-
ments to drug users’ lives, and more as a politically and culturally 
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 suitable form of organizing the relationship between drug using 
and non-using sections of the population’ (Jøhncke 2010; 2009: 
14). It is the welfare rationality that prevails.
I claim that decriminalization would not alter the fundamental 
dynamics for street-level drug users. In want of data regarding 
health and welfare institutions, I have provided an overview of 
the treatment sector. The advantage of this choice was that it di-
rectly challenges the carrot-and-stick paradigm. In the end, the 
overview of research also reveals that the research community has 
proven incapable of challenging the current knowledge regime in 
the area of ‘ruspolitikk’.
Where are the researchers? The big questions are not asked. 
However, the patients do ask these questions, it is merely a matter 
of listening. Berg (2003) did listen in her field study of a treat-
ment institution. The patients Berg met reacted negatively to the 
‘talking cure’ in institutional treatment. I don’t want to talk about 
it, she reported them saying, ‘just give us a job’ (Berg 2003). The 
big question is, what thresholds are there for people to enter 
the labour market and secure an acceptable way of living? The 
treatment industry cannot help this situation, but it is neverthe-
less the question that encapsulates all other issues for the patient. 
Researchers, on the other hand, analyze the effect of treatment.
The research community has been unable to discover and ana-
lyze the skewed framing of drug use and its treatment. So far, the 
criminological literature has not rid itself of the carrot-and-stick 
 paradigm. This chapter attempts to pave the way for a more compre-
hensive understanding of drug policy. The ambition is to bring the 
broad variety of administrative sectors, and the welfare state with its 
rationality, into the mix of drug policies. To do this, it was also nec-
essary to highlight the curtailing character of the welfare state.
The theme of this volume is a changing Nordic drug policy. The 
question has been, what changes in drug policies should we expect 
with decriminalization of use and possession of illicit drugs? When 
Christie and Tham ventured to research the ‘heroes of retreat’ at 
the turn of the century (Christie 1996; Tham,  introduction of this 
volume) they were too optimistic. No retreat appeared. But, per-
haps, had it emerged, the situation today would not have been all 
too different from what we experience today anyway.
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10. A Century of Dissonance and Harmony 
in Swedish Intoxication Policy
Johan Edman
As so many times before in the last 50 years, the Swedish par-
liament has, in the course of the last parliamentary year, called 
for tougher sentencing and increased coercive measures as a 
means of dealing with the drug problem (Edman 2019). The 
 liberal-conservative Moderate Party legal policy spokesperson 
has opined that the penalties for drug dealing be doubled, and the 
statement of government policy read out by the Social Democratic 
Prime Minister in January 2019 pledged stricter penalties for 
those handing over drugs to others (Swedish Radio 5/12 2018; 
Statement of Government Policy 21/1 2019).
The repressive policy on drugs makes a striking contrast with 
an increasingly liberal alcohol policy. For example, in the spring 
of 2018, a parliamentary majority expressed for the first time 
its support for the direct sales of alcohol by producers, which a 
public enquiry had previously found to constitute an immediate 
threat to the Swedish alcohol retailing monopoly Systembolaget 
(Parliamentary Records [PR] 2017/18:107, § 14; SOU 2009:22). 
The reform is deemed to be so urgent that it was addressed in one 
of the 73 policy proposals of the so-called January Agreement be-
tween the Social Democrats, the Green Party, the Liberals and the 
Centre Party in January 2019 (Utkast 11/1 2019).
The examples follow a clear post-war trend: while the drug 
political measures have grown more stringent – or have at least 
retained their severity – the alcohol policy has become ever more 
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liberalised. By discussing the dissonance within the Swedish in-
toxication policy – both between alcohol and drug policies, and 
between the conceptual understanding of intoxication problems 
and the implemented intoxication policies – I seek to promote a 
greater understanding of the current alcohol and drug policies. 
The examples come from the societal debate on and management 
of intoxication in Sweden over the last 100 years, and the study 
is empirically based mainly on official reports and parliamentary 
material. By way of conclusion, I will speculate about the direc-
tion of the intoxicant policy in the future.58
Let me first introduce a conceptual definition and make a de-
marcation. Intoxicant policies do not necessarily problematise 
the consumption of intoxicants or propose that they be restricted 
or banned. In Sweden, alcohol has been the subject of govern-
ment regulation at least since King Gustav Vasa prohibited the 
manufacture of spirits in the mid 1500s based on arguments that 
mainly stemmed from the state-builder’s national economic vi-
sion: the grain was to be preserved for food only. The sparse al-
cohol political measures during the following 300 years serve to 
illustrate various government objectives. The national economy, 
at times questions of public order, but most of all the state needs 
for revenue from the manufacturing or monopoly taxes on spirits, 
have taken centre stage. For example, when Queen Kristina intro-
duced the first manufacturing taxes on spirits in 1638 it was in aid 
of the state’s coffers. The plans of prohibiting the distilling of spir-
its for home consumption in 1718 were also the result of the need 
to strengthen the public finances in a country almost ruined by the 
wars of King Karl XII (Edman 2016a).
The focus here is on what I have chosen to call the Swedish 
intoxication policy. This refers to the public and political discus-
sions about and proposals to solve problems that arise from intox-
ication from narcotic preparations and/or alcohol. Intoxication 
policies can cover phenomena explained by intoxication, such as 
 58 This chapter is a revised version of the previously published contribu-
tion in the yearbook of the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, The Swedish 
Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences: Edman, J. (2019). 
Drogerna: den nya berusningspolitiken. In J. Björkman & P. Hadenius 
(Eds.), Det nya Sverige, Göteborg & Stockholm.
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ill health or intoxicant-related mortality, or pertain to a depen-
dence on an intoxicant irrespective of other consequences. While 
the lamentable effects of intoxication are an indirect point of de-
parture in intoxication political measures, these policies can also 
come down to entirely different things (Yokoe 2019). Most ques-
tions lend themselves to being used in intoxication policies and, 
as we shall see, a range of societal issues have been discussed with 
intoxication as a political tool.
Alcohol Political Prologue
As alcohol has been the culturally and historically established in-
toxicant, it is possible to trace descriptions of intoxication politi-
cal problems far back in time. For example, the Book of Proverbs 
(compiled in the sixth century BCE) of the Old Testament contains 
stories about the dangers of kings’ drunkenness: ‘lest they drink 
and forget what has been decreed, and deprive all the oppressed 
of their rights’ (Book of Proverbs 31:5). What follows a few lines 
down is the image of less fortunate people that ‘drink and for-
get their poverty and remember their misery no more’ (Book of 
Proverbs 31:7). These two early examples of intoxication poli-
cy crop up regularly when intoxication is to be illustrated. It is 
in these terms that Friedrich Engels (1845), for example, discusses 
the role of alcohol as an escapist consolation in his study on the 
condition of the working class in England. The two Biblical sto-
ries represent viable mental models even today: the former could 
be translated into a harm to others approach, much discussed in 
the field of substance abuse research, while the latter could be 
characterised as a symptom theoretical model that extends the 
intoxication policy into the realm of general welfare policy 
(Edman 2016b).
Popular images of the darker sides of drunkenness, such as 
those illustrated by William Hogarth’s well-known diptych Beer 
Street and Gin Lane, took shape in mid-eighteenth-century legis-
lative controls, which specifically intended to curb drunkenness 
and its consequences (Hogarth’s 1751 print was in direct support 
of the Gin Act from the same year). From the late eighteenth cen-
tury onwards, such controls aiming at behavioural modification 
were complemented by a medical problem description, which has 
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exerted varying degrees of influence ever since. In their publica-
tions, the American physician Benjamin Rush (late 1700s), the 
British physician Thomas Trotter (early 1800s) and the Swedish 
doctor Magnus Huss (mid 1800s) talk about the disease of alco-
holism as a defect which causes a sprain of the free will and stops 
the alcohol-abusing individual from making rational decisions 
(Levine 1978; Lundquist 1983; McCandless 1984; McLaughlin 
1989; White 2004; Williams 1987).
From the mid 1800s, the religious, moral and medical opposi-
tion to alcohol consumption met under the auspices of the grow-
ing temperance movement. This transnational movement, which 
had both political and scientific aims, had considerable influence 
over national alcohol legislation and knowledge production in the 
field (Schrad 2007). Here, the alcohol question appears as a kind 
of litmus paper of modernity, where a variety of societal draw-
backs were connected to the consumption of alcohol. The breadth 
of how the alcohol problem was constructed during the decades 
around the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was 
remarkable. Drunkenness was considered a problem in work-
ing life, within the armed forces and in traffic. The moral decay 
among youth was caused by alcohol, women’s drinking and the 
threat of degeneration were connected, while female sobriety was 
seen as a role model. Answers were sought far and wide, from 
total prohibition and strict controls on alcohol sales to social re-
forms and sterilisations (Edman 2015; 2016c).
It is, however, at the beginning of the twentieth century that we 
encounter more comprehensive alcohol political programmes. The 
First World War hastened the development that the  temperance 
movement had worked for, and many countries now introduced 
or tightened their alcohol control systems (Schrad 2010). Several 
countries instituted alcohol bans of some sort during or after the 
First World War; in addition to Russia and the United States, 
three Nordic countries did so too: Finland, Norway and Iceland 
(Edman 2018).
Total prohibition was also discussed in Sweden as the solu-
tion to alcohol consumption, which according to one of many 
investigative committees led to ‘unhappy family situations, pov-
erty, crime, disease, degeneration and neglect of the children’ 
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(Fattigvårdlagstiftningskommittén 1911). The solution came in 
1919 in the form of a rationing book (motbok), which regulated 
the selling of alcohol to individuals. Diligent citizens were given 
a motbok of their own and were allocated a controlled amount 
of spirits depending on their class and sex. At around the same 
time, Sweden also adopted treatment legislation with a focus on 
coercion and resocialisation.
We should note that there was a connection between the mo-
tives underpinning the politics. For example, according to the ar-
chitect of the motbok, Ivan Bratt, who also had a great influence 
on the new legislation on compulsory care, people who were ill 
‘should be treated gently, but when it comes to alcoholics, one 
ought to be strict, and if one should on occasion raise one’s hand 
against them, such heavy-handedness would not be out of place’ 
(Alkoholismen 1927). Bratt’s approach was characteristic of the 
Swedish alcohol political solution: the abuse of alcohol was not a 
disease, alcohol was not a poison, and the alcohol question should 
be tackled with rationing and education rather than by a total 
ban. This social and non-medical description of the problem was 
made more concrete in compulsory care, which would restore 
men to being diligent workers and breadwinners, and women to 
being virtuous wives and good mothers. The pre-war guiding light 
of the transnational temperance movement – hard work and the 
sanctity of family life – was exemplified by an expanding national 
action programme in the inter-war years (Edman 2004).
The focus of alcohol policy on social problems was challenged 
in the years following the Second World War. In the wake of, 
for example, the American alcoholism movement and the public 
opinion at home for a more humane treatment of alcohol abus-
ers, arguments found their way onto the political agenda and into 
the public debate in favour of a medical understanding of the al-
cohol question (Edman 2020). Already in 1944, the Communist 
Party Members of Parliament Set Persson and Hilding Hagberg 
penned a motion and expressed their outrage at the fact that there 
were no medical resources to cure the alcohol abusers: ‘alcohol 
legislation talks about “disease” and “treatment”, but in practice 
converts these concepts into “crime” and “punishment”’ (Lower 
House Parliamentary Bill 1944:310). Over the next few years, the 
244 Retreat or Entrenchment?
disease status of alcohol abuse was discussed intensely, and the 
1946 enquiry into the treatment of alcohol abuse made every ef-
fort to support the medical approach. The expectation was that a 
more medical view on alcohol abuse would lead to less repressive 
treatment (SOU 1948:23). The publication of the committee re-
port was followed a few months later by the launch of the medi-
cal product Antabuse (disulfiram), which was expected to be the 
miracle cure that would change the perception of alcohol abuse 
and the way to treat it. It did not happen; soon the enthusiasm 
gave way to composed disappointment, and so one returned to 
the sobering pragmatism that had characterised compulsory care 
since the 1910s. Because doctors could not guarantee that alcohol 
abusers would get well, coercive measures could not be justified 
by the need for treatment.
But a seed had been sown, and the alcohol political reform of 
1955 shifted the alcohol political motives further and wider. The 
rationing book was abolished at the same time as a more artic-
ulated treatment approach gained ground, and a more extensive 
search for the causes of the abuse – beyond the individual – also 
served to make the question ever more political. In 1967, a public 
enquiry into the care of alcohol abusers submitted its report with 
a fully-fledged symptom theoretical perspective: abject living con-
ditions explained alcohol abuse rather than the other way around 
(SOU 1967:36; SOU 1967:37). This was also the year that a social 
services commission was appointed to examine the social service 
sector in Sweden as a whole, including the care of intoxicant abus-
ers (SOU 1974:39; SOU 1977:40). This group now encompassed 
drug users, too.
Drug Repression and Alcohol Liberalisation
The drug issue gave rise in the 1960s to the formation of a new 
field of intoxication policy based on a rather different problem 
description. The 1960s were a turbulent time in terms of social 
policy, with an expanding welfare state and criticism in the face of 
residual poverty. A wide spectrum of issues, from substance abuse 
to class-based injustices, were investigated and fiercely debated. 
This made it possible to frame the drug problem in different, and 
discordant, ways.
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In addition to the social services enquiry, a commission was 
appointed to investigate the very matter of drug problems, which 
the commissioners did in four reports covering over 1400 pages 
(SOU 1967:25; SOU 1967:41; SOU 1969:52; SOU 1969:53). A 
key question addressed was whether drug abuse could be seen as 
a disease or as a rational response to a dysfunctional and exclu-
sionary society. The debate on social policy that was initiated and 
discussed by the social services enquiry and the commission on 
the care of drug users testifies to the complex nature of the ques-
tion. First of all, we can detect in the 1960s a considered notion of 
the pressing craving as a kind of disease. This conceptual model, 
adopted from centuries-old argumentation on alcohol abuse, put 
all intoxicants on an equal footing as a result of their addictive 
nature. Secondly, drug problems lacked an effective cure, which 
could have clearly placed drug use within the medical domain. 
And thirdly, the issue was raised at a time when the treatment of 
alcohol abusers had come under fire from many different direc-
tions and when the efforts for democratic and, potentially, medi-
cal care were seen as an opportunity to ameliorate the oppressive 
character of compulsory care.
At the same time, such democratic passion was incongru-
ous with notions of the drug user as an enburdened slave, since 
drug users who had voluntarily consented to treatment and who 
were themselves responsible for getting better were expected to 
be  rational citizens capable of making their own decisions. On 
a  political level, this conflict paved the way for ideological argu-
mentation, which removed the focus away from the individual 
drug users. All parties took up the opportunity in the parliament 
to sketch a picture in which drugs were seen as one of the biggest 
societal problems – ‘more dangerous than the atom bomb’ – and 
which therefore called for exceptional measures and strict sen-
tences (Lower House Parliamentary Record 1967:20, § 14: 25).
Regardless of assurances that the parliament should stand 
united in the drugs question – like ‘a coalition government facing 
the threat of war’ – the description of a catastrophic situation 
has enabled ideological posturing (PR 1996/97:94, § 5: 14). For 
example, the left has found that drug abuse could be explained 
by ‘[t]he commercial youth culture and the increasingly brutal 
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market economy’ (Parliamentary Bill [PB] 1997/98:So649: 9; PB 
1998/99:So258: 3). The right-leaning parties have exhibited rath-
er more conservative values and found the causes ‘in our keen 
cadre of so-called cultural workers [who] purposely fight to wreck 
the homes’ (PR 1971:136, § 13: 34). The representatives of these 
parties have seen how ‘satanism, for example, in practice neces-
sitated drugs, with grave desecrations, arson attacks on churches 
and even murders as a result’ (PR 1998/99:58, § 3: 4 f.).
In fact, no question has been too far-fetched to be linked to 
the mighty symbol of drugs. This can be illustrated by the Centre 
Party MP who, at the beginning of the 1990s, strove to keep pas-
senger traffic running on the railway line in the interior of north-
ern Sweden. The argument was that discontinuing this traffic 
would lead to unemployment and thereby to drug abuse (Edman 
2012). The railway line running through the north of Sweden may 
appear far removed from the most pressing drug problems, but 
not only does it prove the potent symbolic value of the drugs is-
sue, it also helps us to see certain drug political contours. Here, 
the picture of the enslaving drugs has been neatly complemented 
by calls for penalties and compulsory care, while the symptom 
theorists have also been able to advocate social reforms ranging 
from class conflict to extended railway lines and tax cuts.
At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the 
penalties for drug-related crime were tightened on a number of 
occasions, while the disease model of drug abuse was somewhat 
paradoxically more or less taken as a given. This is most clearly 
seen in the decision to locate the compulsory care of drug abus-
ers to the psychiatric hospitals, which would not have been pos-
sible had drug abuse not been defined as a psychiatric disorder 
(Edman 2009). While the great social services reform was in the 
pipeline, compulsory care was also debated with renewed inten-
sity. The social enquiry explicitly wielded these debates, which 
were also heard in the parliament, the daily press and in profes-
sional journals as well as in a range of shadow committees. Two 
organisations devoted to the issue of drug policy, the National 
Association for Aid to Drug Abusers (RFHL, Riksförbundet för 
hjälp åt läkemedelsmissbrukare, established in 1965) and the 
National Association for a Drug-free Society (RNS, Riksförbundet 
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 narkotikafritt  samhälle, established in 1969) made it very clear 
where the lines of conflict were drawn. The former pleaded for 
reduced compulsory care, the latter wanted more of it. There were 
thus opposite trends on compulsory care and the penalty scale in 
the 1970s. The coercive element was criticised in the care of al-
cohol abusers, and democratic forms of care and treatment were 
pressed for, but the tone remained harsh in the drug political de-
bate and tougher sentencing made its way into the legislation. 
Both in the parliament and in the news, drugs were still among the 
greatest ills of Swedish society.
At the beginning of the 1980s, the compulsory care of alcohol-
ics and drug abusers was finally concentrated under one legisla-
tion. This had been a long road and shows the conceptual scope of 
the field. The repressive nature of the compulsory care of alcohol 
abusers was much resented – and such care also discriminated 
against the lower classes to a greater degree. The medicalisation 
of alcohol abuse would admittedly have harmonised the compul-
sory care of alcohol and drug abusers, who had been declared 
as suffering from a psychiatric disorder, but this harmonisation 
would also create a large group of potentially mentally ill con-
sumers of a culturally accepted substance. The alternative, to give 
a clean bill of health to those drug abusers who had, since the late 
1960s, been committed to compulsory care on medical grounds 
was not unproblematic, either.
After many years and a change of government (with new di-
rectives on the enquiry), the social enquiry proposed two contra-
dictory alternatives, one advocating compulsory care on a social 
basis, the other preferring compulsory care on medical (psychiat-
ric) grounds. This politically untenable solution with two incom-
patible variants of compulsory care put the social service reform 
on hold for some years, before a new enquiry was able to dismiss 
‘hard-to-define abstract concepts’, such as dependence, as a basis 
for legally secure compulsory care (SOU 1981:7: 38). This is why 
the new law on compulsory care, the Care of Abusers Act (Lag för 
vård av missbrukare, LVM), came to focus on the social grounds 
and indicators.
During a few odd years in the early 1980s, there prevailed in 
Sweden the greatest convergence in the field of intoxication policy 
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since it had been expanded to also cover the drug problem. The 
intensive 1970s debate on the social services had placed both al-
cohol and drug abuse in a social context, often with symptom the-
oretical undertones. This was mirrored by the new legislation on 
compulsory care because it primarily applied to acute situations; 
making use of social grounds and social indicators, the law was 
intended to save lives and prevent serious illness. The number of 
people committed to compulsory care declined steadily, while the 
alcohol policy continued to rest on principles of solidarity, high 
taxes and limited availability. The availability was further limited 
by the decision in 1982 of the alcohol retail monopoly to keep the 
outlets closed on Saturdays.
The repressive drug policy, however, sent entirely different mes-
sages to the world than did the restrictive policies on alcohol. 
Towards the end of the 1970s, the parliament had agreed on the 
challenging target that ‘the society cannot accept any other use of 
drugs than that motivated by medical needs’ (Governmental Bill 
1977/78:105: 30; SoU 1977/78:36; PR 1977/78:160).59 Any other 
use was determined as abuse. At the beginning of the 1980s, the 
police also launched a campaign against small dealers instead of 
concentrating, as before, on the major drug criminals (Kassman 
1998). The late 1980s also showed the first examples of a strict-
er care policy in conjunction with the revised law on compul-
sory care. The revisions were made to enable longer treatment 
periods and to broaden admissions criteria. Control policy was 
radicalised at the same juncture: not only the possession but also 
the use of drugs was criminalised. As of 1993, the penalty scale 
for this offence includes imprisonment. Previously, the drugs leg-
islation had emphasised a difference between the drug users and 
drug dealers. As a result of the 1993 revision, both parties were 
defined as offenders (Träskman 2011).
At the same time, the alcohol policy was headed in the opposite 
direction, towards increased liberalisation. The development has 
not been straightforward; several liberalising reforms have been 
carried through under external pressure, mainly as a consequence 
 59 The definition of drug use as ‘any non-medical use of drugs’ is already 
found in the report by the commission on the care of drug users (SOU 
1967:25: 22).
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of Sweden’s membership in the EU since 1995. Other measures 
are rather more homemade and are, as such, more indicative of 
the political will at home. That Sweden abolished four of the five 
alcohol-related monopolies and allowed unlimited import for pri-
vate use can be considered as stemming from its entry into the EU. 
Sweden has, however, avoided the radical tax cuts introduced by, 
for example, Denmark and Finland.
The three pillars of the Swedish alcohol policy (limited avail-
ability through the state monopoly and age limits, heavy taxation 
and non-profit retail trade) can therefore, despite the external pres-
sures, be described as intact yet weakened. The pillars have been 
made weaker still by the Saturday opening at the Systembolaget, 
which was brought back in 2001. From 1992–2020, there has 
also been a marked liberalisation concerning the services for pro-
viding beverages: the number of permanent licences to serve alco-
hol has more than doubled (Folkhälsomyndigheten 2021a).
Conceptual Convergence
The current divergence between alcohol and drug policies is a bit 
paradoxical given the common conceptual understanding of mis-
use problems as diseases, which once again grew stronger from 
the late twentieth century onwards. Somewhat simplified, one can 
argue that the alcohol political medicalisation has followed the 
established line of reasoning promoted by the post-war American 
alcoholism movement. This movement saw alcohol as a necessary, 
but by no means sufficient, factor behind those alcohol problems 
which mainly emerged among certain individuals (psychological-
ly or genetically) predisposed to developing abuse problems. The 
trend is not yet as pronounced in Sweden – given the Swedish tra-
dition of social alcohol policy – but it can be detected in commis-
sion enquiries and official documents, which appreciatively, or at 
the very least uncritically, take medicalised international concepts 
as their starting point (see, for example, Folkhälsomyndigheten 
2018; Socialstyrelsen 2017).
Today, substance abuse treatment is typically referred to as de-
pendency treatment, and the latest major public enquiry in 2011 
proposed that it should be possible to commit both alcohol and 
drug abusers to compulsory psychiatric care because it ‘has been 
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shown that abuse and dependency are considered as psychiatric 
diagnoses, which also clearly emerges from the international diag-
nostic and classification systems’ (SOU 2011:35: 307). The com-
mission’s proposal was not adopted, which in itself speaks volumes 
for the intoxicant political dissonance during the 2000s. It is no 
problem to officially describe alcohol and drug abuse as a medical 
addiction, but problems arise when the premise is to be put into 
practice. That the difference should be a matter of degree rather 
than an essential difference between an ordinary consumer of alco-
hol and a psychiatrically ill alcohol abuser is hard to digest in the 
Swedish alcohol political debate. Efforts to equate the culturally 
familiar figure of the alcohol abuser and the less  familiar character 
of the drug abuser already failed at the end of the 1970s, when the 
minority government, led by the Liberal Party, attempted this. On 
that occasion, the legislators put a definitive stop to committing 
substance abusers to compulsory psychiatric care ‘whether they 
are mentally ill or not’ (Lagrådets protokoll 27/2 1979: 395 f.). 
The proposal by the public enquiry in 2011 came under heavy 
criticism from several consultation bodies and was not addressed 
at a political level at all (Socialdepartementet 2012).
Sweden has so far not taken the final step towards describing 
substance abuse as a primarily medical question, which is also seen 
in the fact that substance abuse problems are dealt with by both 
the municipal social services and within the health care system 
administered by the county councils. Such shared responsibility 
is rare in the EU. Alcohol abusers can admittedly be viewed as ill 
these days, which has long been the label used for drug abusers, at 
least in the political debate (and in Swedish political terminology 
any non-medical use of drugs makes a person a drug abuser). The 
extension of drug political harm reduction, which has come rath-
er late in the day and has taken the form of substitution treatment 
and needle exchange programmes, is one of the more concrete 
examples of such medicalisation (Edman 2017). Alcohol abuse is 
also increasingly treated with medical methods of varying effect.
Even if the social perspective continues to stand in good stead, 
both in legislation and politics, an internationally potent move-
ment advocates a medicalised view on intoxication and related 
problems. The inspiration stems from the so-called Brain Disease 
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Model of Addiction (BDMA), which seeks to explain an increas-
ing range of human conditions and actions. The model also draws 
on general definitions of dependency, craving and abstinence to 
explain behaviours that have nothing whatsoever to do with in-
toxicants. These include such behavioural addictions as shopahol-
ism and sex addiction (Edman & Berndt 2018). This perspective is 
institutionalised in the interaction between influential diagnostic 
manuals and a rapidly growing research field with creative oper-
ationalisations of the diagnostic criteria (Edman & Berndt 2016).
The question is whether this broadened biomedical problem 
description could lead towards revitalised harmony within intox-
ication policy. For example, could the equation in a biomedical 
sense of alcohol and drugs pave the way for liberalised drug pol-
icies, which would deal with the disease of addiction with care 
and treatment instead of trying to contain it with penalties? One 
example of a more care-oriented approach comes from Portugal, 
where decriminalisation and major investments in addiction 
treatment have reduced drug-related morbidity and mortality 
(Hughes & Stevens 2010). Norway, among others, has shown 
interest in changing its drug policy in line with the Portuguese 
model (Johnsen 2017). So far, there are no real signs of Sweden 
following that path, even if we have seen some tendencies in that 
direction lately, with lawyers publicly advocating decriminalisa-
tion of drug use and a less confrontational media debate on drug 
issues (Avkriminalisera 2019; Ekdal och Ekdal 2019). At the time 
of writing, the Swedish parliament’s social committee has also 
unanimously invited the government to evaluate the Swedish drug 
policy to make sure that it is ‘consistent with the requirements of 
evidence-based care, proven experience and harm reduction’, but 
it is also stated that any reform should take a ‘continued restric-
tive drug policy’ as its point of departure (SoU 2019/20:7: 29). In 
a rather blatant attempt to avert decriminalisation of drug con-
sumption, the Swedish social minister has, however, preceded any 
evaluation by stating that decriminalisation is not on the agenda 
(Thurfjell 2020). Policy-based evidence still has the upper hand 
over evidence-based policy.
Things may happen, but at a slow pace. The diagnostic culture 
has united the field conceptually, but this has not yet led to any 
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liberalisation of the Swedish drug policy. In the popular under-
standing of intoxication problems, addiction diagnoses of alco-
hol versus drug consumption also play rather different roles: the 
brain disease of narcomania is a challenging nightmare scenario, 
justifying repressive measures, while alcohol addiction fits in with 
the liberal alcohol policy and is the basis of voluntary treatment 
forms for a better-off clientele that should learn moderation rath-
er than abstinence (Zaitzewsky Rundgren 2013). This intoxica-
tion political dissonance also shows that this is still, to a great 
degree, a question of class politics. Drug policies were formulated 
in the 1960s as an official response to the increasingly evident 
abuse of narcotics and medications. The working-class youth that 
gave a face to the drug problem served as a wry reflection of the 
diligent citizen, and much of the treatment also aimed at social 
rehabilitation and an orderly life (Edman & Olsson 2014). The 
care and treatment of alcohol abusers has provided this class-
based  education ever since the early 1900s, and even today those 
committed to compulsory care are clearly a socioeconomically 
disadvantaged group (SiS 2018). The trend is also seen in the pub-
lic health-driven prevention work: for example, research within 
prevention science promotes individualised solutions to prob-
lems that could otherwise be construed as structural (Roumeliotis 
2016). This understanding of the substance abuse problems nei-
ther hinders tougher sentencing for drug offences nor spoils a 
merry occasion of direct sales of alcohol by producers.
The post-war model of addiction has admittedly conceptualised 
alcohol as an unhealthy intoxicant, but the core of the  phenomenon 
has been placed within certain alcohol users. While this solution 
satisfies the idea of care and treatment, it does not challenge the 
great alcohol-consuming public or strong capital interests. If 
the site of the dependence was the very substance instead, the po-
litical implications would be entirely different. This is, for instance, 
the case with tobacco, since nicotine addiction almost without fail 
has been discussed as a property of the substance. The very idea 
of there being a group of people predisposed to heavy tobacco use 
has, in fact, been condemned as ‘ludicrous’ by a researcher in this 
field (Nordlund 2005: 337). The fact that we consume roughly the 
same amount of alcohol now as we did in the mid 1970s, while 
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smoking has declined radically, shows the importance of choosing 
the right explanatory model as policy support (Edman & Berndt 
2020). Drugs may have been banned long ago, but they share the 
tobacco model of addiction. If we avoid seeking consistency in 
the increasingly biomedicalised intoxication policy, it is perfectly 
possible that this dissonance will go on to thrive.
Where Are We Heading?
The different constructions of alcohol and drug use run like a red 
thread through what can be described as the dissonance of the 
Swedish intoxication policy. The recurring ambition to political-
ly adopt an umbrella concept for intoxication, to find a lowest 
common denominator for the problem area, whether that be so-
cial inequality or medical dependence, has so far not led to equal 
treatment of alcohol and drug users. The political construction 
of the problem is much too distinct, which then drives radically 
different political control measures. At one point, alcohol was the 
dangerous intoxicant – so dangerous that it was almost prohib-
ited. Since the 1960s, the drugs have assumed this role and are 
often described as among the greatest social problems. The policy 
dissonance is, regardless of the conceptual harmonisation, evident 
in the latest governmental alcohol and drug strategy, for example. 
Even though it is acknowledged that the regulation of substances 
differs, alcohol and drug misuse are both described as dependen-
cy. However, the policy goals are divided: to ‘limit the harm of 
alcohol’ versus create a ‘drug-free society’ (Regeringens skrivelse 
2015/16:86: 6 & 10).
Where does this leave us, then; are drugs not vastly more 
 dangerous than alcohol? A soiled heroin needle in a public toilet 
does, unarguably, appear riskier than a glass of rosé on a nice 
terrace. But how accurately do these stereotypical images portray 
the reality? ‘Drugs’ is a generic collective term for everything from 
khat and marijuana to crack and heroin. The reluctance in Swedish 
politics to divide narcotic preparations into light and heavy drugs 
masks this effectively. This is a part of the Swedish zero-tolerance 
policy on drugs, a political doctrine that has brought governments 
of various hues together since the 1970s. The same zero toler-
ance has also bred a political reluctance to make a commitment 
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to substitution treatment, needle exchange programmes and other 
efforts that could make the drugs less dangerous. These measures 
have therefore come late because of a fear of legitimising drug use: 
‘To give needles to drug addicts for free is like giving an alcoholic 
a bottle of whisky once a month in a spirit of rehabilitation’, as a 
right-wing politician formulated it at the beginning of the 2000s 
(PB 2005/06:So523).
Researchers tend to talk about control damage, that is, the dam-
age and consequences caused by the ban and the repression itself, 
which are then often used as a pretext for tough and repressive 
measures. But it is possible, also without talking about control 
damage, to question the absolute hierarchy of harm that justifies 
long prison sentences for dealing light drugs while allowing ever 
more licences to serve alcohol in nice comfortable surroundings. 
According to the British neuropsychopharmacologist David Nutt, 
it is difficult, on the whole, to derive drug control from the harmful 
effects of the substances. He claims that it is not necessarily the 
most dangerous intoxicants that come under the most restrictions. 
Like Sweden, Great Britain has a relatively restrictive drug policy 
and a liberal alcohol policy. However, Nutt estimates that the harm-
ful effects from alcohol and tobacco are higher than, for example, 
harms from cannabis, LSD and ecstasy (Nutt, King, Saulsbury 
& Blakemore 2007).60 This message was emphasized when Nutt 
(2009), as the chair of the British government’s Advisory Council 
on the Misuse of Drugs, scored rhetorical points by describing ec-
stasy as less harmful than horseback riding (or rather addiction to 
horseback riding, cleverly termed as ‘equasy’). This did not lead to 
any revision of British drug policy but only to Nutt being sacked 
as chair of the council (Tran 2009). It is plainly obvious that cul-
ture and history, as well as downright prejudices about drugs and 
intoxicants, play a part in the legislation – also at a time when 
evidence is called for before political decisions are taken.
The weak relationship between an intoxicant’s harmfulness 
and the societal responses to it have also been examined in a 
 60 A commission appointed by the British government had already found in 
1969 that alcohol was more harmful than cannabis, which was also re-
ported in Sweden (see, for example, ‘Cannabis ej lika farligt som alkohol’, 
Dagens Nyheter, 9/1 1969).
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number of historical studies (e.g. Berridge 2013; Gusfield 1996). 
It is, however, hard to appreciate various intoxicants’ relation to 
injuries, mortality or dependence. Test methods and classifications 
change, estimates of necessary and sufficient causes of death are 
often problematic, diagnoses vary on the caregiver’s skills and 
competences, traditions and financing models. Regardless of these 
difficulties, the official statistics can prove to be interesting and, 
even if for no other reason, can serve as a reasonable basis for 
political initiatives. According to the indicators employed by the 
Public Health Agency of Sweden (Folkhälsomyndigheten 2019a; 
2019b), more than double the number of Swedes died of alco-
hol-related causes in 2016 than did of drug-related causes (1907 
and 908 individuals, respectively). Alcohol is deemed to be the fifth 
most common cause to the national burden of disease (calculated 
as premature disability and death). It ranks just behind smoking, 
but clearly before drugs, which are not even among the ten most 
common causes (GBD 2017). While mortality and morbidity per 
user show a different picture, rational public health endeavours 
should perhaps also take these absolute figures as their starting 
point. But the discussion on whether intoxicants’ harms should 
constitute the basis of intoxication policy has not had much of an 
impact on Swedish politicians.
Neither medicalisation nor discussion and contrasting of harms 
have led to any harmonisation of intoxication policies or, more 
importantly, to any liberalisation of the Swedish drug policy. This 
is not surprising since the drug question can hardly be reduced to 
a matter of fact, nor to any demonstrable relative harm where a 
one-dimensional critique of the disproportionality of drug policy 
would contribute to a collective awakening and cause our elected 
officials to change their opinion overnight. Rather, the drug issue 
is a matter of concern, with deep historical roots, broad social 
connotations, and firmly mixed with other political issues that go 
beyond instrumental reactions to drug consumption described as, 
for example, a public health problem.61
 61 For a critique of the critique of matters of facts vs matters of concern, see: 
Latour, B. (2004). Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of 
fact to matters of concern. Critical Inquiry, 30(2), 225–248.
256 Retreat or Entrenchment?
Even within the narrower conceptual fields of understanding 
drug consumption as a disease, things get complicated because 
of the somewhat impressionistic use of the addiction model. 
Imprecise usage of key concepts within this model leads to a sit-
uation where this construction can legitimate a bit of anything, a 
dilemma that is older than the current brain-centred explanatory 
model. Already 50 years ago, the criminologist Nils Christie and 
the sociologist Kettil Bruun coined the term ‘fat words’ to refer 
to ambiguous concepts within the intoxication policy. They talk-
ed about drug addiction as one of these ‘big, fat words without 
very much content’ (Christie & Bruun 1969: 68). But these words 
served a role as ‘grease in the social machinery’, and provided 
an opportunity to avoid unpleasant political conflicts because 
they are ‘camouflaging unsolvable dilemmas’ (Christie & Bruun 
1969: 71 f.).
Two consequences emerge from this vague conceptual usage. 
Firstly, common and politically potent concepts do not always 
provide a satisfactory account of the actual conditions. Sometimes 
it is obvious that politics, in fact, shies away from concepts that 
describe the reality in a good way. For example, a public enquiry 
some years after Sweden’s entry into the EU discussed the option 
of more often describing substance abuse as dependency – not 
because it corresponded to any verifiable qualitative trait, but be-
cause the term was commonly used outside Sweden and would 
therefore make comparative studies easier (SOU 1999:90).
Secondly, the pragmatic use of concepts shows that this area 
is hardly governable by research. The intoxication policy is influ-
enced by a number of factors, and when it happens to be legitimat-
ed by research, it is often a case of carefully selected knowledge 
in support of certain political arguments. Evidence-based politics 
is still politics, and the step is therefore easy to take towards poli-
tics-based evidence. For example, the political opposition against 
needle exchange programmes was typically driven by arguments 
grounded in an ideologically based questioning of research or an-
ecdotal reasoning for one’s own case (Eriksson & Edman 2017).
The dynamic character of the drug issue as a multidimensional 
matter of concern, the vague and even contradictory conceptual 
framing, and the importance of the drug issue as a vital tool for 
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various political discussions, all contribute to a drug political sta-
tus quo. There are thus reasons to believe that the intoxication 
policy will only change in the face of strong forces. These could 
be political pressure groups fighting for drug user rights or po-
litically useful problem descriptions or gains for the state. One 
strong new body of interest could be the market. A market-driven 
liberalisation is, however, not uncomplicated, nor logically neces-
sary. As shown by Kleiman and Ziskind, legalisation of cannabis 
does not come in the form of a specific policy; it could be free or 
restrained, allowing marketing or not, drugs could be provided 
by for-profit or not-for-profit enterprises, in the form of a state 
monopoly, etc. According to the authors, a private, for-profit, viv-
idly marketed solution – i.e. the US ‘alcohol model’ – would be 
‘the second-worst option (behind only continued prohibition)’ 
(Kleiman & Ziskind 2019: 277).
Nevertheless, this is where we see the stronger initiatives for 
a change, as exemplified by Swedish alcohol liberalisations. 
Regardless of the recurring alcohol political ambition to wield 
restrictive alcohol policies, the concrete implementation shows – 
with generous service licences and unlimited import for personal 
use, for example – a market-driven liberalisation. The proposed 
direct sales of alcohol by producers follow the market-oriented 
trend, when the reform is described as important for sparsely 
populated regions and the business sector. It is also clear that the 
direct sales are expected to appeal to a certain socioeconomic cli-
entele. As a proponent of agrarian business interests expresses it, 
the direct sales seek ‘the Swedish middle class [which] will grow 
increasingly inclined to spend money on really good-quality food 
and beverages’ (Björklund 2017).
Is this market-driven liberalisation also the future for drug pol-
icies? If so, the alcohol industry surely has the money, and it is no 
coincidence that one of the biggest American alcohol producers 
has done deals within the newly legalised Canadian cannabis in-
dustry (Maloney & George-Cosh 2017). To allow this, however, 
there must be something in it for the state. In Canada and in the 
US states that have legalised cannabis, the expected tax revenues 
have clearly driven liberalised policies, and this is a plausible con-
nection also on this side of the Atlantic (Colorado Department of 
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Revenue, July 2021; Dehaas 2018; Kovacevich 2018). The great 
Finnish tax cuts on alcohol in 2004 were, for example, motivated, 
among other factors, by the desire to retain the tax revenue on 
alcohol sales, which the state risked losing otherwise (primarily to 
Estonia) (Mäkelä & Österberg 2009).
In Sweden, too, the state is an important economic stakeholder, 
and irrespective of the daily-quoted market friendliness of the cur-
rent government, there is an interest to direct the significant tax 
revenue from the sales of alcohol into the public treasury. The his-
torical development of the Swedish tobacco and gambling market 
also shows that the national public health ambitions have hardly 
been devoid of crude financial interests (Edman & Berndt 2020). 
The Swedish people will not be gifted any new tax-free sins.
The capital of intoxication is knocking at the door, and if we 
let it enter, it will be taxed, but the political price is the loss of an 
extremely potent symbolic issue. This is not just the problem of 
the year, soon to be replaced by another problem, as columnist Art 
Buchwald (1970) wittingly described the changing value of social 
problems. Sure, there are other problems aspiring to be the prob-
lem with a capital P in the 2020s – e.g. terrorism, migration or the 
environment – but the drug problem has served us well. Judging 
by the parliamentary debates since the mid 1960s, drug use can 
be explained by almost anything. The solution is therefore sought 
far and wide. Whether one wants to lower taxes or maintain a 
railway, the drug problem becomes politically useful in a way that 
alcohol no longer can (Christie & Bruun 1985; Edman 2012). It 
will be hard to replace such a problem.
References
Alkoholismen är ej att betrakta som en sjukdom. (1927). 
Stockholms-Tidningen, 24/2.
Berridge, V. (2013). Demons: Our changing attitudes to alcohol, 
tobacco, & drugs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Björklund, H. M. (2017). Uppblåst om gårdsförsäljning. ATL 
Lantbrukets affärstidning, 12/9.
Book of Proverbs 31:5 and 31:7.
259A Century of Dissonance and Harmony in Swedish Intoxication Policy 
Buchwald, A. (1970). Crowning a year’s problem. The Sunday 
Missoulian, 1/3.
Cannabis ej lika farligt som alkohol. (1969). Dagens Nyheter, 9/1.
Christie, N. & Bruun, K. (1969). Alcohol problems: The conceptual 
framework. In M. Keller & T. G. Coffey (Eds.), Proceedings of 
the 28th International Congress on Alcohol and Alcoholism.  
Vol. 2, Highland Park, N.J.: Hillhouse Press.
Christie, N. & Bruun, K. (1985). Den gode fiende. 
Narkotikapolitikk i Norden. Oslo: Univ.-forl.
Colorado Department of Revenue (2021, July 11). Marijuana Tax 
Reports, https://cdor.colorado.gov/data-and-reports/marijuana 
-data/marijuana-tax-reports.
De Basso, Sargon et al. (2019). Avkriminalisera bruk av narkotika i 
Sverige. Aftonbladet, 30/1.
Dehaas, J. (2018). Provinces raked in revenue on day one of  
cannabis sales. CTV News, 18/10.
Edman, J. (2004). Torken. Tvångsvården av alkoholmissbrukare i  
Sverige 1940–1981. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell 
International.
Edman, J. (2009). Vård till varje pris. Den psykiatriska tvångsvården 
av narkotikamissbrukarna 1968–1981. Stockholm: Stockholms 
universitet, Centrum för socialvetenskaplig alkohol- och 
drogforskning.
Edman, J. (2012). Vård och ideologi. Narkomanvården som 
politiskt slagfält. Umeå: Borea.
Edman, J. (2015). Temperance and modernity. Alcohol consumption 
as a collective problem 1885–1913. Journal of Social History, 
49(1), 20–52.
Edman, J. (2016a). Alkoholen som katalysator. Ikaros, 13(1–2), 17–19.
Edman, J. (2016b). Harm to others – rediscovered or eternal? 
Nordic Studies on Alcohol and Drugs, 33(5–6), 479–481.
Edman, J. (2016c). Transnational nationalism and idealistic  
science: The alcohol question between the wars. Social History of 
Medicine, 29(3), 590–610.
260 Retreat or Entrenchment?
Edman, J. (2017). Swedish drug policy. In R. Colson & H. Bergeron 
(Eds.), European Drug Policies: The Ways of Reform. New York: 
Routledge, 195–205.
Edman, J. (2018). Un siècle de restrictions sur l’alcool: Un regard 
international et historique. In A. Coutant (Ed.), Prohibitions. 
Broché: Mare & Martin, 111–139.
Edman, J. (2019). Drogerna: Den nya berusningspolitiken. In J. 
Björkman & P. Hadenius (Eds.), Det nya Sverige. Göteborg, 
Stockholm: Makadam Förlag.
Edman, J. (2020). A medical challenge: The alcohol disease in 
Sweden 1946–1955. Social History of Medicine, 33(1),  
224–246.
Edman, J. & Berndt, J. (2016). From boredom to dependence: The 
medicalisation of the Swedish gambling problem. Nordic Studies 
on Alcohol and Drugs, 33(1), 81–110.
Edman, J. & Berndt, J. (2018). Oniomaniacs: The popular fram-
ing of consumption as a disease. Addiction Research & Theory, 
26(6), 431–438.
Edman, J. & Berndt, J. (2020). A thickening plot: Components and 
complexities in the political framing of the smoking problem in 
Sweden, 1957–1993. Drugs: Education, Prevention and Policy, 
27(2), 145–153.
Edman, J. & Olsson, B. (2014) The Swedish drug problem: 
Conceptual understanding and problem handling 1839–2011. 
Nordic Studies on Alcohol and Drugs, 31(5–6), 503–526.
Ekdal och Ekdal. (2019, February 19). Drogpolitiken. SVT. https://
www.svtplay.se/ekdal-och-ekdal.
Engels, F. (1845). Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England. 
Leipzig: Ej kursiverat. Wigand.
Eriksson, L. & Edman, J. (2017). Knowledge, values, and needle 
exchange programs in Sweden. Contemporary Drug Problems, 
44(2), 105–124.
Fattigvårdlagstiftningskommittén. (1911). Förslag till lag om  
behandling af alkoholister. Stockholm: Fattig vårds lag stiftnings- 
kommittén.
261A Century of Dissonance and Harmony in Swedish Intoxication Policy 
Folkhälsomyndigheten. (2021a, October 11). Antal stadigvarande 




Folkhälsomyndigheten. (2021b, October 11). Socioekonomiska 
skillnader i alkohol, narkotika och tobak – delvis olika mönster 












GBD 2016 Risk Factors Collaborators. (2017). Global, regional, 
and national comparative risk assessment of 84 behavioural, 
environmental and occupational, and metabolic risks or clusters 
of risks, 1990–2016: A systematic analysis for the Global  
Burden of Disease Study 2016. The Lancet, 390, 1345–1422.
Governmental Bill 1977/78:105. https://data.riksdagen.se/fil 
/C0A4841E-2798-4E2A-9B9D-3C6FB5F6DB50.
Gusfield, J. R. (1996). Contested meanings: The construction of 
alcohol problems. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press.
Hughes, C. E. & Stevens, A. (2010). What can we learn from the 
Portuguese decriminalization of illicit drugs? The British Journal 
of Criminology, 50(6), 999–1022.
Johnsen, A. B. (2017). Historisk i Stortinget: Slutt på straff for  
rusmisbrukere. Verdens Gang, 13/12.
Kassman, A. (1998). Polisen och narkotikaproblemet. Från nationel-
la aktioner mot narkotikaprofitörer till lokala insatser för att 
störa missbruket. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International.
262 Retreat or Entrenchment?
Kleiman, M. A. R. & Ziskind, J. (2019). Lawful access to cannabis: 
Gains, losses and design criteria. Journal of Illicit Economies and 
Development, 1(3), 272–278.
Kovacevich, N. (2018). Cannabis is a tax bonanza for states. Forbes, 
5/12.
Lagrådets protokoll 27/2 1979. In Prop. 1979/80:1, part B.  
https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/A3CF80E6-E66E-4385-8BFE-9116E8 
BBF223.
Latour, B. (2004). Why has critique run out of steam? From matters 
of fact to matters of concern. Critical Inquiry, 30(2), 225–248.
Levine, H. G. (1978). The discovery of addiction: Changing  
conceptions of habitual drunkenness in America. Journal of 
Studies on Alcohol, 39(1), 143–174.
Lower House Parliamentary Bill 1944:310 (SKP). https://weburn 
.kb.se/riks/tv%C3%A5kammarriksdagen/pdf/web/1944/web 
_mot_1944__ak__310/mot_1944__ak__310.pdf.
Lower House Parliamentary Record 1967:20, § 14 (H). https:// 
weburn.kb.se/riks/tv%C3%A5kammarriksdagen/pdf/web/1967 
/web_prot_1967__ak__20/prot_1967__ak__20.pdf.
Lundquist, G. R. (1983). Magnus Huss – pionjären inom svensk 
alkoholforskning. Alkohol och narkotika, 77(6), 18–23.
Mäkelä, P. & Österberg, E. (2009). Weakening of one more alcohol 
control pillar: A review of the effects of the alcohol tax cuts in 
Finland in 2004. Addiction, 104(4), 554–563.
Maloney, J. & George-Cosh, D. (2017). Big brewer makes a play for 
marijuana beverages. The Wall Street Journal, 29/10.
McCandless, P. (1984). ‘Curses of civilization’: Insanity and  
drunkenness in Victorian Britain. British Journal of Addiction, 
79(4), 49–58.
McLaughlin, P. (1989) Responding to drunkenness in Scottish 
society: A socio-historical study of responses to alcohol problems. 
University of Stirling.
Nordlund, A. (2005). Tobaksrökning och hälsa i Sverige under 
1900-talet. In J. Sundin, C. Hogstedt, J. Lindberg & H. Moberg 
263A Century of Dissonance and Harmony in Swedish Intoxication Policy 
(Eds.), Svenska folkets hälsa i historiskt perspektiv. Stockholm: 
Statens folkhälsoinstitut.
Nutt, D. (2009). Equasy – an overlooked addiction with im-
plications for the current debate on drug harms. Journal of 
Psychopharmacology, 23(1), 3–5.
Nutt, D., King, L. A., Saulsbury, W. & Blakemore, C. (2007). 
Development of a rational scale to assess the harm of drugs of 
potential misuse. The Lancet, 369(9566), 1047–1053.
Parliamentary Bills [PB] 1997/98:So649 (V) https://www.riksdagen 
.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/motion/droger_GL02So649; 
1998/99:So258 (V) https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar 
/dokument/motion/drogpolitiken_GM02So258; 2005/06:So523  
(KD) https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/1AF1982F-BD1E-4DEB-A0AF 
-E1726EB47012.
Parliamentary Records [PR] 1971:136 https://data.riksdagen.se/fil 
/ED08B9E8-0B55-4A53-9DB1-1D8A76B11530; 1977/78:160; 
1996/97:94 https://data.riksdagen.se/fil/E3592D47-EA09-4E37 




Regeringens skrivelse 2015/16:86: En samlad strategi för alkohol-, 





Roumeliotis, F. (2016). Ideological closure: Drug prevention in 
a post-political society. Stockholm: Department of Sociology, 
Stockholm University.
Schrad, M. L. (2007). The prohibition option. Transnational tem-
perance and national policymaking in Russia, Sweden and the 
United States. University of Wisconsin–Madison.
Schrad, M. L. (2010). The political power of bad ideas: Networks, 
institutions, and the global prohibition wave. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
264 Retreat or Entrenchment?
SiS (2018). Personer intagna på SiS LVM-hem 2017. Statens institu-
tionsstyrelse. https://www.stat-inst.se/webbshop/3-2018-personer 
-intagna-pa-sis-lvm-hem-2017/.
Socialdepartementet (2012). dnr S2012/4504/FST.
Socialstyrelsen (2017). Nationella riktlinjer för vård och stöd vid 
missbruk och beroende: vetenskapligt underlag.
SoU 1977/78:36.
SoU 2019/20:7.
SOU 1948:23, Betänkande med förslag till lag om nykterhetsvård m.m.
SOU 1967:25, Narkotikaproblemet. Del 1: Kartläggning och vård.
SOU 1967:36, Nykterhetsvårdens läge. Del I. Klientel och 
behandlingsresurser.
SOU 1967:37, Nykterhetsvårdens läge. Del II. Bilagor.
SOU 1967:41, Narkotikaproblemet. Del 2: Kontrollsystemet.
SOU 1969:52, Narkotikaproblemet. Del 3: Samordnade åtgärder.
SOU 1969:53, Narkotikaproblemet. Del 4: Socialmedicinska och 
kliniska undersökningar.
SOU 1974:39, Socialvården. Mål och medel.
SOU 1977:40, Socialtjänst och socialförsäkringstillägg. Lagar och 
motiv.
SOU 1981:7, Lag om vård av missbrukare i vissa fall.
SOU 1999:90, Narkotikastatistik – om samhällets behov av infor-
mation om narkotikastatistik.
SOU 2009:22, En ny alkohollag.
SOU 2011:35, Bättre insatser vid missbruk och beroende.
Statement of Government Policy (2019, January 1). https://www 
.regeringen.se/48f68a/contentassets/6e0630547665482eaf 
982c4777f42f85/regeringsforklaringen-2019.pdf.
Swedish Radio 5/12 2018, https://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel 
.aspx?programid=83&artikel=7106046.
265A Century of Dissonance and Harmony in Swedish Intoxication Policy 
Thurfjell, K. (2020). S-ministern: Inte aktuellt med avkriminaliser-
ing. Svenska Dagbladet, 14/2.
Tran, M. (2009). Government drug adviser David Nutt sacked. The 
Guardian, 30/10.
Träskman, P. O. (2011). Narkotikabrotten och kontrollen av bruket 
av narkotika genom straffrättsliga medel. In B. Olsson (Ed.), 
Narkotika. Om problem och politik, Stockholm: Norstedts 
Juridik.
Utkast till sakpolitisk överenskommelse mellan Socialdemokraterna, 
Centerpartiet, Liberalerna och Miljöpartiet de gröna, 11/1 2019.
White, W. L. (2004). The lessons of language: Historical perspectives 
on the rhetoric of addiction. In S. W. Tracy & C. J. Acker (Eds.), 
Altering American consciousness. The history of alcohol and drug 
use in the United States, 1800–2000. Amherst, MA: University of 
Massachusetts Press.
Williams, S. E. (1987). The attitude of physicians towards alcohol-
ism in the U.S. from 1790–1860. In S. Barrows, R. Room & J. 
Verhey (Eds.), The social history of alcohol. Drinking and culture 
in modern society. Berkeley, CA: Alcohol Research Group, 
Medical Research Institute of San Francisco.
Yokoe, R. (2019). Alcohol and politics in twentieth-century Britain. 
The Historical Journal, 62(1), 267–287.
Zaitzewsky Rundgren, M. (2013). Många alkoholberoende kan lära 
sig dricka måttligt. Accent, 15/11.

11. Clashing Perspectives: Cannabis Users 
and Swedish Drug Policy
Josefin Månsson, Mats Ekendahl & Patrik Karlsson
Introduction
Urine testing wasn’t fun. I mean, they are so advanced now, they 
see the THC [tetrahydrocannabinol] count go up and down. Not 
only if it’s a positive or a negative, but to what extent. It was hard, 
because I thought that they would only detect if it was a positive 
or a negative, and that I could smoke a little while tapering off. 
But all along it went up and down… They called it a relapse when 
I came in for a meeting: ‘You’ve had a relapse!’ Oh my god, such a 
hassle. I just smoked a joint. 
(Hektor)
Hektor was a cannabis smoker in his twenties who had been in 
treatment for some time back when we met with him for an in-
terview. He told us that he liked to smoke cannabis, but that he 
wanted to stop using it while he was in treatment since his school 
required this. The above quote is an extract from his story about 
meeting the Swedish youth treatment system. Just like many other 
cannabis users we have talked to, Hektor’s story about his own 
use, what cannabis meant to him and how he experienced and cal-
culated risks differed from what the treatment staff had told him 
about cannabis. By emphasizing the silliness of denoting smoking a 
joint with the clinical term relapse, he points to this fundamental 
conflict between perspectives.
It is against this background that we have found it interesting 
to study different perspectives on cannabis use and what happens 
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when they meet. We will try to answer a series of questions: How 
is youth cannabis use perceived by different actors in treatment? 
How do cannabis users view their use and the measures taken 
against it? What do motives for using cannabis say about the po-
litical context in which they are expressed? In asking these ques-
tions, we scrutinize what happens when different perspectives on 
cannabis use meet and how societal efforts towards change shape 
this meeting.
We aim to discuss the situation for cannabis users in the 
Swedish drug policy context, which relies on criminal control and 
prohibition. We focus on the way this strict policy sets the stage 
for the encounter between cannabis users and the demands on 
them to stop using. Starting out with findings from a research 
project on users like Hektor, as well as youth treatment centers 
targeting cannabis users, we take a comprehensive look at how 
these relate to each other. On a more general level, we also discuss 
what implications these findings have for how the cannabis issue 
is enacted in policy and practice in Sweden.
The material described in this chapter comes from a research 
project about cannabis (FORTE, project nr 2015–01582). Data 
was collected from 2015–2017 and consists mainly of interviews. 
Interviews were carried out with staff from outpatient treatment 
centers for young substance users in the Stockholm area (n = 18), 
with young people who have been in treatment at such centers 
(n = 18), and with adults who use cannabis (n = 12). We also 
collected online posts (n = 238) on this issue through an open 
discussion thread at Flashback Forum (see https://www.flashback 
.org/t2883872). The analyses of the different materials were sim-
ilar. In order to create an overview, a first coding focused on how 
participants talked about cannabis use, treatment and Swedish 
drug policy. The data were then, in a second step, coded using 
various theoretical tracks, including logics (McPherson & Sauder 
2013), legitimation (Suchman 1995), responsibilization (Trnka & 
Trundle 2014) and motive accounts (Burke 1969/1945). The ma-
terials, including survey data, have previously been analysed sep-
arately and presented in empirical articles (Ekendahl, Karlsson & 
Månsson 2018; Ekendahl, Månsson & Karlsson 2020a, 2020b; 
Karlsson et al. 2018, 2019), including an overview in Swedish 
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(Ekendahl, Månsson & Karlsson 2020c). More information on 
theoretical and methodological issues can be found in the pub-
lished articles.
The Framework of a Strict Drug Policy
In Sweden, cannabis is a controversial and much debated topic in 
the media and in politics, as well as among authorities and the 
public. Common viewpoints are that cannabis is particularly dan-
gerous for the psychosocial development of young people (e.g. 
Danielsson, Olsson & Allebeck 2019), that it works as a gateway 
to ‘hard’ drugs (e.g. Ellgren, Spano & Hurd 2007) and that it feeds 
organized crime in problem-burdened areas (e.g. The Swedish 
Police Authority 2017). Although cannabis use is uncommon in 
Sweden compared to many other European states (EMCDDA 
2019), a recurrent claim is that it is increasing among both ad-
olescents and young adults. While young Swedish cannabis us-
ers can mainly be seen as ‘marijuana testers’, with a comparably 
 affluent social situation (Karlsson et al. 2019), the focus on prev-
alence as a problem in its own right is common in Sweden (see, 
e.g., Månsson & Ekendahl 2015). This was recently illustrated in 
discussions following the increase last year in adult (aged 30–44 
years) consumption from 1.1% in 2004 to 3.7% in 2018 (Public 
Health Agency 2019), which has attracted some attention (e.g. 
CAN 2019; Ritzén 2019).
It is clear that the Swedish restrictive drug policy constitutes 
an ideological framework when the consequences of cannabis 
use are described in Sweden. The policy assumes that the sub-
stance in itself causes the aforementioned problems (see Chapter 6 
by Tham ‘On the Possible Deconstruction of the Swedish Drug 
Policy’). Historically, this focus, to a considerable extent, has been 
influenced by the work of one of the most important actors in the 
development of Swedish drug policy, Nils Bejerot, doctor in social 
medicine (Edman 2012). Bejerot saw drug use as a contagious dis-
ease that needed to be contained in order to prevent societal disas-
ter. His tenets steered policy ‘to a police-oriented strategy whose 
objective was to clear the streets of drug pushers’ (Lenke & Olsson 
2002: 69). In line with this policy direction, Sweden does not seem 
to be heading towards retreat, that is, a more liberalized drug 
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policy. Such policies can be seen in the majority of other Western 
states, and they are usually based on a division between drug use 
per se and problematic drug use. Rather, recent political moves 
in Sweden point to doing ‘more of the same’. For example, in the 
Swedish government’s strategy for alcohol, narcotics, doping and 
tobacco it is stated that Sweden shall promote  restrictive canna-
bis policies (Skr. 2015/16:86), and the Swedish Prime Minister 
Stefan Löfven declared in 2019 that Sweden should not ‘legalize 
and legitimize [cannabis], and say that this is a natural part of our 
society. Because it is not, and it should not be’ (Olsson 2019).
Swedish drug policy classifies all drug use as ‘abuse’ (missbruk). 
Harm reduction has typically been considered incompatible with 
the zero-tolerance approach to drugs and is accused of sending the 
‘wrong’ message. While some harm reduction efforts have been 
developed and made more accessible to drug users in Sweden (e.g. 
substitution treatment, exchange of syringes and prescribing anti-
dote to opioid overdoses), these are exclusively directed towards 
‘hard’ drugs. Cannabis treatment focuses instead on recovery with 
abstinence as the end goal. This recovery-as-abstinence model has 
been debated in other countries (such as the UK and Australia, see 
e.g., Klein & Dixon 2020; Lancaster, Duke & Ritter 2015), and it 
has been suggested that this model has negative implications for 
individuals seeking to engage in treatment (e.g. McKeganey 2014; 
Wincup 2016). Recent social science drug research has begun to 
problematize the demands placed upon the drug-using individu-
al to change in order to become ‘normal’ (e.g. Fomiatti, Moore 
& Fraser 2019; Fraser & Ekendahl 2018). One central point is 
that such change-oriented efforts individualize drug problems; 
another is that rigid definitions of successful treatment outcomes 
reject some users’ wish to continue using drugs, or to change in 
a different way than what society demands (Pienaar et al. 2017). 
As the processes of change related to drug use are complex (e.g. 
McIntosh & McKeganey 2000; West & Brown 2013), a strict 
abstinence goal may reinforce feelings of stigmatization among 
help-seeking individuals who do not agree with this prescribed 
way out of drug use (Csete et al. 2016).
The notion of change is usually closely connected to people who 
use drugs – they are expected to submit themselves to treatment 
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and adjust to punitive social welfare measures (e.g. urine tests). 
However, recent developments in international drug policy have 
entailed new questions on how treatment systems, legal processes 
and health promotion might be reformed to benefit people who 
use drugs. In line with this, scholarly discussions on the meanings 
of change are surfacing through questions regarding how drugs 
are made a problem (e.g. Bacchi 2018), on what the persistent 
focus on the future creates (e.g. Lancaster, Rhodes & Rance 2019) 
and what we might learn from stasis (e.g. Dennis 2019). It is from 
this theoretical perspective of change that we discuss the findings 
from some of our previous research on cannabis.
Different Perspectives on Cannabis
In a previous dissertation project, one of us examined the assump-
tions about cannabis that are represented in official contexts, 
such as in the media and at information conferences organized 
by authorities, and in unofficial contexts, such as on internet 
forums (Månsson 2017). The study showed that actors in these 
discussions relied on scientific evidence showing how dangerous 
or harmless the substance is. The expansive research literature, 
however, points in different directions regarding the consequences 
of cannabis use and how the substance should be regulated (Hall 
& Lynskey 2020). The positions are locked between those who 
advocate continued prohibition and those who want society to 
liberalize cannabis policies; all think they are right and refuse 
to reconsider their positions. This also means that cannabis is at-
tributed with divergent meanings; for example, it can symbolical-
ly ‘become’ a threat to a whole youth generation, a medicine or a 
healthier intoxicant than alcohol.
Here, we look closer at how political conditions, taken for 
granted ‘truths’ and societal efforts to get people to avoid the 
substance are interwoven. Our focus is on how the complicated 
cannabis issue is expressed in people’s descriptions of what they 
do, think and feel. By engaging with a diversity of knowledge, we 
hope to avoid the pitfalls of viewing evidence as simplified and the 
idea of there being ‘correct answers’ to complex policy questions 
(Rhodes & Lancaster 2019).
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Treatment Perspectives on the Dangers of Cannabis Use
Although the treatment centers that are included in this study 
treat all types of substance use (including alcohol), the focus on 
cannabis was apparent in the staff interviews (Ekendahl, Karlsson 
& Månsson 2018). The staff expressed great concerns about the 
substance. This held true both in relation to the negative conse-
quences that young users were considered to be particularly sen-
sitive to, and to the liberal attitudes that were said to affect them 
via popular culture and the internet. Concerns about young peo-
ple’s behavior were also key in staff statements. For example, they 
described cannabis use as dangerous and impossible to combine 
with a healthy and normal lifestyle. This is illustrated in the quote 
below where one of our participants elaborated on why she thinks 
using cannabis is ‘a bad idea when you are young’:
You have to be clear about what we know about the consequenc-
es of smoking cannabis regularly, over extended periods of time. 
Nothing happens after trying two or three times, but I think that 
at least parents should know what happens when a young person 
smokes regularly, and the kids themselves should know. […] For 
example, the THC release curve. I talk about it being fat soluble, 
that it stays in the body a bit longer. I talk about chronic intoxica-
tion, although I don’t use that word. But I talk about the fact that 
if you smoke regularly for a long period of time, you’re under the 
influence even when you’re not high, so to speak. To the parents, 
at least, I show brain images demonstrating where in the brain it 
sticks, the cannabinoid system and things like that.
Here, the effects of regular use are linked to those of sporadic 
use, which served to emphasize the problem and fuel the concern 
for young people (regardless of their involvement with cannabis). 
The concern was made trustworthy by presenting the dangerous 
effects of cannabis use in biomedical language (e.g. the effects on 
brain function). The participant drew on scientific evidence of the 
negative effects of regular cannabis use on young people and used 
this knowledge to prevent cannabis experimenters from continu-
ing. This process had two effects: it constituted cannabis as par-
ticularly dangerous for young people and, in doing so, constituted 
young people as a group with great needs.
The use of biomedical language was common among staff, and 
they repeatedly referred to research and statistics to demonstrate 
273Clashing Perspectives: Cannabis Users and Swedish Drug Policy 
that they conveyed ‘safe’ and ‘correct’ information about cannabis 
to young people and their parents. This was illustrated by one of 
the participants in the quote below.
I see this as a very important job that we have to do, since I don’t 
see legalizing yet another drug as a solution. I see it as a very im-
portant job over the next few years to provide alternative infor-
mation – from safe sources and to learn to resist the other stuff. To 
show another side, that smoking does have negative effects.
The use of research emphasized the severity of the cannabis prob-
lem and placed weight on the centers as experts and advocates of 
zero tolerance to drugs. Scientific evidence thus became a way to 
both legitimize the treatment and to quality control it. This quote 
also illustrates how scientific evidence, often presented as a singu-
lar ‘fact’, was used to resist the opinion that cannabis should be 
legalized (see also Månsson & Ekendahl 2015).
However, references to science were also problematized by 
staff. For example, several participants mentioned that some 
clients referred to scientific reports supporting a different view 
on cannabis than the one presented by the treatment staff and 
the strict Swedish drug policy. And as one participant stated, the 
‘mishmash of information that goes against one another is pretty 
mad […] and it is difficult to handle the global opinion when you 
are sitting in a small room with a teenager and you are not 100% 
sure of what is really true.’ This shows how controversies around 
evidence created problems, and accordingly the staff avoided 
going into political discussions as this was seen as a dead end. 
Similarly, they described how they tried to avoid talking to young 
people about drug policy and the fact that cannabis is prohibited. 
This topic was saved for occasions when staff really wanted to 
emphasize the dangers of the drug and the legal consequences that 
consumption could lead to.
Throughout, the staff described a competent and serious client 
work. They referred to their vast experience of meeting young peo-
ple, and the knowledge of their behavior and needs that they had 
gained through this. They expressed a clear wish to meet clients 
‘here and now’ in order to personalize efforts and interventions. 
Each meeting was seen as important for building relationships, 
providing accurate information about cannabis, and thereby 
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 facilitating behavioral change. Given this professional approach, 
the drug political focus on control and abstinence was sometimes 
described as problematic. The quote below is an example:
It’s as if I play a role and I get a lot of transference, like projections. 
It’s as if I’m not a person but I also become the state. There is this 
young person and every time I see him he talks about it like: ‘You 
all force me to come here and leave urine samples, you all force 
me to do this!’ And I go: ‘It’s me, who is sitting here as a person 
talking to you, and I want you to take a drug test.’ But all the time 
it’s just ‘You all …’
This quote exemplifies how mandatory parts of the treatment, 
like urine tests, were described to create resistance and problems 
in establishing a relationship with the client. The participant 
here was uncomfortable with being reduced to a representative 
of the state and to tackle this, she downplayed it by stating that 
‘I want you to …’  rather than accepting the accusation ‘you all 
force …’ Similarly, the demand to become drug free in treatment 
was sometimes described as problematic when focusing on rela-
tional aspects.
Yes, the way we see it is that you have to become drug free. But 
I think we are very good at not making it into morals. I think we 
are good at understanding what is going on. No, it’s not always 
 simple, but you don’t have to make the decision to never smoke 
again. […] But can we make a deal? These six weeks you won’t 
smoke. […] We start here, and then when you haven’t smoked for 
a while you might see things differently.
Just like mandatory urine tests were transformed into a help of-
fering in the previous quote, becoming drug free is in this quote 
transformed from a goal imposed from above to a deal made be-
tween two equals. Such strategical redefinitions of the situation, 
from one of compulsion to one of opportunity, were significative 
of how the staff handled the clash between Swedish drug policy 
and providing adequate treatment.
One dilemma raised by the staff was that the treatment seemed 
more suited to help certain groups of clients, even though the stat-
ed objective was to make all types of young people quit canna-
bis. According to the staff, good results could mainly be achieved 
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among the clients who could be characterized as ‘marijuana 
 testers’ (see Karlsson et al. 2019). More experienced and socially 
vulnerable users were often seen as more difficult to treat. This 
observation was also consistent with how the young people them-
selves perceived the potential of treatment.
Youth Perspectives on Cannabis Use
The young people we interviewed described different pathways 
into treatment. Some had entered voluntarily, some were forced 
to go by parents or school, while others had been court-ordered. 
Four different user groups could be identified from the client in-
terviews (Ekendahl, Månsson & Karlsson 2020a). We classified 
these groups inductively from the study sample as a way to get 
an overview of the material. One such group was those who de-
scribed themselves as socially established and saw cannabis use 
as a stupid mistake – a youth sin. Another group described very 
problematic backgrounds, containing more deviant behaviors 
than the use of illegal drugs. Yet another group described canna-
bis as a lifestyle – they really liked the substance and did not see 
any problems with it. The last, and least common group, had tried 
cannabis and gotten caught but did not really think the drug was 
particularly interesting.
Those who thought that the treatment had been helpful came 
mainly from the first two groups. They agreed with the staff’s 
descriptions of harms; cannabis controls the behavior of young 
people and creates an addiction, and they could thereby under-
stand their past. Their own cannabis experiences were similar to 
those told by the staff at the treatment centers, focusing on, for 
example, addiction. Metaphors about being inside a ‘glass bulb’ 
while using cannabis and about ‘being in love’ with the substance 
surfaced repeatedly in both materials. The young clients described 
how they had been able to embrace the new information they got 
during treatment and made the decision to stop using cannabis. 
They saw the treatment as a turning point in life and believed it 
was easy to take responsibility and change after their contact with 
the treatment center.
They [staff] have taught you why it’s better not to do it [cannabis], 
than to do it. And I’ve thought about why you become  addicted. 
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That the level of happiness rises, and then it sinks below what’s 
normal, below the normal level of happiness that I have now 
sitting here. You go below a certain point. He [staff] drew some 
graph showing me. And it confirmed that you can become addict-
ed to this.
The young person who provided the above quote described 
it almost as a revelation when he, after receiving informative 
 explanations from the staff, realized that his continued use of can-
nabis was a result of the substance itself. In this and similar de-
scriptions, individual choices, actions and emotions were shaped 
by the agency of the substance. Later in the interview this topic 
was revisited, and the client described being able to control his 
use before coming to treatment, but then becoming convinced he 
could not. Pivotal in this, and similar stories, was the knowledge 
passed on by staff about addiction and the brain, which was said 
to support the client in making the right decision (see also Barnett 
et al. 2018). The treatment center here became an ‘educator to-
wards “good” risk choices’ (Kemshall 2002: 43), and this client 
was the perfect example of a well-educated citizen who made the 
choice required by a government actor – to stop using cannabis.
The last two groups generally described resistance to the treat-
ment; they did not think it was something suitable for them and 
did not see the point at all. They disagreed with the staff’s prob-
lematization of cannabis and resisted being treated as drug ad-
dicts. These young people saw their cannabis use in a completely 
different way than the treatment staff (e.g. they described it as 
unproblematic and informed), and were surprised of the medi-
cal language used when staff talked about cannabis. These young 
people questioned the treatment but, because they had committed 
a crime, they understood and accepted their situation. The treat-
ment was presented as unavoidable in the endeavor to eventually 
be left alone and to be able to continue with cannabis or to sim-
ply get on with their lives. Some described how they ‘used’ the 
treatment centers as a way of proving to their families that they 
were drug free, although they were not (or were only during treat-
ment). They stated that they acted like motivated clients while in 
treatment in order to continue using cannabis without causing too 
much trouble, like one of the participants quoted below who had 
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been mandated to treatment as a consequence of being caught by 
the police with traces of THC in his urine.
Participant:  They [staff] were more like, ‘What can you do to 
not keep on doing it [cannabis]?’ It was basically 
that question, but in different versions all the time. 
How they should keep me away from it. Which I 
did during spring, until the day I quit treatment. 
[…] 
Interviewer:   What do you think they would say at the treat-
ment center if they knew that you didn’t stop?
Participant:   Well, they would be disappointed. I can see their 
faces right now. Because they have a very clear 
view that this is bad in every way. But I think can-
nabis, and this is always my counter-argument, I 
think that you become slow and stuff, but other-
wise I see nothing dangerous with it besides it be-
ing illegal. That’s the greatest danger.
As mentioned as a key technique for building relationships in the 
staff interviews, the young person above testified to how staff tried 
to make him choose to stay away from cannabis, conveying that 
treatment was not framed as coercion. The participant described 
his awareness of this, as well as what treatment staff thought 
about cannabis and what he was obliged to do in treatment. He 
resisted this, however, in two ways: he took up cannabis use on 
the day of his release from treatment, and he refused to change his 
mind about cannabis being rather harmless. However, later in the 
interview he stated that he avoided voicing such opinions during 
treatment as any such talk that ‘slipped through’ made treatment 
more intrusive, for example through additional urine tests. Thus, 
the meaning that these young people attributed treatment with 
seemed to have little to do with the goal of recovery. At the same 
time, their resistance may not have been visible for treatment 
staff. In the end, clients with this dodging stance may therefore 
be taken as illustrative examples of successful rather than poor 
treatment outcomes.
Whether the young people described resistance or compli-
ance with treatment, they understood their own experiences in a 
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 responsible manner. For example, information on and assessments 
of risks were considered to be crucial for their approach to canna-
bis. They did not refer at all to traditional sociological or patho-
logical explanations of drug use (e.g. economic vulnerability, peer 
pressure, boredom) when they explained why they had ended up 
in their current situation (see Järvinen & Ravn 2015; Phoenix & 
Kelly 2013). Instead, they were careful in describing how they 
themselves had made the choice to start using, and that no one else 
was responsible. Regardless of the attitude towards the treatment, 
the youth generally understood why the adult world was worried 
about them and they agreed with the basics of strict Swedish drug 
policy. Although many saw the benefits of legalizing cannabis for 
medical purposes, they thought differently about legalization for 
recreational use. The idea was that cannabis is, after all, associated 
with certain risks that most people cannot handle safely.
Adult Perspectives on Using Cannabis in a Strict  
Drug Policy
The young people’s relatively compliant approach to Swedish 
drug policy was not at all visible when the adult cannabis users 
made their voices heard (Ekendahl, Månsson & Karlsson 2020b). 
The online discussions and interviews with adult users showed 
that prohibition and sanctions against cannabis, as well as stig-
matization of users, were seen as unfair, undemocratic and irra-
tional. The adult participants were not classified into different 
groups, instead we focused on classifying their motives for using 
the  substance. The following quotes thus represent general trends 
in the material.
We are extremely oppressed, which has made me believe that some 
get paranoid simply because others cannot know anything about 
our use. Your whole world can get shattered if the wrong person 
gets to know about it. Tainted criminal record, extreme difficulties 
(if not impossible) to get a loan, employers will deny me work etc. 
The list goes on and on.
As illustrated in the above quote from the online material, most 
participants were extremely offended by the strict Swedish drug 
policy and the effects it had on their lives. Both online discussions 
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and interviews centered on aspects of stigmatization, problems 
with how Sweden handled cannabis users and worries about hav-
ing to deal with criminals to purchase the substance. Accounts of 
feeling alone, unsafe and hunted by society were repeated. These 
discussions, for example, centered on experiences of not getting 
the medical care that was needed after admitting to the use of 
cannabis, and on stories of young people whose lives had been 
ruined after police crackdowns. As an effect, some stated that they 
had lost their faith in Swedish society – calling it ‘an oppressive 
regime – a non-democracy’.
The agitated feelings about Swedish drug policy probably em-
anate from clashing perspectives on what cannabis is. According 
to the adult users, cannabis is a relatively harmless substance that 
could be used for many different purposes; with everything from 
recreational motives such as relaxation and creativity to medi-
cal motives to mitigate physical and mental disorders being men-
tioned (see also Mitchell et al. 2016). A common view was that 
they did not want to change into non-users. With the exception 
of the effects of the strict drug policy in itself, most did not experi-
ence any problems with their use. In fact, it was often described as 
quite the opposite – it was something that helped them with var-
ious problems in life. About half of the participants in the online 
material referred to medical motives for cannabis use. We could 
also see, in the interviews, that these motives usually surfaced im-
mediately, to be complemented with accounts of recreation lat-
er on when the participants were ‘warmed up’ and had received 
follow-up questions. The way the participants approached the 
question of why they used cannabis thus suggests an influence of 
drug prohibition on motive accounts – those motives that were 
believed to be more accepted and rational appeared first. The ex-
tract below is an illustration of this:
I had a few friends over. We were going to a reggae club and ev-
erybody was there. Five hundred people dancing and having fun. 
Then I came home, and the police had busted the door open and 
torn up the apartment. And found ten grams of weed. And I said: 
‘Oh my god, how can you bust the door open? Why didn’t you 
call?’. ‘We did, but you didn’t answer.’ ‘No you didn’t! Check my 
phone.’ I don’t know what will happen with it. I have been to 
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a hearing and I’ve told them exactly how it is. ‘Well, this is it: 
I smoke. It’s for pain and it’s relaxing for me.’
Here, the recreational motive of having fun was reformulated into 
a medical motive of pain relief when the participant described his 
contact with the police. What is also interesting with this quote 
is that it was one of very few descriptions of large social gather-
ings that included cannabis use. Unlike results from prior research 
describing cannabis use as a social activity (see, e.g., Osborne & 
Fogel 2008), the participants did not present this as particularly 
relevant in Sweden. Instead, they generally claimed to hide their 
cannabis use from outsiders and do it privately. Some participants 
even said that a consequence of their cannabis use was that they 
felt lonely since they were scared to talk to other people about it. 
While this may be a typical characteristic of adult cannabis use, it 
may also reflect a drug policy where cannabis use is met as devi-
ant, and where individuals worry about legal sanctions.
Although social settings were not emphasized in the material, 
the setting was described as important in relation to accounts of 
more private use of the substance.
When the family came and it was more everyday routines, 
when you have less time for everything, then I get easily annoyed 
and I act out. […] Then I can have a hit [of cannabis], and then 
I come down and become calm so I can handle the situation. So, 
my need for cannabis increases when I enter stressful everyday 
environments.
This quote illustrates how cannabis use was described as an exten-
sion of the family setting with its routines, stress and arguments. 
In this, and similar quotes, drug effects such as intoxication were 
downplayed or rejected. Cannabis use was instead explained with 
reference to its soothing effects that facilitate social functioning. 
These adults recognized that cannabis use violated society’s rules 
– particularly those who used it in family settings. The difference 
from the young users was that the adults could easily justify their 
lifestyle by claiming that cannabis made them into (what they 
perceived as) better people, leading productive and healthy lives. 
Cannabis use was presented as a conscious decision, similar to 
how some young persons described it.
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Cannabis, Drug Policy and Change
Based on the overall results of this study, we, like previous re-
search (e.g. Månsson 2017), can see that cannabis is a substance 
with many meanings. Treatment staff and certain groups of young 
people emphasized its dangers, while other user groups (both 
young people and adults) described the substance as relatively 
harmless with both recreational and medical uses. Our research 
project shows that there is not one unchallenged ‘story’ about 
cannabis. To the contrary, all actors in our material seemed to 
have to explain their views. Not surprisingly, those who presented 
cannabis as harmless were forced to motivate their stance because 
it challenged dominant assumptions in Sweden. Perhaps more 
surprisingly, those who viewed cannabis as dangerous strived to 
introduce both research and experience to justify this. This shows 
how the context provides the boundaries as to what can be said 
about drugs and their users, and that such statements can be un-
derstood in relation to both the current strict drug policy and an 
increasingly drug-liberal world.
This cohesive grip on the material from our research project 
illustrates how a focus on change shapes the meeting between can-
nabis users and the drug policy system on several levels – and that 
it may be helpful for some but problematic for others. Looking at 
the everyday treatment practice, the demand on young clients to 
quit using steered the direction of both interventions (e.g. mandato-
ry urine tests) and client–staff interaction (e.g. pedagogical efforts 
to make young people choose wisely). In this way, the drug played 
a key role in client relationships and in how these were enacted 
and legitimized. The treatment was prompted by youth cannabis 
use and it targeted the effects of the substance. For the large group 
of ‘marijuana testers’, this approach was considered to work well. 
Staff described them as compliant clients who quit using the drug, 
which indicates good treatment outcomes. The smaller group of 
more socially disadvantaged and advanced users – who showed 
several other problem behaviors and were more convinced that 
cannabis was relatively unproblematic – was considered more dif-
ficult to build relationships with and to guide in the direction of 
lifestyle change. While we have shown that ‘difficult’ clients can be 
satisfied with and benefit from the treatment (Ekendahl, Månsson 
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& Karlsson 2020a), this generally reflects that a narrow and ju-
diciary entry into young people’s lives (that cannabis use is illegal 
and must end) has both advantages and disadvantages if the goal 
is to reduce drug problems. Socially  affluent young people who 
had a lot to lose seemed to listen to staff messages about how 
dangerous cannabis is and quit use. Those, on the other hand, who 
had more severe problems in life than consequences of cannabis 
use often seemed to find it difficult to engage with a treatment they 
found misdirected and irrelevant. In the worst case, this means 
that the young people who need the help the most will reject it.
The cannabis problem is usually described through the moni-
toring of prevalence rates. By such quantification, a complex phe-
nomenon is simplified and made into a distinct problem to be 
acted upon by society (Lancaster, Rhodes & Rance 2019). For 
example, the logic underpinning the vision of a drug-free society, 
along with the criminalization of personal drug use (see Chapter 6 
‘On the Possible Deconstruction of the Swedish Drug Policy’), is 
based on the idea that users have to change into non-users. It also 
rests on the notion that society has to change from one with ille-
gal drugs to one without. By focusing so strongly on prevalence 
figures, there is a real risk that Swedish cannabis prevention ad-
dresses symptoms of unfavorable living conditions rather than on 
their root causes. An overly narrow view on people’s drug use can 
also further stigmatize the most socially vulnerable. Being pros-
ecuted for a drug offense may, on the one hand, help some indi-
viduals to get on the right track (Ekendahl, Månsson & Karlsson 
2020a). On the other hand, it can also impose an identity such 
as ‘drug addict’ or ‘junkie’ on young people who, under different 
circumstances, might ‘mature out’ of experimentation with drugs. 
The material effects of this labelling can be profound, as illus-
trated by users who describe that they have lost their jobs, not 
received proper medical care and in some ways live as outcasts. 
Although the Swedish welfare state strives for inclusion (Moore 
et al. 2015), the current drug policy with its ‘change agenda’ may 
exclude cannabis users as ‘Others’.
Research shows that those who are defined by society as drug 
users are forced to fight hard to escape the stigma and margin-
alization that this label entails (e.g. Ekendahl 2006; Fraser et al. 
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2017; Petersson 2013; Svensson 1996). As illustrated in this re-
search project, some cannabis users simply do not identify with 
being a problem that needs to be solved. They want to contin-
ue using their drug of choice for both medical and recreational 
 reasons, and they view society’s demands for change as problem-
atic. By paying attention to users who say they benefit from their 
use, and by engaging with their wishes to change slowly, or not at 
all, we may develop a treatment and policy approach that is more 
responsive to the perspectives of those who we wish to help. This, 
however, seems difficult if the issue of cannabis is governed by a 
primary focus on change. We therefore ask, what would happen if 
we were to accept that cannabis (and other drugs) are part of our 
society? Such an approach would perhaps transform the demand 
to change quickly (for example in treatment) and provide the pos-
sibility of slowing down and paying attention to the experiences 
and preferences of the users. This could perhaps direct the focus 
on change from the substance and the users towards more general 
societal aspects of wellbeing. As suggested by Fomiatti, Moore & 
Fraser (2017), this would help in developing more sensible and 
humanitarian treatment and policy.
In conclusion, despite the increased demands on evidence-based 
practice, it seems difficult to progress in the discussions on canna-
bis by relying on objective knowledge. We have previously shown 
how diametrically different views on what cannabis is, how the 
drug should be controlled and whether the user group should be 
considered large or small find research support (see, e.g., Månsson 
2017), which indicates that sources are chosen based on the inter-
ests of different parties. Such controversy highlights fundamental 
uncertainties of ‘science-making’ and the problem of relying on 
evidence as a singular entity that can unanimously guide policy 
(see, e.g., Rhodes et al. 2019). In our different materials, cannabis 
appears fluid with multiple meanings. Consequently, the prob-
lems related to the substance become very different. For example, 
to the staff, the effects of cannabis on the brain were pivotal, 
while the adult users generally emphasized the punitive measures 
taken against them. A multitude of actors with different perspec-
tives and agendas are engaged with the problem, which in turn 
can introduce a variety of themes for discussion. With different 
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problematizations, various scientific results become relevant and 
these results are also negotiated in practice between professional 
opinions and political ideas that show ‘how evidence is made to 
work’ (Rhodes et al. 2019).
Following these considerations, we believe that cannabis should 
be seen as a matter of concern rather than as a matter of fact 
(Latour 2004); it encompasses a variety of voices and knowledge. 
There seems to be nothing fundamentally scientifically rational 
when Swedish politicians follow the prohibitionist tradition with-
out considering alternative, and increasingly endorsed, ways of 
controlling cannabis (see Goldberg 2021). But how are we then 
to combine and weigh different perspectives against each other? 
In line with Rhodes and Lancaster (2019), we find it relevant to 
seriously elucidate how evidence is made, put to use and made 
to matter. Simply stating that research shows that cannabis is 
dangerous and should therefore be prohibited becomes pointless 
when very diverse claims can be supported by scientific studies; 
cannabis is not merely a technical and a scientific problem but also 
a social and a political one. Such a complex issue requires com-
plex solutions. Another approach would be to take seriously and 
clarify how politics, ideology and science interact when societies 
define and solve drug problems (Bacchi 2018). Engaging with the 
uncertainty of what cannabis is, and taking different actors and 
their controversies seriously, might not establish a ‘truth’ about 
cannabis, but it can make the situation more intelligible and re-
veal aspects that were initially difficult to see (Callon, Lascoumes 
& Barthe 2009). It could result in our decision-makers feeling 
obliged to justify a continued focus on cannabis-using young peo-
ple and a continued criminalization of drug use with reference to 
sources other than research findings supporting this policy.
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12. Are the Nordic Countries 
at a Crossroads?
Henrik Tham
The question of how the drug policies of the Nordic countries 
will develop in the near future will be characterized by retreat or 
entrenchment, by decriminalization or continued penalization, by 
an increase or a decrease in police resources, and by more or less 
people in prison, will depend on both the historic development 
and the present situation. The existing drug policies constitute the 
starting point, and those policies have been historically created. 
The histories of the five countries, in terms of their drug policies, 
show both common and separate traits.
A common characteristic of the countries is the fact that they 
are all advanced welfare states. A number of features of the drug 
policies seem to be connected to welfare state ambitions. A clear 
trait is the tradition of care. No one should be left to her- or him-
self with serious problems but should be able to count on public 
help. This is shown by the public health system of all the countries. 
Even if the problems can be regarded as self-inflicted, a non-moral 
and social deterministic view would, in principle, characterize the 
Nordic welfare state.
Such an understanding of individual problems could be regard-
ed as humanistic but also as patriarchal. It has been claimed that 
welfare states in the Nordic countries act as parents in relation 
to citizens, showing care but also defining what the problem is 
and how it should be solved. Such an understanding could lead 
to a situation where the state doesn’t think that the subjects un-
derstand their problems properly and therefore need help, which 
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sometimes even needs to be provided by force (Smith & Ugelvik 
2017). The Nordic states have, in varying degrees, employed com-
pulsory care of people with problematic drug use. This side of the 
caring tradition could possibly lead to administrative sanctions re-
placing penal sanctions in a situation following decriminalization.
An analysis of the Swedish welfare state summaries the project 
as ‘putting life in order’ (Hirdman 2000). The state represents the 
highest reason. Rules are created for ‘how it should be’, thereby 
creating deviants. Critique of state interventions as violations of 
the private sphere would be countered with the argument that the 
problems of the individual are degrading and constitute the real 
violation, rather than the intervention to try to help the citizens 
(op. cit.: 229, 232). Translated into this context, state interference 
with drug consumption would be justified as being to the benefit 
of the drug user.
The Nordic welfare state is part of a strong reformist social 
democracy. Social democracy is neither libertarian, non-interven-
tionist, minimal state nor revolutionary striving for an entirely 
different system that is supposed to more or less immediately 
solve most problems. Its reformist character could even lead to an 
ambition to create social problems to have something to intervene 
against. Non-intervention would just seem alien in a welfare state 
context. The abolitionist demands of decriminalization and legal-
ization of drugs have been difficult to accept for politicians, civil 
servants and treatment personnel, and possibly also the general 
public in the Nordic countries.
The reformism of the welfare state can be interpreted as a most 
ambitious project to wipe out social problems. In an analysis of 
the drug policy of Sweden it has been claimed that the goal of the 
policy is ‘the clean home’ (Gould 1994). The Minister of Social 
Affairs even confirmed this indirectly in a response to this cri-
tique (Westerberg 1994). This understanding of the drug prob-
lem has also been demonstrated in Norway and Iceland by the 
official mottos of ‘a drug free society’. At the same time, howev-
er, it should be noted that this expression was directly refuted in 
Finland and was only recently being used politically in Denmark.
Another historic feature with possible relevance for the pres-
ent drug policy in the Nordic countries is the tradition from the 
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temperance movement. In the first part of the twentieth century, 
Finland, Iceland and Norway had alcohol prohibition. Sweden 
had a ration system, limiting the amount of alcohol that could be 
bought. Denmark, closer to continental culture, did not have these 
restrictions but tried to regulate alcohol consumption through 
high taxation. The four northern states clearly belonged to the 
‘Vodka-belt’. The climate made the growing of grapes for wine 
or hops for beer difficult. An alcohol culture based on distilled 
 beverages developed, with a drinking pattern with more detrimen-
tal effects (Lenke 1991). The heavy drinking led to the formation 
of strong temperance movements in the later part of the nine-
teenth century.
Different but connected effects of the tradition from the tem-
perance movements in four of the five countries could possibly 
be discerned. A central idea of the temperance movements was 
that weaker alcoholic beverages, beer, would likely lead to binge 
drinking of aqua vitae. This was the ‘stepping stone theory’ that 
inspired an alcohol policy that regarded beer drinking as risky 
and inappropriate (Lenke 1991). Places for drinking beer were 
not encouraged. Iceland did not permit beer until 1989. The cozy 
atmosphere of an English pub or a German Bierstube was hardly 
present in places for beer drinking and would be avoided by most 
respectable people in some of the countries.
The absolutist organizations in both the field of alcohol and 
drugs have joined together. The temperance movement has then 
transferred its traditions to the NGOs working against drugs. 
The zero-tolerance drug policy corresponds to the strict rule of 
non-drinking of the teetotalers. The strict stand also results in 
a resistance to mark a difference between ‘soft drugs’, beer and 
cannabis, and ‘hard drugs’, spirits and heroin. The fight against 
cannabis also became central in the drug policies, with its use in-
terpreted in the frame of it being a stepping stone requiring early 
intervention and not sending the right signals.
A possible further effect of the tradition from the temperance 
movement is a resistance to medical solutions to the drug problem. 
Solutions should be social rather than biological. This has mani-
fested itself initially in a resistance to syringe exchange and substi-
tution treatment. In the debate in Sweden about a  national syringe 
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exchange programme, the medical profession was in favour but 
the personnel in different types of therapeutic treatments were 
opposed (Tham 2005). The proposal for a national programme 
was first rejected but later accepted when syringe exchange was 
attached to treatment interventions.
The forces that have shaped the drug policies in the Nordic 
countries will still be active when the present policies are analyzed 
in a situation where several other countries are retreating from the 
war on drugs. The insight of the objective damage that the con-
sumption of drugs has caused will of course also be present. To 
sum up, the welfare state, the tradition of the temperance move-
ment and the observed results of heavy drug use all seem to have 
worked in the direction of a drug policy that will not promote 
a liberalization.
Whether or not there will be a change in the drug policies of 
the Nordic countries in a liberal direction will ultimately depend 
on the governments. Will the ruling parties propose decriminal-
ization, and is there a majority in Parliament for such reforms, 
and others, in the direction of liberalization of the drug policy? 
Denmark never went as far as the other countries in criminaliz-
ing drug consumption, but the sanctions for drug possession and 
dealing have, on the other hand, been strengthened. In Finland, 
both the Government and the political parties are divided on the 
question of decriminalization, but the Prime Minister and the ma-
jority of the Government Ministers are against it. In Iceland, a 
number of proposals for decriminalization have been presented 
but have so far been defeated in the Parliament. 
In early 2021, the Norwegian Government recommended a de-
criminalization of the use of drugs and minor possessions for own 
use to the Parliament. The parties in the Parliament were, how-
ever, divided on the issues and the proposal was defeated when 
the Social Democrats opposed the bill. Finally, the Swedish Social 
Democratic–Green Government is very clearly against decrimi-
nalization, but the Social Democratic youth-party has demand-
ed an evaluation of the criminalization of use of drugs. Some of 
the parties in Parliament take the same stand and in 2020, the 
Parliament demanded an evaluation of the Swedish drug policy.
The Police have been, and are, a central actor in the drug  policies 
of the Nordic countries, stressing the importance of penal law, 
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police resources and unconventional police measures. In Norway, 
the Drug Police Association has ‘occupied’ a large number of in-
ternet-sites in order to direct those searching for information to 
police perspectives. In Denmark, the Police were active in the cre-
ation of the ‘Pusher law’, which increased police powers (Frantzsen 
2005). Cases involving possession of illicit drugs have increased 
markedly in Denmark and likely indicate increased police activity. 
In Finland, the Police have influenced the penalty scales to al-
low them the possibility to carry out searches for suspected drug 
crimes. The special drug police in Iceland, often US-trained, have 
been quite active in describing the threat from drugs and demand-
ing increased resources and penal law expansions. The Swedish 
Police wrote their own drug policy manifesto and were quite ac-
tive in the demand for a legislative change that made the con-
trol of body liquid possible (Rikspolisstyrelsen 1989; Proposition 
1987/88:71: 88). The Swedish Drug Police Association has also 
been most active in spreading an alarmistic view on drugs and de-
manding more control through a journal, conferences, study-trips 
and collaboration with other similar associations, particularly in 
the USA (Svenska Narkotikapolisföreningen). How the Police 
in the different Nordic countries will react to proposals of decrim-
inalization, and even legalization, will be of central importance 
for the future development of the drug policies.
As said in the introductory chapter, the general criminal poli-
cy of the Nordic countries is relatively liberal in an international 
context, referred to as ‘Scandinavian exceptionalism’. The com-
paratively low prison populations and relatively decent standards 
of the prisons are still true. All the countries have, however, moved 
in the direction of a more law and order oriented criminal policy 
(Lappi-Seppälä 2016). In this development, ‘organized crime’ is 
increasingly referred to as a serious threat that has to be combat-
ted. The drug trade is pictured to be at the centre of organized 
crime, and increasingly the demand side is being put forward as 
the driving force of this. 
Finally, an open political and public debate of the risks of us-
ing drugs and the costs of controlling drugs seems difficult to 
establish. In principle, everyone agrees on the importance of an 
evidence-based drug policy. In the interviews in Sweden with 
treatment personnel and people undergoing treatment, both sides 
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referred to scientific ‘facts’ but came up with diametrically op-
posite conclusions. The ideological component of the drug issue 
seems quite strong. This circumstance has led social scientists to 
look for other explanations to ‘the war on drugs’. Alternative ex-
planations to a rational drug policy have been suggested in terms 
like ‘the good enemy’, ‘moral panic’, ‘outsiders’ and ‘national proj-
ects’. The ideological character of the drug issue could, in princi-
ple, lead policies in both a more and less restrictive direction. Thus 
far, however, it seems to primarily have prevented a more open 
debate on the pros and cons of the present drug policies.
Even though there are different circumstances pointing in the 
direction of status quo in the drug policies, there are also signs of 
liberalization and developments that seem to demand a change. 
That the debate about drug policies has escalated is quite clear in 
all the countries. One line of critique is the general lack of positive 
results of the drug policies pursued so far. The groups of problem-
atic drug users have not been shown to be reduced. The situation 
of marginalized people using drugs has repeatedly been reported 
as bad or even deteriorating. The living conditions of these groups 
is a central argument in the Norwegian report on drug policy and 
its proposal to move from control to help. All the countries have 
high death tolls that have become increasingly politically dis-
turbing. The Swedish Parliament has demanded zero-tolerance to 
drug-related deaths. Arguments that the high figures are the result 
of repressive drug policies are increasingly coming to the fore in 
the debate.
The tradition from the temperance movement might in this 
context have the potential of liberalizing policies. Iceland, Finland 
and Norway gave up on alcohol prohibition. Sweden abandoned 
the rationing system and reduced alcohol control measures in sev-
eral respects. The costs of control of prohibition and other regula-
tions became too large and the system was changed. In the present 
debate, comparisons between alcohol and drug policies are also 
frequently made in the Nordic countries by those who demand a 
policy that is less based on punishment.
There is also the market. The analysis in this book of Swedish 
alcohol policy showed how the country had to adopt to the 
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prices and the availability of alcohol, both in order to prevent 
smuggling and so as not to lose tax revenues. If continental 
European states should start to legalize cannabis and the prices 
were attractive, the Nordic countries would find themselves fac-
ing the same problems as with the smuggling of alcohol during 
prohibition or when preventing present-day smuggling of cheap 
alcohol into the countries. The future drug policies of the Nordic 
countries will unavoidably be influenced by developments in oth-
er European countries.
The attitudes towards using drugs are partly a question of gen-
eration. Young people are relatively more liberal. In both Finland 
and Sweden, the political youth parties are mainly in favour of 
decriminalization of the use of drugs. This change in attitudes 
could be linked to an increased awareness of human rights. Such 
a development is reported from Finland. A drug policy strongly 
based on penal law will force the police to take action against the 
young, which will inevitably lead to feelings of injustice among 
those who are the targets of police interventions. This also links 
in with the emerging critique of stop and search in several Western 
countries, which, to a high degree, is justified by the suspicion of 
the use of drugs. Police practice in the field of drugs becomes in-
tertwined with issues of class and ethnicity, with the potential to 
challenge politics in wider areas.
The Nordic countries have a tradition of harmonization of 
penal legislation. As mentioned, this has led to an expansion 
of penal law in the field of drugs where the countries have referred 
to each other for the need of strengthening the threat of pun-
ishment. At the same time, however, the drug policies of the five 
countries are partly different, and the political debate might lead 
to increased differences. Already today, people who have smoked 
cannabis in Denmark have later been sentenced for the use of drugs 
in Sweden when traces have been found in urine tests. Apart from 
the problem of not following the principle of double criminaliza-
tion, this praxis might cause further strain between the countries if 
the use of drugs is decriminalized in some countries but could still 
lead to a sentence in another through the use of drug tests. The tra-
dition of harmonization then might work in the opposite direction.
300 Retreat or Entrenchment?
All in all, the most likely prognosis is that there will be a change 
in the drug policy of the Nordic countries. A move in the direc-
tion of less use of penal law and criminal justice seems to be 
 unavoidable considering the development in other countries. In 
addition, the criminal justice approach to drug prevention in the 
Nordic countries does not seem to have been effective.
In the political debate to target groups that use drugs, two ide-
al types can possibly be discerned: the user and the abuser. This 
distinction corresponds to dichotomies used more generally in 
the analysis of norm-breaking behaviour. Should the deviant be 
regarded as criminal or sick (Aubert 1968), as villain or wretch 
(Sahlin 1994)? That the two categories do not necessarily corre-
spond to a punitive or non-punitive policy has been stressed in 
this book. The drug user is also alternately pictured as a victim 
and a perpetrator. The dividing line between these is not clear-cut 
but rather a continuous variable. Nevertheless, the dichotomy can 
be used for analytic purposes.
The dependent and marginalized drug consumer who does not 
seem to gain illegitimately from his or her behaviour would not 
have to be criminalized. Consumption and the possession of small 
amounts of drugs for personal use doesn’t have to be the con-
cern of the criminal justice system. The drug-abuser could instead 
be the object of care and treatment, being granted help within 
a comprehensive public service system. Even the advocates of a 
zero-tolerance drug policy would today argue for more treatment 
resources. This is also in line with general welfare state ideology. 
A public health perspective, which is increasingly being referred 
to in the Nordic countries, could also justify harm reduction mea-
sures but without using that concept.
The question then is what policy a welfare and public health 
perspective implies for the temporary or recreational user. In the 
proposal for decriminalization that has been presented to 
the Norwegian Parliament it is the abuser, not the user, that 
is the object of the reform. A decriminalization of use and the 
possession of small amounts, which would be of benefit for 
the long-time drug-abuser, would legally also apply to the occa-
sional well-adapted drug user. Here, some of the Nordic countries 
seem to take another stand. The arguments against decriminaliza-
tion seem to follow two lines.
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The first line of argument is that young people have to be protect-
ed. To not decriminalize will then be argued from the  perspective 
of public health. How valid such a line of reasoning is can be dis-
cussed. Children who use drugs can be the object of intervention 
from the social services in the same way as when they use alcohol, 
which is not illegal. That drug use has been criminalized to such 
a high extent depends, according to Christie and Bruun (1985), 
on the fact that it is used by young and powerless people in a 
way that would not be possible for alcohol consumers. Also an 
issue here is the effect of a continuous criminalization. When an 
increasing number of young people are using drugs  recreationally 
there is the risk, if the deterrent effect doesn’t work, that the num-
ber that will be labelled as criminals will increase. A continued 
criminalization of drugs, both in the law and in  practice, will also 
pose an increasing risk of creating tensions along age, class and 
ethnic lines.
The second line of argument is that the users will have to 
be controlled by criminalization, since they are the cause of 
drug-abuse, organized crime and deaths. This is the argument 
in Denmark, where a dual-track system differentiates between 
those with a problematic use of drugs, who receive help, and 
the recreational user, who is increasingly criminalized. The ar-
gument that the well-adapted user is a pre-requisite for the 
organized crime and gang-related shootings is increasingly 
voiced by politicians. In Sweden, the high and rising numbers of 
drug-related deaths are linked to the policies aimed at prevent-
ing first-time drug use. By upholding a zero-tolerance policy and 
preventing children and young people from using drugs, it is 
argued – without any empirical support – that fewer people will 
die from drug use (Proposition 2020/21:121, s. 65). An inter-
national quest for a more humanitarian drug policy will, in the 
Nordic countries, not necessarily change the situation for the rec-
reational user.
The changes in the surrounding world will influence the drug 
policies of the Nordic countries. The public and political debate 
have, in just a few years, markedly opened up. Making a retreat is, 
however, not that easy. Beliefs, ideologies and vested interests can 
be quite resistant. The Nordic countries stand at a crossroads, but 
what new roads will be taken is far from clear.
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The drug policies of the Nordic countries have been relatively strict. 
Since this seems to contradict the internationally recognized 
liberal criminal policy in general, analyses have been devoted to try 
to understand this gap. The new question in relation to drug policy 
is, however, if and how the Nordic countries will adapt to a new 
situation when several countries all over the world are questioning 
‘the war on drugs’ and orienting themselves in the direction of 
decriminalization and legalization.
The Nordic project on the possible change in drug policies tries to 
answer, or at least illuminate, different questions, such as: What 
signs are there of changing drug policies in the direction of the 
reduced use of penal law? What arguments are used in the public 
discourse to challenge earlier policies? What obstacles are there 
to change in terms of justifications, fears and actors?
The volume is of interest to anyone who is engaged, practically, 
politically or intellectually, in the question of drug policy in a 
situation where the scenes are changing quickly.
The 14 authors from the five Nordic countries have great experi-
ence in conducting research in the field of drug policy and repre-
sent different disciplines: criminology, sociology, social work, his-
tory and law.
